Immanuel Kant - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Immanuel Kant was born April 22, 1724 in Königsberg, near the southeastern shore of the Baltic Sea. Today Königsberg has been renamed ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop ImmanuelKantFirstpublishedThuMay20,2010;substantiverevisionTueJul28,2020 ImmanuelKant(1724–1804)isthecentralfigureinmodern philosophy.Hesynthesizedearlymodernrationalismandempiricism, setthetermsformuchofnineteenthandtwentiethcenturyphilosophy, andcontinuestoexerciseasignificantinfluencetodayin metaphysics,epistemology,ethics,politicalphilosophy,aesthetics, andotherfields.ThefundamentalideaofKant’s“critical philosophy”–especiallyinhisthreeCritiques:the CritiqueofPureReason(1781,1787),theCritiqueofPracticalReason (1788),andtheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment(1790)–is humanautonomy.Hearguesthatthehumanunderstandingisthesource ofthegenerallawsofnaturethatstructureallourexperience;and thathumanreasongivesitselfthemorallaw,whichisourbasisfor beliefinGod,freedom,andimmortality.Therefore,scientific knowledge,morality,andreligiousbeliefaremutuallyconsistentand securebecausetheyallrestonthesamefoundationofhumanautonomy, whichisalsothefinalendofnatureaccordingtotheteleological worldviewofreflectingjudgmentthatKantintroducestounifythe theoreticalandpracticalpartsofhisphilosophicalsystem. 1.Lifeandworks 2.Kant’sprojectintheCritiqueofPureReason 2.1ThecrisisoftheEnlightenment 2.2Kant’sCopernicanrevolutioninphilosophy 3.Transcendentalidealism 3.1Thetwo-objectsinterpretation 3.2Thetwo-aspectsinterpretation 4.Thetranscendentaldeduction 4.1Self-consciousness 4.2Objectivityandjudgment 4.3Thelaw-giverofnature 5.Moralityandfreedom 5.1Theoreticalandpracticalautonomy 5.2Freedom 5.3Thefactofreason 5.4Thecategoricalimperative 6.Thehighestgoodandpracticalpostulates 6.1Thehighestgood 6.2Thepostulatesofpurepracticalreason 7.Theunityofnatureandfreedom 7.1Thegreatchasm 7.2Thepurposivenessofnature Bibliography PrimaryLiterature SecondaryLiterature AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.Lifeandworks ImmanuelKantwasbornApril22,1724inKönigsberg,nearthe southeasternshoreoftheBalticSea.TodayKönigsberghasbeen renamedKaliningradandispartofRussia.ButduringKant’slifetime KönigsbergwasthecapitalofEastPrussia,anditsdominant languagewasGerman.Thoughgeographicallyremotefromtherestof PrussiaandotherGermancities,Königsbergwasthenamajor commercialcenter,animportantmilitaryport,andarelatively cosmopolitanuniversity town.[1] Kantwasbornintoanartisanfamilyofmodestmeans.Hisfatherwas amasterharnessmaker,andhismotherwasthedaughterofaharness maker,thoughshewasbettereducatedthanmostwomenofhersocial class.Kant’sfamilywasneverdestitute,buthisfather’stradewasin declineduringKant’syouthandhisparentsattimeshadtorelyon extendedfamilyforfinancialsupport. Kant’sparentswerePietistandheattendedaPietistschool,the CollegiumFridericianum,fromageseightthroughfifteen.Pietismwas anevangelicalLutheranmovementthatemphasizedconversion,reliance ondivinegrace,theexperienceofreligiousemotions,andpersonal devotioninvolvingregularBiblestudy,prayer,and introspection.Kantreactedstronglyagainsttheforcedsoul-searching towhichhewassubjectedattheCollegiumFridericianum,inresponse towhichhesoughtrefugeintheLatinclassics,whichwerecentralto theschool’scurriculum.LaterthematureKant’semphasisonreason andautonomy,ratherthanemotionanddependenceoneitherauthority orgrace,mayinpartreflecthisyouthfulreactionagainst Pietism.ButalthoughtheyoungKantloathedhisPietistschooling,he haddeeprespectandadmirationforhisparents,especiallyhis mother,whose“genuinereligiosity”hedescribedas “notatallenthusiastic.”Accordingtohisbiographer, ManfredKuehn,Kant’sparentsprobablyinfluencedhimmuchless throughtheirPietismthanthroughtheirartisanvaluesof“hard work,honesty,cleanliness,andindependence,”whichtheytaught himbyexample.[2] KantattendedcollegeattheUniversityofKönigsberg,knownas theAlbertina,wherehisearlyinterestinclassicswasquickly supersededbyphilosophy,whichallfirstyearstudentsstudiedand whichencompassedmathematicsandphysicsaswellaslogic, metaphysics,ethics,andnaturallaw.Kant’sphilosophyprofessors exposedhimtotheapproachofChristianWolff(1679–1750),whose criticalsynthesisofthephilosophyofG.W.Leibniz(1646–1716)was thenveryinfluentialinGermanuniversities.ButKantwasalsoexposed toarangeofGermanandBritishcriticsofWolff,andtherewere strongdosesofAristotelianismandPietismrepresentedinthe philosophyfacultyaswell.Kant’sfavoriteteacherwasMartinKnutzen (1713–1751),aPietistwhowasheavilyinfluencedbybothWolffandthe EnglishphilosopherJohnLocke(1632–1704).KnutzenintroducedKantto theworkofIsaacNewton(1642–1727),andhisinfluenceisvisiblein Kant’sfirstpublishedwork,ThoughtsontheTrueEstimationofLiving Forces(1747),whichwasacriticalattempttomediateadisputein naturalphilosophybetweenLeibniziansandNewtoniansovertheproper measurementofforce. AftercollegeKantspentsixyearsasaprivatetutortoyoungchildren outsideKönigsberg.Bythistimebothofhisparentshaddiedand Kant’sfinanceswerenotyetsecureenoughforhimtopursuean academiccareer.HefinallyreturnedtoKönigsbergin1754and beganteachingattheAlbertinathefollowingyear.Forthenextfour decadesKanttaughtphilosophythere,untilhisretirementfrom teachingin1796attheageofseventy-two. Kanthadaburstofpublishingactivityintheyearsafterhereturned fromworkingasaprivatetutor.In1754and1755hepublishedthree scientificworks–oneofwhich,UniversalNaturalHistoryandTheory oftheHeavens(1755),wasamajorbookinwhich,amongotherthings, hedevelopedwhatlaterbecameknownasthenebularhypothesisabout theformationofthesolarsystem.Unfortunately,theprinterwent bankruptandthebookhadlittleimmediateimpact.Tosecure qualificationsforteachingattheuniversity,Kantalsowrotetwo Latindissertations:thefirst,entitledConciseOutlineofSome ReflectionsonFire(1755),earnedhimtheMagisterdegree;andthe second,NewElucidationoftheFirstPrinciplesofMetaphysical Cognition(1755),entitledhimtoteachasanunsalariedlecturer.The followingyearhepublishedanotherLatinwork,TheEmploymentin NaturalPhilosophyofMetaphysicsCombinedwithGeometry,ofWhich SampleIContainsthePhysicalMonadology(1756),inhopesof succeedingKnutzenasassociateprofessoroflogicandmetaphysics, thoughKantfailedtosecurethisposition.BoththeNewElucidation, whichwasKant’sfirstworkconcernedmainlywithmetaphysics,andthe PhysicalMonadologyfurtherdevelopthepositionontheinteractionof finitesubstancesthathefirstoutlinedinLivingForces.Bothworks departfromLeibniz-Wolffianviews,thoughnotradically.TheNew ElucidationinparticularshowstheinfluenceofChristianAugust Crusius(1715–1775),aGermancriticof Wolff.[3] AsanunsalariedlecturerattheAlbertinaKantwaspaiddirectlyby thestudentswhoattendedhislectures,soheneededtoteachan enormousamountandtoattractmanystudentsinordertoearnaliving. Kantheldthispositionfrom1755to1770,duringwhichperiodhewould lectureanaverageoftwentyhoursperweekonlogic,metaphysics,and ethics,aswellasmathematics,physics,andphysicalgeography.Inhis lecturesKantusedtextbooksbyWolffianauthorssuchasAlexander GottliebBaumgarten(1714–1762)andGeorgFriedrichMeier(1718–1777), buthefollowedthemlooselyandusedthemtostructurehisown reflections,whichdrewonawiderangeofideasofcontemporary interest.TheseideasoftenstemmedfromBritishsentimentalist philosopherssuchasDavidHume(1711–1776)andFrancisHutcheson (1694–1747),someofwhosetextsweretranslatedintoGermaninthe mid-1750s;andfromtheSwissphilosopherJean-JacquesRousseau (1712–1778),whopublishedaflurryofworksintheearly1760s.From earlyinhiscareerKantwasapopularandsuccessfullecturer.Healso quicklydevelopedalocalreputationasapromisingyoungintellectual andcutadashingfigureinKönigsbergsociety. Afterseveralyearsofrelativequiet,Kantunleashedanotherburstof publicationsin1762–1764,includingfivephilosophicalworks.The FalseSubtletyoftheFourSyllogisticFigures(1762)rehearses criticismsofAristotelianlogicthatweredevelopedbyotherGerman philosophers.TheOnlyPossibleArgumentinSupportofaDemonstration oftheExistenceofGod(1762–3)isamajorbookinwhichKantdrewon hisearlierworkinUniversalHistoryandNewElucidationtodevelopan originalargumentforGod’sexistenceasaconditionoftheinternal possibilityofallthings,whilecriticizingotherargumentsforGod’s existence.Thebookattractedseveralpositiveandsomenegative reviews.In1762KantalsosubmittedanessayentitledInquiry ConcerningtheDistinctnessofthePrinciplesofNaturalTheologyand MoralitytoaprizecompetitionbythePrussianRoyalAcademy,though Kant’ssubmissiontooksecondprizetoMosesMendelssohn’swinning essay(andwaspublishedwithitin1764).Kant’sPrizeEssay,asitis known,departsmoresignificantlyfromLeibniz-Wolffianviewsthanhis earlierworkandalsocontainshisfirstextendeddiscussionofmoral philosophyinprint.ThePrizeEssaydrawsonBritishsourcesto criticizeGermanrationalismintworespects:first,drawingonNewton, Kantdistinguishesbetweenthemethodsofmathematicsandphilosophy; andsecond,drawingonHutcheson,heclaimsthat“anunanalysable feelingofthegood”suppliesthematerialcontentofourmoral obligations,whichcannotbedemonstratedinapurelyintellectualway fromtheformalprincipleofperfectionalone (2:299).[4] Thesethemes reappearintheAttempttoIntroducetheConceptofNegativeMagnitudes intoPhilosophy(1763),whosemainthesis,however,isthatthereal oppositionofconflictingforces,asincausalrelations,isnot reducibletothelogicalrelationofcontradiction,asLeibnizians held.InNegativeMagnitudesKantalsoarguesthatthemoralityofan actionisafunctionoftheinternalforcesthatmotivateonetoact, ratherthanoftheexternal(physical)actionsortheirconsequences. Finally,ObservationsontheFeelingoftheBeautifulandtheSublime (1764)dealsmainlywithallegeddifferencesinthetastesofmenand womenandofpeoplefromdifferentcultures.Afteritwaspublished, Kantfilledhisowninterleavedcopyofthisbookwith(often unrelated)handwrittenremarks,manyofwhichreflectthedeep influenceofRousseauonhisthinkingaboutmoralphilosophyinthe mid-1760s. TheseworkshelpedtosecureKantabroaderreputationinGermany,but forthemostparttheywerenotstrikinglyoriginal.LikeotherGerman philosophersatthetime,Kant’searlyworksaregenerallyconcerned withusinginsightsfromBritishempiricistauthorstoreformor broadentheGermanrationalisttraditionwithoutradicallyundermining itsfoundations.Whilesomeofhisearlyworkstendtoemphasize rationalistideas,othershaveamoreempiricistemphasis.Duringthis timeKantwasstrivingtoworkoutanindependentposition,butbefore the1770shisviewsremainedfluid. In1766Kantpublishedhisfirstworkconcernedwiththepossibilityof metaphysics,whichlaterbecameacentraltopicofhismature philosophy.DreamsofaSpirit-SeerElucidatedbyDreamsof Metaphysics,whichhewrotesoonafterpublishingashortEssayon MaladiesoftheMind(1764),wasoccasionedbyKant’sfascinationwith theSwedishvisionaryEmanuelSwedenborg(1688–1772),whoclaimedto haveinsightintoaspiritworldthatenabledhimtomakeaseriesof apparentlymiraculouspredictions.InthiscuriousworkKant satiricallycomparesSwedenborg’sspirit-visionstothebeliefof rationalistmetaphysiciansinanimmaterialsoulthatsurvivesdeath, andheconcludesthatphilosophicalknowledgeofeitherisimpossible becausehumanreasonislimitedtoexperience.Theskepticaltoneof Dreamsistempered,however,byKant’ssuggestionthat“moralfaith” neverthelesssupportsbeliefinanimmaterialandimmortalsoul,even ifitisnotpossibletoattainmetaphysicalknowledgeinthisdomain (2:373). In1770,attheageofforty-six,Kantwasappointedtothechairin logicandmetaphysicsattheAlbertina,afterteachingforfifteen yearsasanunsalariedlecturerandworkingsince1766asa sublibrariantosupplementhisincome.Kantwasturneddownforthe samepositionin1758.Butlater,ashisreputationgrew,hedeclined chairsinphilosophyatErlangen(1769)andJena(1770)inhopesof obtainingoneinKönigsberg.AfterKantwasfinallypromoted,he graduallyextendedhisrepertoireoflecturestoincludeanthropology (Kant’swasthefirstsuchcourseinGermanyandbecameverypopular), rationaltheology,pedagogy,naturalright,andevenmineralogyand militaryfortifications.Inordertoinauguratehisnewposition,Kant alsowroteonemoreLatindissertation:ConcerningtheFormand PrinciplesoftheSensibleandIntelligibleWorld(1770),whichis knownastheInauguralDissertation. TheInauguralDissertationdepartsmoreradicallyfrombothWolffian rationalismandBritishsentimentalismthanKant’searlierwork. InspiredbyCrusiusandtheSwissnaturalphilosopherJohannHeinrich Lambert(1728–1777),Kantdistinguishesbetweentwofundamental powersofcognition,sensibilityandunderstanding(intelligence), wheretheLeibniz-Wolffiansregardedunderstanding(intellect)asthe onlyfundamentalpower.Kantthereforerejectstherationalistview thatsensibilityisonlyaconfusedspeciesofintellectualcognition, andhereplacesthiswithhisownviewthatsensibilityisdistinct fromunderstandingandbringstoperceptionitsownsubjectiveforms ofspaceandtime–aviewthatdevelopedoutofKant’searlier criticismofLeibniz’srelationalviewofspaceinConcerningthe UltimateGroundoftheDifferentiationofDirectionsinSpace(1768). Moreover,asthetitleoftheInauguralDissertationindicates,Kant arguesthatsensibilityandunderstandingaredirectedattwo differentworlds:sensibilitygivesusaccesstothesensibleworld, whileunderstandingenablesustograspadistinctintelligible world.Thesetwoworldsarerelatedinthatwhattheunderstanding graspsintheintelligibleworldisthe“paradigm”of “NOUMENALPERFECTION,”whichis“acommonmeasure forallotherthingsinsofarastheyarerealities.” Consideredtheoretically,thisintelligibleparadigmofperfectionis God;consideredpractically,itis“MORALPERFECTION” (2:396).TheInauguralDissertationthusdevelopsaformofPlatonism; anditrejectstheviewofBritishsentimentaliststhatmoral judgmentsarebasedonfeelingsofpleasureorpain,sinceKantnow holdsthatmoraljudgmentsarebasedonpureunderstandingalone. After1770Kantneversurrenderedtheviewsthatsensibilityand understandingaredistinctpowersofcognition,thatspaceandtimeare subjectiveformsofhumansensibility,andthatmoraljudgmentsare basedonpureunderstanding(orreason)alone.Buthisembraceof PlatonismintheInauguralDissertationwasshort-lived.Hesoondenied thatourunderstandingiscapableofinsightintoanintelligible world,whichclearedthepathtowardhismaturepositioninthe CritiqueofPureReason(1781),accordingtowhichtheunderstanding (likesensibility)suppliesformsthatstructureourexperienceofthe sensibleworld,towhichhumanknowledgeislimited,whilethe intelligible(ornoumenal)worldisstrictlyunknowabletous.Kant spentadecadeworkingontheCritiqueofPureReasonandpublished nothingelseofsignificancebetween1770and1781.Butitspublication markedthebeginningofanotherburstofactivitythatproducedKant’s mostimportantandenduringworks.Becauseearlyreviewsofthe CritiqueofPureReasonwerefewand(inKant’sjudgment) uncomprehending,hetriedtoclarifyitsmainpointsinthemuch shorterProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysicsThatWillBeAbletoCome ForwardasaScience(1783).Amongthemajorbooksthatrapidly followedaretheGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals(1785),Kant’s mainworkonthefundamentalprincipleofmorality;theMetaphysical FoundationsofNaturalScience(1786),hismainworkonnatural philosophyinwhatscholarscallhiscriticalperiod(1781–1798);the secondandsubstantiallyrevisededitionoftheCritiqueofPureReason (1787);theCritiqueofPracticalReason(1788),afullerdiscussionof topicsinmoralphilosophythatbuildson(andinsomewaysrevises) theGroundwork;andtheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment(1790),which dealswithaestheticsandteleology.Kantalsopublishedanumberof importantessaysinthisperiod,includingIdeaforaUniversalHistory WithaCosmopolitanAim(1784)andConjecturalBeginningofHuman History(1786),hismaincontributionstothephilosophyofhistory;An AnswertotheQuestion:WhatisEnlightenment?(1784),whichbroaches someofthekeyideasofhislaterpoliticalessays;andWhatDoesit MeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?(1786),Kant’sinterventioninthe pantheismcontroversythatragedinGermanintellectualcirclesafter F.H.Jacobi(1743–1819)accusedtherecentlydeceasedG.E.Lessing (1729–1781)ofSpinozism. WiththeseworksKantsecuredinternationalfameandcametodominate Germanphilosophyinthelate1780s.Butin1790heannouncedthatthe CritiqueofthePowerofJudgmentbroughthiscriticalenterprisetoan end(5:170).BythenK.L.Reinhold(1758–1823),whoseLettersonthe KantianPhilosophy(1786)popularizedKant’smoralandreligiousideas, hadbeeninstalled(in1787)inachairdevotedtoKantianphilosophy atJena,whichwasmorecentrallylocatedthanKönigsbergand rapidlydevelopingintothefocalpointofthenextphaseinGerman intellectualhistory.Reinholdsoonbegantocriticizeandmoveaway fromKant’sviews.In1794hischairatJenapassedtoJ.G.Fichte, whohadvisitedthemasterinKönigsbergandwhosefirstbook, AttemptataCritiqueofAllRevelation(1792),waspublished anonymouslyandinitiallymistakenforaworkbyKanthimself.This catapultedFichtetofame,butsoonhetoomovedawayfromKantand developedanoriginalpositionquiteatoddswithKant’s,whichKant finallyrepudiatedpubliclyin1799(12:370–371).YetwhileGerman philosophymovedontoassessandrespondtoKant’slegacy,Kant himselfcontinuedpublishingimportantworksinthe1790s.Amongthese areReligionWithintheBoundariesofMereReason(1793),whichdrewa censurefromthePrussianKingwhenKantpublishedthebookafterits secondessaywasrejectedbythecensor;TheConflictoftheFaculties (1798),acollectionofessaysinspiredbyKant’stroubleswiththe censoranddealingwiththerelationshipbetweenthephilosophicaland theologicalfacultiesoftheuniversity;OntheCommonSaying:ThatMay beCorrectinTheory,ButitisofNoUseinPractice(1793),Toward PerpetualPeace(1795),andtheDoctrineofRight,thefirstpartof TheMetaphysicsofMorals(1797),Kant’smainworksinpolitical philosophy;theDoctrineofVirtue,thesecondpartofTheMetaphysics ofMorals(1797),Kant’smostmatureworkinmoralphilosophy,whichhehadbeenplanningfor morethanthirtyyears;andAnthropologyFromaPragmaticPointofView (1798),basedonKant’santhropologylectures.Severalother compilationsofKant’slecturenotesfromothercourseswerepublished later,butthesewerenotpreparedbyKanthimself. Kantretiredfromteachingin1796.Fornearlytwodecadeshehadlived ahighlydisciplinedlifefocusedprimarilyoncompletinghis philosophicalsystem,whichbegantotakedefiniteshapeinhismind onlyinmiddleage.Afterretiringhecametobelievethattherewasa gapinthissystemseparatingthemetaphysicalfoundationsofnatural sciencefromphysicsitself,andhesetouttoclosethisgapina seriesofnotesthatpostulatetheexistenceofanetherorcaloric matter.Thesenotes,knownastheOpusPostumum,remainedunfinished andunpublishedinKant’slifetime,andscholarsdisagreeontheir significanceandrelationtohisearlierwork.Itisclear,however, thatsomeoftheselatenotesshowunmistakablesignsofKant’smentaldecline, whichbecametragicallyprecipitousaround1800.KantdiedFebruary12, 1804,justshortofhiseightiethbirthday. 2.Kant’sprojectintheCritiqueofPureReason ThemaintopicoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisthepossibilityof metaphysics,understoodinaspecificway.Kantdefinesmetaphysicsin termsof“thecognitionsafterwhichreasonmightstrive independentlyofallexperience,”andhisgoalinthebookisto reacha“decisionaboutthepossibilityorimpossibilityofa metaphysicsingeneral,andthedeterminationofitssources,aswell asitsextentandboundaries,all,however,fromprinciples” (Axii.SeealsoBxiv;and4:255–257).ThusmetaphysicsforKant concernsaprioriknowledge,orknowledgewhosejustificationdoesnot dependonexperience;andheassociatesaprioriknowledgewithreason. TheprojectoftheCritiqueistoexaminewhether,how,andtowhat extenthumanreasoniscapableofaprioriknowledge. 2.1ThecrisisoftheEnlightenment TounderstandtheprojectoftheCritiquebetter,letusconsider thehistoricalandintellectualcontextinwhichitwas written.[5] Kantwrotethe CritiquetowardtheendoftheEnlightenment,whichwastheninastate ofcrisis.Hindsightenablesustoseethatthe1780’swasa transitionaldecadeinwhichtheculturalbalanceshifteddecisively awayfromtheEnlightenmenttowardRomanticism,butKantdid nothavethebenefitofsuchhindsight. TheEnlightenmentwasareactiontotheriseandsuccessesofmodern scienceinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Thespectacular achievementsofNewtoninparticularengenderedwidespreadconfidence andoptimismaboutthepowerofhumanreasontocontrolnatureandto improvehumanlife.Oneeffectofthisnewconfidenceinreasonwas thattraditionalauthoritieswereincreasinglyquestioned.Why shouldweneedpoliticalorreligiousauthoritiestotellushowto liveorwhattobelieve,ifeachofushasthecapacitytofigurethese thingsoutforourselves?KantexpressesthisEnlightenmentcommitment tothesovereigntyofreasonintheCritique: Ourageistheageofcriticism,towhicheverythingmustsubmit. Religionthroughitsholinessandlegislationthroughitsmajesty commonlyseektoexemptthemselvesfromit.Butinthiswaytheyexcite ajustsuspicionagainstthemselves,andcannotlayclaimtothat unfeignedrespectthatreasongrantsonlytothatwhichhasbeenable towithstanditsfreeandpublicexamination.(Axi) Enlightenmentisaboutthinkingforoneselfratherthanlettingothers thinkforyou,accordingtoWhatisEnlightenment?(8:35).Inthis essay,KantalsoexpressestheEnlightenmentfaithintheinevitability ofprogress.Afewindependentthinkerswillgraduallyinspirea broaderculturalmovement,whichultimatelywillleadtogreater freedomofactionandgovernmentalreform.Acultureofenlightenment is“almostinevitable”ifonlythereis“freedomtomakepublicuseof one’sreasoninallmatters”(8:36). Theproblemisthattosomeitseemedunclearwhetherprogresswouldin factensueifreasonenjoyedfullsovereigntyovertraditional authorities;orwhetherunaidedreasoningwouldinsteadleadstraight tomaterialism,fatalism,atheism,skepticism(Bxxxiv),oreven libertinismandauthoritarianism(8:146).TheEnlightenmentcommitment tothesovereigntyofreasonwastiedtotheexpectationthatitwould notleadtoanyoftheseconsequencesbutinsteadwouldsupportcertain keybeliefsthattraditionhadalwayssanctioned.Crucially,these includedbeliefinGod,thesoul,freedom,andthecompatibilityof sciencewithmoralityandreligion.Althoughafewintellectuals rejectedsomeorallofthesebeliefs,thegeneralspiritofthe Enlightenmentwasnotsoradical.TheEnlightenmentwasaboutreplacing traditionalauthoritieswiththeauthorityofindividualhumanreason, butitwasnotaboutoverturningtraditionalmoralandreligious beliefs. YettheoriginalinspirationfortheEnlightenmentwasthenewphysics, whichwasmechanistic.Ifnatureisentirelygovernedbymechanistic, causallaws,thenitmayseemthatthereisnoroomforfreedom,a soul,oranythingbutmatterinmotion.Thisthreatenedthetraditional viewthatmoralityrequiresfreedom.Wemustbefreeinordertochoose whatisrightoverwhatiswrong,becauseotherwisewecannotbeheld responsible.Italsothreatenedthetraditionalreligiousbeliefina soulthatcansurvivedeathorberesurrectedinanafterlife.So modernscience,theprideoftheEnlightenment,thesourceofits optimismaboutthepowersofhumanreason,threatenedtoundermine traditionalmoralandreligiousbeliefsthatfreerationalthoughtwas expectedtosupport.Thiswasthemainintellectualcrisisofthe Enlightenment. TheCritiqueofPureReasonisKant’sresponsetothiscrisis.Itsmain topicismetaphysicsbecause,forKant,metaphysicsisthedomainof reason–itis“theinventoryofallwepossessthroughpure reason,orderedsystematically”(Axx)–andtheauthorityof reasonwasinquestion.Kant’smaingoalistoshowthatacritiqueof reasonbyreasonitself,unaidedandunrestrainedbytraditional authorities,establishesasecureandconsistentbasisforboth Newtonianscienceandtraditionalmoralityandreligion.Inother words,freerationalinquiryadequatelysupportsalloftheseessential humaninterestsandshowsthemtobemutuallyconsistent.Soreason deservesthesovereigntyattributedtoitbytheEnlightenment. 2.2Kant’sCopernicanrevolutioninphilosophy ToseehowKantattemptstoachievethisgoalintheCritique,it helpstoreflectonhisgroundsforrejectingthePlatonismofthe InauguralDissertation.TheInauguralDissertationalsotries toreconcileNewtoniansciencewithtraditionalmoralityandreligioninaway, butitsstrategyisdifferentfromthatoftheCritique.Accordingto theInauguralDissertation,Newtonianscienceistrueofthesensible world,towhichsensibilitygivesusaccess;andtheunderstanding graspsprinciplesofdivineandmoralperfectioninadistinct intelligibleworld,whichareparadigmsformeasuringeverythinginthe sensibleworld.Soonthisviewourknowledgeoftheintelligibleworld isaprioribecauseitdoesnotdependonsensibility,andthisa prioriknowledgefurnishesprinciplesforjudgingthesensibleworld becauseinsomewaythesensibleworlditselfconformstoorimitates theintelligibleworld. SoonafterwritingtheInauguralDissertation,however,Kantexpressed doubtsaboutthisview.AsheexplainedinaFebruary21,1772letter tohisfriendandformerstudent,MarcusHerz: InmydissertationIwascontenttoexplainthenatureof intellectualrepresentationsinamerelynegativeway,namely,tostate thattheywerenotmodificationsofthesoulbroughtaboutbythe object.However,Isilentlypassedoverthefurtherquestionofhowa representationthatreferstoanobjectwithoutbeinginanyway affectedbyitcanbepossible….[B]ywhatmeansarethese [intellectualrepresentations]giventous,ifnotbythewayinwhich theyaffectus?Andifsuchintellectualrepresentationsdependonour inneractivity,whencecomestheagreementthattheyaresupposedto havewithobjects–objectsthatareneverthelessnotpossibly producedthereby?…[A]stohowmyunderstandingmayformforitself conceptsofthingscompletelyapriori,withwhichconceptsthethings mustnecessarilyagree,andastohowmyunderstandingmayformulate realprinciplesconcerningthepossibilityofsuchconcepts,withwhich principlesexperiencemustbeinexactagreementandwhichnevertheless areindependentofexperience–thisquestion,ofhowthefaculty ofunderstandingachievesthisconformitywiththethingsthemselves, isstillleftinastateofobscurity.(10:130–131) HereKantentertainsdoubtsabouthowaprioriknowledgeofan intelligibleworldwouldbepossible.ThepositionoftheInaugural Dissertationisthattheintelligibleworldisindependentofthehuman understandingandofthesensibleworld,bothofwhich(indifferent ways)conformtotheintelligibleworld.But,leavingasidequestions aboutwhatitmeansforthesensibleworldtoconformtoan intelligibleworld,howisitpossibleforthehumanunderstandingto conformtoorgraspanintelligibleworld?Iftheintelligibleworldis independentofourunderstanding,thenitseemsthatwecouldgraspit onlyifwearepassivelyaffectedbyitinsomeway.ButforKant sensibilityisourpassiveorreceptivecapacitytobeaffectedby objectsthatareindependentofus(2:392,A51/B75).Sotheonlywaywe couldgraspanintelligibleworldthatisindependentofusisthrough sensibility,whichmeansthatourknowledgeofitcouldnotbea priori.Thepureunderstandingalonecouldatbestenableustoform representationsofanintelligibleworld.Butsincetheseintellectual representationswouldentirely“dependonourinneractivity,”asKant saystoHerz,wehavenogoodreasontobelievethattheywouldconformtoan independentintelligibleworld.Suchaprioriintellectual representationscouldwellbefigmentsofthebrainthatdonot correspondtoanythingindependentofthehumanmind.Inanycase,it iscompletelymysterioushowtheremightcometobeacorrespondence betweenpurelyintellectualrepresentationsandanindependent intelligibleworld. Kant’sstrategyintheCritiqueissimilartothatoftheInaugural Dissertationinthatbothworksattempttoreconcilemodernscience withtraditionalmoralityandreligionbyrelegatingthemtodistinct sensibleandintelligibleworlds,respectively.ButtheCritiquegives afarmoremodestandyetrevolutionaryaccountofaprioriknowledge. AsKant’slettertoHerzsuggests,themainproblemwithhisviewin theInauguralDissertationisthatittriestoexplainthepossibility ofaprioriknowledgeaboutaworldthatisentirelyindependentofthe humanmind.Thisturnedouttobeadeadend,andKantneveragain maintainedthatwecanhaveaprioriknowledgeaboutanintelligible worldpreciselybecausesuchaworldwouldbeentirelyindependentof us.However,Kant’srevolutionarypositionintheCritiqueisthatwe canhaveaprioriknowledgeaboutthegeneralstructureofthesensible worldbecauseitisnotentirelyindependentofthehumanmind.The sensibleworld,ortheworldofappearances,isconstructedbythe humanmindfromacombinationofsensorymatterthatwereceive passivelyandaprioriformsthataresuppliedbyourcognitive faculties.Wecanhaveaprioriknowledgeonlyaboutaspectsofthe sensibleworldthatreflecttheaprioriformssuppliedbyour cognitivefaculties.InKant’swords,“wecancognizeofthingsa priorionlywhatweourselveshaveputintothem”(Bxviii).So accordingtotheCritique,aprioriknowledgeispossibleonlyifand totheextentthatthesensibleworlditselfdependsonthewaythe humanmindstructuresitsexperience. Kantcharacterizesthisnewconstructivistviewofexperienceinthe CritiquethroughananalogywiththerevolutionwroughtbyCopernicus inastronomy: Uptonowithasbeenassumedthatallourcognitionmust conformtotheobjects;butallattemptstofindoutsomethingabout themapriorithroughconceptsthatwouldextendourcognitionhave,on thispresupposition,cometonothing.Henceletusoncetrywhetherwe donotgetfartherwiththeproblemsofmetaphysicsbyassumingthat theobjectsmustconformtoourcognition,whichwouldagreebetter withtherequestedpossibilityofanaprioricognitionofthem,which istoestablishsomethingaboutobjectsbeforetheyaregiventous. ThiswouldbejustlikethefirstthoughtsofCopernicus,who,whenhe didnotmakegoodprogressintheexplanationofthecelestialmotions ifheassumedthattheentirecelestialhostrevolvesaroundthe observer,triedtoseeifhemightnothavegreatersuccessifhemade theobserverrevolveandleftthestarsatrest.Nowinmetaphysicswe cantryinasimilarwayregardingtheintuitionofobjects.If intuitionhastoconformtotheconstitutionoftheobjects,thenIdo notseehowwecanknowanythingofthemapriori;butiftheobject (asanobjectofthesenses)conformstotheconstitutionofour facultyofintuition,thenIcanverywellrepresentthispossibility tomyself.YetbecauseIcannotstopwiththeseintuitions,iftheyare tobecomecognitions,butmustreferthemasrepresentationsto somethingastheirobjectanddeterminethisobjectthroughthem,Ican assumeeitherthattheconceptsthroughwhichIbringaboutthis determinationalsoconformtotheobjects,andthenIamonceagainin thesamedifficultyabouthowIcouldknowanythingaboutthema priori,orelseIassumethattheobjects,orwhatisthesamething, theexperienceinwhichalonetheycanbecognized(asgivenobjects) conformstothoseconcepts,inwhichcaseIimmediatelyseeaneasier wayoutofthedifficulty,sinceexperienceitselfisakindof cognitionrequiringtheunderstanding,whoseruleIhavetopresuppose inmyselfbeforeanyobjectisgiventome,henceapriori,whichrule isexpressedinconceptsapriori,towhichallobjectsofexperience mustthereforenecessarilyconform,andwithwhichtheymust agree.(Bxvi–xviii) Asthispassagesuggests,whatKanthaschangedintheCritiqueis primarilyhisviewabouttheroleandpowersoftheunderstanding, sincehealreadyheldintheInauguralDissertationthatsensibility contributestheformsofspaceandtime–whichhecallspure(ora priori)intuitions(2:397)–toourcognitionofthesensibleworld. ButtheCritiqueclaimsthatpureunderstandingtoo,ratherthangiving usinsightintoanintelligibleworld,islimitedtoprovidingforms– whichhecallspureoraprioriconcepts–thatstructureourcognition ofthesensibleworld.Sonowbothsensibilityandunderstandingwork togethertoconstructcognitionofthesensibleworld,whichtherefore conformstotheaprioriformsthataresuppliedbyourcognitive faculties:theaprioriintuitionsofsensibilityandtheapriori conceptsoftheunderstanding.Thisaccountisanalogoustothe heliocentricrevolutionofCopernicusinastronomybecausebothrequire contributionsfromtheobservertobefactoredintoexplanationsof phenomena,althoughneitherreducesphenomenatothecontributionsof observers alone.[6] Thewaycelestial phenomenaappeartousonearth,accordingtoCopernicus,isaffected byboththemotionsofcelestialbodiesandthemotionoftheearth, whichisnotastationarybodyaroundwhicheverythingelserevolves. ForKant,analogously,thephenomenaofhumanexperiencedependonboth thesensorydatathatwereceivepassivelythroughsensibilityandthe wayourmindactivelyprocessesthisdataaccordingtoitsownapriori rules.Theserulessupplythegeneralframeworkinwhichthesensible worldandalltheobjects(orphenomena)initappeartous.Sothe sensibleworldanditsphenomenaarenotentirelyindependentofthe humanmind,whichcontributesitsbasicstructure. HowdoesKant’sCopernicanrevolutioninphilosophyimproveonthe strategyoftheInauguralDissertationforreconcilingmodernscience withtraditionalmoralityandreligion?First,itgivesKantanewand ingeniouswayofplacingmodernscienceonanapriorifoundation.He isnowinapositiontoarguethatwecanhaveaprioriknowledgeabout thebasiclawsofmodernsciencebecausethoselawsreflectthehuman mind’scontributiontostructuringourexperience.Inotherwords,the sensibleworldnecessarilyconformstocertainfundamentallaws–such asthateveryeventhasacause–becausethehumanmindconstructsit accordingtothoselaws.Moreover,wecanidentifythoselawsby reflectingontheconditionsofpossibleexperience,whichrevealsthat itwouldbeimpossibleforustoexperienceaworldinwhich,for example,anygiveneventfailstohaveacause.FromthisKant concludesthatmetaphysicsisindeedpossibleinthesensethatwecan haveaprioriknowledgethattheentiresensibleworld–notjustour actualexperience,butanypossiblehumanexperience–necessarily conformstocertainlaws.Kantcallsthisimmanentmetaphysicsorthe metaphysicsofexperience,becauseitdealswiththeessential principlesthatareimmanenttohumanexperience. But,second,if“wecancognizeofthingsapriorionlywhatwe ourselveshaveputintothem,”thenwecannothaveapriori knowledgeaboutthingswhoseexistenceandnatureareentirely independentofthehumanmind,whichKantcallsthingsinthemselves (Bxviii).Inhiswords:“[F]romthisdeductionofourfacultyof cognizingapriori[…]thereemergesaverystrangeresult[…], namelythatwiththisfacultywecannevergetbeyondtheboundaries ofpossibleexperience,[…and]thatsuchcognitionreaches appearancesonly,leavingthethinginitselfassomethingactualfor itselfbutuncognizedbyus”(Bxix–xx).Thatis,Kant’s constructivistfoundationforscientificknowledgerestrictsscience totherealmofappearancesandimpliesthattranscendentmetaphysics –i.e.,aprioriknowledgeofthingsinthemselvesthattranscend possiblehumanexperience–isimpossible.IntheCritique Kantthusrejectstheinsightintoanintelligibleworldthathe defendedintheInauguralDissertation,andhenowclaimsthat rejectingknowledgeaboutthingsinthemselvesisnecessaryfor reconcilingsciencewithtraditionalmoralityandreligion.Thisis becauseheclaimsthatbeliefinGod,freedom,andimmortalityhavea strictlymoralbasis,andyetadoptingthesebeliefsonmoralgrounds wouldbeunjustifiedifwecouldknowthattheywere false.“Thus,”Kantsays,“Ihadtodenyknowledge inordertomakeroomforfaith”(Bxxx).Restrictingknowledge toappearancesandrelegatingGodandthesoultoanunknowablerealm ofthingsinthemselvesguaranteesthatitisimpossibletodisprove claimsaboutGodandthefreedomorimmortalityofthesoul,which moralargumentsmaythereforejustifyusinbelieving.Moreover,the determinismofmodernsciencenolongerthreatensthefreedomrequired bytraditionalmorality,becausescienceandthereforedeterminism applyonlytoappearances,andthereisroomforfreedomintherealm ofthingsinthemselves,wheretheselforsoulislocated.Wecannot know(theoretically)thatwearefree,becausewecannotknowanything aboutthingsinthemselves.Butthereareespeciallystrongmoral groundsforthebeliefinhumanfreedom,whichactsas“the keystone”supportingothermorallygroundedbeliefs (5:3–4).Inthisway,Kantreplacestranscendentmetaphysics withanewpracticalsciencethathecallsthemetaphysicsof morals.Itthusturnsoutthattwokindsofmetaphysicsarepossible: themetaphysicsofexperience(ornature)andthemetaphysicsof morals,bothofwhichdependonKant’sCopernicanrevolutionin philosophy. 3.Transcendentalidealism PerhapsthecentralandmostcontroversialthesisoftheCritiqueof PureReasonisthathumanbeingsexperienceonlyappearances,not thingsinthemselves;andthatspaceandtimeareonlysubjectiveforms ofhumanintuitionthatwouldnotsubsistinthemselvesifonewereto abstractfromallsubjectiveconditionsofhumanintuition.Kantcalls thisthesistranscendental idealism.[7] Oneofhisbestsummariesofitisarguablythefollowing: Wehavethereforewantedtosaythatallourintuitionisnothingbut therepresentationofappearance;thatthethingsthatweintuitare notinthemselveswhatweintuitthemtobe,noraretheirrelationsso constitutedinthemselvesastheyappeartous;andthatifweremove ourownsubjectorevenonlythesubjectiveconstitutionofthesenses ingeneral,thenallconstitution,allrelationsofobjectsinspace andtime,indeedspaceandtimethemselveswoulddisappear,andas appearancestheycannotexistinthemselves,butonlyinus.Whatmay bethecasewithobjectsinthemselvesandabstractedfromallthis receptivityofoursensibilityremainsentirelyunknowntous.Weare acquaintedwithnothingexceptourwayofperceivingthem,whichis peculiartous,andwhichthereforedoesnotnecessarilypertainto everybeing,thoughtobesureitpertainstoeveryhumanbeing.Weare concernedsolelywiththis.Spaceandtimeareitspureforms, sensationingeneralitsmatter.Wecancognizeonlytheformera priori,i.e.,priortoallactualperception,andtheyaretherefore calledpureintuition;thelatter,however,isthatinourcognition thatisresponsibleforitsbeingcalledaposterioricognition,i.e., empiricalintuition.Theformeradherestooursensibilityabsolutely necessarily,whateversortofsensationswemayhave;thelattercanbe verydifferent. (A42/B59–60)[8] KantintroducestranscendentalidealisminthepartoftheCritique calledtheTranscendentalAesthetic,andscholarsgenerallyagreethat forKanttranscendentalidealismencompassesatleastthefollowing claims: Insomesense,humanbeingsexperienceonlyappearances,notthings inthemselves. Spaceandtimearenotthingsinthemselves,ordeterminationsof thingsinthemselvesthatwouldremainifoneabstractedfromall subjectiveconditionsofhumanintuition.[Kantlabelsthisconclusion a)atA26/B42andagainatA32–33/B49.Itisatleastacrucialpartof whathemeansbycallingspaceandtimetranscendentallyideal (A28/B44,A35–36/B52)]. Spaceandtimearenothingotherthanthesubjectiveformsofhuman sensibleintuition.[Kantlabelsthisconclusionb)atA26/B42and againatA33/B49–50]. Spaceandtimeareempiricallyreal,whichmeansthat“everything thatcancomebeforeusexternallyasanobject”isinbothspaceand time,andthatourinternalintuitionsofourselvesareintime (A28/B44,A34–35/B51–51). Butscholarsdisagreewidelyonhowtointerprettheseclaims,and thereisnosuchthingasthestandardinterpretationofKant’s transcendentalidealism.Twogeneraltypesofinterpretationhavebeen especiallyinfluential,however.Thissectionprovidesanoverviewof thesetwointerpretations,althoughitshouldbeemphasizedthatmuch importantscholarshipontranscendentalidealismdoesnotfallneatly intoeitherofthesetwocamps. 3.1Thetwo-objectsinterpretation Thetwo-objectsreadingisthetraditionalinterpretationofKant’s transcendentalidealism.Itgoesbacktotheearliestreviewofthe Critique–theso-calledGöttingenreviewbyChristianGarve (1742–1798)andJ.G.Feder (1740–1821)[9]– anditwasthe dominantwayofinterpretingKant’stranscendentalidealismduringhis ownlifetime.Ithasbeenaliveinterpretiveoptionsincethenand remainssotoday,althoughitnolongerenjoysthedominancethatit once did.[10] Accordingtothetwo-objectsinterpretation,transcendentalidealismis essentiallyametaphysicalthesisthatdistinguishesbetweentwo classesofobjects:appearancesandthingsinthemselves.Anothername forthisviewisthetwo-worldsinterpretation,sinceitcanalsobe expressedbysayingthattranscendentalidealismessentially distinguishesbetweenaworldofappearancesandanotherworldof thingsinthemselves. Thingsinthemselves,onthisinterpretation,areabsolutelyrealin thesensethattheywouldexistandhavewhateverpropertiestheyhave evenifnohumanbeingswerearoundtoperceivethem.Appearances,on theotherhand,arenotabsolutelyrealinthatsense,becausetheir existenceandpropertiesdependonhumanperceivers.Moreover,whenever appearancesdoexist,insomesensetheyexistinthemindofhuman perceivers.Soappearancesarementalentitiesormental representations.This,coupledwiththeclaimthatweexperienceonly appearances,makestranscendentalidealismaformofphenomenalismon thisinterpretation,becauseitreducestheobjectsofexperienceto mentalrepresentations.Allofourexperiences–allofour perceptionsofobjectsandeventsinspace,eventhoseobjectsand eventsthemselves,andallnon-spatialbutstilltemporalthoughtsand feelings–fallintotheclassofappearancesthatexistinthe mindofhumanperceivers.Theseappearancescutusoffentirelyfrom therealityofthingsinthemselves,whicharenon-spatialand non-temporal.YetKant’stheory,onthisinterpretation,nevertheless requiresthatthingsinthemselvesexist,becausetheymusttransmitto usthesensorydatafromwhichweconstructappearances.Inprinciple wecannotknowhowthingsinthemselvesaffectoursenses,becauseour experienceandknowledgeislimitedtotheworldofappearances constructedbyandinthemind.Thingsinthemselvesarethereforea sortoftheoreticalposit,whoseexistenceandrolearerequiredbythe theorybutarenotdirectlyverifiable. Themainproblemswiththetwo-objectsinterpretationare philosophical.MostreadersofKantwhohaveinterpretedhis transcendentalidealisminthiswayhavebeen–oftenvery –criticalofit,forreasonssuchasthefollowing: First,atbestKantiswalkingafinelineinclaimingontheonehand thatwecanhavenoknowledgeaboutthingsinthemselves,butonthe otherhandthatweknowthatthingsinthemselvesexist,thatthey affectoursenses,andthattheyarenon-spatialandnon-temporal.At worsthistheorydependsoncontradictoryclaimsaboutwhatwecanand cannotknowaboutthingsinthemselves.Thisobjectionwas influentiallyarticulatedbyJacobi,whenhecomplainedthat “withoutthatpresupposition[ofthingsinthemselves]Icould notenterintothesystem,butwithitIcouldnotstaywithin it”(Jacobi1787,336). Second,evenifthatproblemissurmounted,ithasseemedtomanythat Kant’stheory,interpretedinthisway,impliesaradicalformof skepticismthattrapseachofuswithinthecontentsofourownmind andcutsusofffromreality.Someversionsofthisobjectionproceed frompremisesthatKantrejects.Oneversionmaintainsthatthingsin themselvesarerealwhileappearancesarenot,andhencethatonKant’s viewwecannothaveexperienceorknowledgeofreality.ButKantdenies thatappearancesareunreal:theyarejustasrealasthingsin themselvesbutareinadifferentmetaphysicalclass.Anotherversion claimsthattruthalwaysinvolvesacorrespondencebetweenmental representationsandthingsinthemselves,fromwhichitwouldfollow thatonKant’sviewitisimpossibleforustohavetruebeliefsabout theworld.ButjustasKantdeniesthatthingsinthemselvesarethe only(orprivileged)reality,healsodeniesthatcorrespondencewith thingsinthemselvesistheonlykindoftruth.Empiricaljudgmentsare truejustincasetheycorrespondwiththeirempiricalobjectsin accordancewiththeaprioriprinciplesthatstructureallpossible humanexperience.ButthefactthatKantcanappealinthiswaytoan objectivecriterionofempiricaltruththatisinternaltoour experiencehasnotbeenenoughtoconvincesomecriticsthatKantis innocentofanunacceptableformofskepticism,mainlybecauseofhis insistenceonourirreparableignoranceaboutthingsinthemselves. Thirdandfinally,Kant’sdenialthatthingsinthemselvesarespatial ortemporalhasstruckmanyofhisreadersasincoherent.Theroleof thingsinthemselves,onthetwo-objectinterpretation,istoaffect oursensesandtherebytoprovidethesensorydatafromwhichour cognitivefacultiesconstructappearanceswithintheframeworkofoura prioriintuitionsofspaceandtimeandaprioriconceptssuchas causality.Butifthereisnospace,time,change,orcausationinthe realmofthingsinthemselves,thenhowcanthingsinthemselvesaffect us?Transcendentalaffectionseemstoinvolveacausalrelationbetween thingsinthemselvesandoursensibility.Ifthisissimplythewaywe unavoidablythinkabouttranscendentalaffection,becausewecangive positivecontenttothisthoughtonlybyemployingtheconceptofa cause,whileitisneverthelessstrictlyfalsethatthingsin themselvesaffectuscausally,thenitseemsnotonlythatweare ignorantofhowthingsinthemselvesreallyaffectus.Itseems, rather,tobeincoherentthatthingsinthemselvescouldaffectusat alliftheyarenotinspaceortime. 3.2Thetwo-aspectsinterpretation Thetwo-aspectsreadingattemptstointerpretKant’stranscendental idealisminawaythatenablesittobedefendedagainstatleastsome oftheseobjections.Onthisview,transcendentalidealismdoesnot distinguishbetweentwoclassesofobjectsbutratherbetweentwo differentaspectsofoneandthesameclassofobjects.Forthisreason itisalsocalledtheone-worldinterpretation,sinceitholdsthat thereisonlyoneworldinKant’sontology,andthatatleastsome objectsinthatworldhavetwodifferentaspects:oneaspectthat appearstous,andanotheraspectthatdoesnotappeartous.Thatis, appearancesareaspectsofthesameobjectsthatalsoexistin themselves.So,onthisreading,appearancesarenotmental representations,andtranscendentalidealismisnotaformof phenomenalism.[11] Thereareatleasttwomainversionsofthetwo-aspectstheory.One versiontreatstranscendentalidealismasametaphysicaltheory accordingtowhichobjectshavetwoaspectsinthesensethattheyhave twosetsofproperties:onesetofrelationalpropertiesthatappearto usandarespatialandtemporal,andanothersetofintrinsic propertiesthatdonotappeartousandarenotspatialortemporal (Langton1998).Thisproperty-dualistinterpretationfaces epistemologicalobjectionssimilartothosefacedbythetwo-objects interpretation,becauseweareinnobetterpositiontoacquire knowledgeaboutpropertiesthatdonotappeartousthanweareto acquireknowledgeaboutobjectsthatdonotappeartous.Moreover, thisinterpretationalsoseemstoimplythatthingsinthemselvesare spatialandtemporal,sinceappearanceshavespatialandtemporal properties,andonthisviewappearancesarethesameobjectsasthings inthemselves.ButKantexplicitlydeniesthatspaceandtimeare propertiesofthingsinthemselves. Asecondversionofthetwo-aspectstheorydepartsmoreradicallyfrom thetraditionaltwo-objectsinterpretationbydenyingthat transcendentalidealismisatbottomametaphysicaltheory.Instead,it interpretstranscendentalidealismasafundamentallyepistemological theorythatdistinguishesbetweentwostandpointsontheobjectsof experience:thehumanstandpoint,fromwhichobjectsareviewed relativetoepistemicconditionsthatarepeculiartohumancognitive faculties(namely,theaprioriformsofoursensibleintuition);and thestandpointofanintuitiveintellect,fromwhichthesameobjects couldbeknowninthemselvesandindependentlyofanyepistemic conditions(Allison2004).Humanbeingscannotreallytakeupthe latterstandpointbutcanformonlyanemptyconceptofthingsasthey existinthemselvesbyabstractingfromallthecontentofour experienceandleavingonlythepurelyformalthoughtofanobjectin general.Sotranscendentalidealism,onthisinterpretation,is essentiallythethesisthatwearelimitedtothehumanstandpoint,and theconceptofathinginitselfplaystheroleofenablingustochart theboundariesofthehumanstandpointbysteppingbeyondthemin abstract(butempty)thought. Onecriticismofthisepistemologicalversionofthetwo-aspectstheory isthatitavoidstheobjectionstootherinterpretationsby attributingtoKantamorelimitedprojectthanthetextofthe Critiquewarrants.Therearepassagesthatsupportthis reading.[12] Butthereare alsomanypassagesinbotheditionsoftheCritiqueinwhichKant describesappearancesasrepresentationsinthemindandinwhichhis distinctionbetweenappearancesandthingsinthemselvesisgivennot onlyepistemologicalbutmetaphysical significance.[13] Itisunclear whetherallofthesetextsadmitofasingle,consistent interpretation. 4.Thetranscendentaldeduction ThetranscendentaldeductionisthecentralargumentoftheCritique ofPureReasonandoneofthemostcomplexanddifficulttextsinthe historyofphilosophy.Givenitscomplexity,therearenaturallymany differentwaysofinterpretingthe deduction.[14]This brief overviewprovidesoneperspectiveonsomeofitsmainideas. ThetranscendentaldeductionoccursinthepartoftheCritiquecalled theAnalyticofConcepts,whichdealswiththeaprioriconceptsthat, onKant’sview,ourunderstandingusestoconstructexperiencetogether withtheaprioriformsofoursensibleintuition(spaceandtime), whichhediscussedintheTranscendentalAesthetic.Kantcallsthesea prioriconcepts“categories,”andheargueselsewhere(intheso-called metaphysicaldeduction)thattheyincludesuchconceptsassubstance andcause.Thegoalofthetranscendentaldeductionistoshowthatwe haveaprioriconceptsorcategoriesthatareobjectivelyvalid,or thatapplynecessarilytoallobjectsintheworldthatweexperience. Toshowthis,Kantarguesthatthecategoriesarenecessaryconditions ofexperience,orthatwecouldnothaveexperiencewithoutthe categories.InKant’swords: [T]heobjectivevalidityofthecategories,asaprioriconcepts, restsonthefactthatthroughthemaloneisexperiencepossible(as farastheformofthinkingisconcerned).Fortheythenarerelated necessarilyandaprioritoobjectsofexperience,sinceonlybymeans ofthemcananyobjectofexperiencebethoughtatall. Thetranscendentaldeductionofallaprioriconceptsthereforehasa principletowardwhichtheentireinvestigationmustbedirected, namelythis:thattheymustberecognizedasaprioriconditionsof thepossibilityofexperiences(whetheroftheintuitionthatis encounteredinthem,orofthethinking).Conceptsthatsupplythe objectivegroundofthepossibilityofexperiencearenecessaryjust forthatreason.(A93–94/B126) ThestrategyKantemploystoarguethatthecategoriesareconditions ofexperienceisthemainsourceofboththeobscurityandthe ingenuityofthetranscendentaldeduction.Hisstrategyistoargue thatthecategoriesarenecessaryspecificallyforself-consciousness, forwhichKantoftenusestheLeibnizianterm“apperception.” 4.1Self-consciousness OnewaytoapproachKant’sargumentistocontrasthisviewof self-consciousnesswithtwoalternativeviewsthatherejects.Eachof theseviews,bothKant’sandthoseherejects,canbeseenasoffering competinganswersthequestion:whatisthesourceofoursenseofan ongoingandinvariableselfthatpersiststhroughoutallthechangesin ourexperience? ThefirstanswertothisquestionthatKantrejectsisthat self-consciousnessarisesfromsomeparticularcontentbeingpresentin eachofone’srepresentations.Thismaterialconceptionof self-consciousness,aswemaycallit,issuggestedby Locke’saccountofpersonalidentity.AccordingtoLocke,“it beingthesameconsciousnessthatmakesaManbehimselftohimself, personalIdentitydependsonthatonly,whetheritbeannexedonlyto oneindividualSubstance,orcanbecontinuedinasuccessionof severalSubstances”(Essay2.27.10).WhatLockecalls“thesame consciousness”maybeunderstoodassomerepresentationalcontentthat isalwayspresentinmyexperienceandthatbothidentifiesany experienceasmineandgivesmeasenseofacontinuousselfbyvirtue ofitscontinualpresenceinmyexperience.Oneproblemwiththisview, Kantbelieves,isthatthereisnosuchrepresentationalcontentthat isinvariablypresentinexperience,sothesenseofanongoingself cannotpossiblyarisefromthatnon-existentcontent(whatLockecalls “consciousness”)beingpresentineachofone’srepresentations.In Kant’swords,self-consciousness“doesnotyetcomeaboutbymy accompanyingeachrepresentationwithconsciousness,butratherbymy addingonerepresentationtotheotherandbeingconsciousoftheir synthesis.ThereforeitisonlybecauseIcancombineamanifoldof givenrepresentationsinoneconsciousnessthatitispossibleforme torepresenttheidentityoftheconsciousnessinthese representations”(B133).HereKantclaims,againsttheLockean view,thatself-consciousnessarisesfromcombining(orsynthesizing) representationswithoneanotherregardlessoftheircontent.Inshort, Kanthasaformalconceptionofself-consciousnessratherthana materialone.Sincenoparticularcontentofmyexperienceis invariable,self-consciousnessmustderivefrommyexperiencehavingan invariableformorstructure,andconsciousnessoftheidentityof myselfthroughallofmychangingexperiencesmustconsistinawareness oftheformalunityandlaw-governedregularityofmyexperience.The continuousformofmyexperienceisthenecessarycorrelateformy senseofacontinuousself. Thereareatleasttwopossibleversionsoftheformalconceptionof self-consciousness:arealistandanidealistversion.Ontherealist version,natureitselfislaw-governedandwebecomeself-consciousby attendingtoitslaw-governedregularities,whichalsomakesthisan empiricistviewofself-consciousness.Theideaofanidenticalself thatpersiststhroughoutallofourexperience,onthisview,arises fromthelaw-governedregularityofnature,andourrepresentations exhibitorderandregularitybecauserealityitselfisorderedand regular.Kantrejectsthisrealistviewandembracesaconceptionof self-consciousnessthatisbothformalandidealist.AccordingtoKant, theformalstructureofourexperience,itsunityandlaw-governed regularity,isanachievementofourcognitivefacultiesratherthana propertyofrealityinitself.Ourexperiencehasaconstantform becauseourmindconstructsexperienceinalaw-governedway.So self-consciousness,forKant,consistsinawarenessofthemind’s law-governedactivityofsynthesizingorcombiningsensibledatato constructaunifiedexperience.Asheexpressesit,“thisunityof consciousnesswouldbeimpossibleifinthecognitionofthemanifold themindcouldnotbecomeconsciousoftheidentityofthefunctionby meansofwhichthismanifoldissyntheticallycombinedintoone cognition”(A108). Kantarguesforthisformalidealistconceptionofself-consciousness, andagainsttheformalrealistview,onthegroundsthat“wecan representnothingascombinedintheobjectwithouthavingpreviously combineditourselves”(B130).Inotherwords,evenifrealityin itselfwerelaw-governed,itslawscouldnotsimplymigrateovertoour mindorimprintthemselvesonuswhileourmindisentirelypassive.We mustexerciseanactivecapacitytorepresenttheworldascombinedor orderedinalaw-governedway,becauseotherwisewecouldnotrepresent theworldaslaw-governedevenifitwerelaw-governedinitself. Moreover,thiscapacitytorepresenttheworldaslaw-governedmustbe aprioribecauseitisaconditionofself-consciousness,andwewould alreadyhavetobeself-consciousinordertolearnfromourexperience thattherearelaw-governedregularitiesintheworld.Soitis necessaryforself-consciousnessthatweexerciseanaprioricapacity torepresenttheworldaslaw-governed.Butthiswouldalsobe sufficientforself-consciousnessifwecouldexerciseourapriori capacitytorepresenttheworldaslaw-governedevenifrealityin itselfwerenotlaw-governed.Inthatcase,therealistandempiricist conceptionofself-consciousnesswouldbefalse,andtheformal idealistviewwouldbetrue. Kant’sconfidencethatnoempiricistaccountcouldpossiblyexplain self-consciousnessmaybebasedonhisassumptionthatthesenseof selfeachofushas,thethoughtofoneselfasidenticalthroughoutall ofone’schangingexperiences,involvesnecessityanduniversality, whichonhisviewarethehallmarksoftheapriori.Thisassumptionis reflectedinwhatwemaycallKant’sprincipleofapperception:“TheI thinkmustbeabletoaccompanyallmyrepresentations;forotherwise somethingwouldberepresentedinmethatcouldnotbethoughtatall, whichisasmuchastosaythattherepresentationwouldeitherbe impossibleorelseatleastwouldbenothingforme” (B131–132).[15] Noticethe claimsaboutnecessityanduniversalityembodiedinthewords“must” and“all”here.Kantissayingthatforarepresentationtocountas mine,itmustnecessarilybeaccessibletoconsciousawarenessinsome (perhapsindirect)way:Imustbeabletoaccompanyitwith“I think….”Allofmyrepresentationsmustbeaccessibleto consciousnessinthisway(buttheyneednotactuallybeconscious), becauseagainthatissimplywhatmakesarepresentationcountasmine. Self-consciousnessforKantthereforeinvolvesaprioriknowledgeabout thenecessaryanduniversaltruthexpressedinthisprincipleof apperception,andaprioriknowledgecannotbebasedonexperience. Kantmayhavedevelopedthisthreadofhis argumentinthetranscendentaldeductionafterreadingJohannNicolaus Tetens(1736–1807)ratherthanthroughadirectencounterwith Locke’stexts(Tetens1777,Kitcher2011).Onthesubjectof self-consciousness,TetenswasafollowerofLockeandalsoengaged withHume’sargumentsforrejectingacontinuingself.SoKant’s actualopponentsinthedeductionmayhavebeenLockeanandHumean positionsasrepresentedbyTetens,aswellasrationalistviewsthat KantwouldhaveencountereddirectlyintextsbyLeibniz,Wolff,and someoftheirfollowers. 4.2Objectivityandjudgment Onthebasisofthisformalidealistconceptionof self-consciousness,Kant’sargument(atleastonecentralthreadofit) movesthroughtwomoreconditionsofself-consciousnessinorderto establishtheobjectivevalidityofthecategories.Thenextcondition isthatself-consciousnessrequiresmetorepresentanobjectiveworld distinctfrommysubjectiverepresentations–thatis,distinctfrommy thoughtsaboutandsensationsofthatobjectiveworld.Kantusesthis connectionbetweenself-consciousnessandobjectivitytoinsertthe categoriesintohisargument. Inordertobeself-conscious,Icannotbewhollyabsorbedinthe contentsofmyperceptionsbutmustdistinguishmyselffromtherestof theworld.Butifself-consciousnessisanachievementofthemind, thenhowdoesthemindachievethissensethatthereisadistinction betweentheIthatperceivesandthecontentsofitsperceptions? AccordingtoKant,themindachievesthissensebydistinguishing representationsthatnecessarilybelongtogetherfromrepresentations thatarenotnecessarilyconnectedbutaremerelyassociatedina contingentway.ConsiderKant’sexampleoftheperceptionofahouse (B162).Imagineahousethatistoolargetofitintoyourvisualfield fromyourvantagepointnearitsfrontdoor.Nowimaginethatyouwalk aroundthehouse,successivelyperceivingeachofitssides.Eventually youperceivetheentirehouse,butnotallatonce,andyoujudgethat eachofyourrepresentationsofthesidesofthehousenecessarily belongtogether(assidesofonehouse)andthatanyonewhodeniedthis wouldbemistaken.Butnowimaginethatyougrewupinthishouseand associateafeelingofnostalgiawithit.Youwouldnotjudgethat representationsofthishousearenecessarilyconnectedwithfeelings ofnostalgia.Thatis,youwouldnotthinkthatotherpeopleseeingthe houseforthefirsttimewouldbemistakeniftheydeniedthatitis connectedwithnostalgia,becauseyourecognizethatthishouseis connectedwithnostalgiaforyoubutnotnecessarilyforeveryone.Yet youdistinguishthismerelysubjectiveconnectionfromtheobjective connectionbetweensidesofthehouse,whichisobjectivebecausethe sidesofthehousenecessarilybelongtogether“intheobject,”because thisconnectionholdsforeveryoneuniversally,andbecauseitis possibletobemistakenaboutit.Thepointhereisnotthatwemust successfullyidentifywhichrepresentationsnecessarilybelongtogether andwhicharemerelyassociatedcontingently,butratherthattobe self-consciouswemustatleastmakethisgeneraldistinctionbetween objectiveandmerelysubjectiveconnectionsofrepresentations. Atthispoint(atleastinthesecondeditiontext)Kantintroducesthe keyclaimthatjudgmentiswhatenablesustodistinguishobjective connectionsofrepresentationsthatnecessarilybelongtogetherfrom merelysubjectiveandcontingentassociations:“[A]judgmentisnothing otherthanthewaytobringgivencognitionstotheobjectiveunityof apperception.Thatistheaimofthecopulaisinthem:todistinguish theobjectiveunityofgivenrepresentationsfromthesubjective.For thisworddesignatestherelationoftherepresentationstothe originalapperceptionanditsnecessaryunity”(B141–142).Kantis speakinghereaboutthementalactofjudgingthatresultsinthe formationofajudgment.JudgingisanactofwhatKantcalls synthesis,whichhedefinesas“theactionofputtingdifferent representationstogetherwitheachotherandcomprehendingtheir manifoldnessinonecognition”(A77/B103).Inotherwords,to synthesizeisingeneraltocombineseveralrepresentationsintoa single(more)complexrepresentation,andtojudgeisspecificallyto combineconceptsintoajudgment–thatis,tojoinasubjectconcept toapredicateconceptbymeansofthecopula,asin“thebodyis heavy”or“thehouseisfour-sided.”Judgmentsneednotbetrue,of course,buttheyalwayshaveatruthvalue(trueorfalse)becausethey makeclaimstoobjectivevalidity.WhenIsay,bycontrast,that“IfI carryabody,Ifeelapressureofweight,”orthat“ifIseethis house,Ifeelnostalgia,”Iamnotmakingajudgmentabouttheobject (thebodyorthehouse)butratherIamexpressingasubjective associationthatmayapplyonlytome (B142).[16] Kant’sreferencetothenecessaryunityofapperceptionor self-consciousnessinthequotationabovemeans(atleast)thatthe actionofjudgingisthewayourmindachievesself-consciousness.We mustrepresentanobjectiveworldinordertodistinguishourselves fromit,andwerepresentanobjectiveworldbyjudgingthatsome representationsnecessarilybelongtogether.Moreover,recallfrom 4.1 that,forKant,wemusthaveanaprioricapacity torepresenttheworldaslaw-governed,because“wecanrepresent nothingascombined(orconnected)intheobjectwithouthaving previouslycombineditourselves”(B130).Itfollowsthatobjective connectionsintheworldcannotsimplyimprintthemselvesonourmind. Rather,experienceofanobjectiveworldmustbeconstructedby exercisinganaprioricapacitytojudge,whichKantcallsthefaculty ofunderstanding(A80–81/B106).Theunderstandingconstructsexperience byprovidingtheapriorirules,ortheframeworkofnecessarylaws,in accordancewithwhichwejudgerepresentationstobeobjective.These rulesarethepureconceptsoftheunderstandingorcategories,which arethereforeconditionsofself-consciousness,sincetheyarerules forjudgingaboutanobjectiveworld,andself-consciousnessrequires thatwedistinguishourselvesfromanobjectiveworld. Kantidentifiesthecategoriesinwhathecallsthemetaphysical deduction,whichprecedesthetranscendental deduction.[17]Very briefly,sincethecategoriesareapriorirulesforjudging,Kant arguesthatanexhaustivetableofcategoriescanbederivedfroma tableofthebasiclogicalformsofjudgments.Forexample,according toKantthelogicalformofthejudgmentthat“thebodyisheavy”would besingular,affirmative,categorical,andassertoric.Butsince categoriesarenotmerelogicalfunctionsbutinsteadarerulesfor makingjudgmentsaboutobjectsoranobjectiveworld,Kantarrivesat histableofcategoriesbyconsideringhoweachlogicalfunctionwould structurejudgmentsaboutobjects(withinourspatio-temporalformsof intuition).Forexample,heclaimsthatcategoricaljudgmentsexpressa logicalrelationbetweensubjectandpredicatethatcorrespondstothe ontologicalrelationbetweensubstanceandaccident;andthelogical formofahypotheticaljudgmentexpressesarelationthatcorresponds tocauseandeffect.Takentogetherwiththisargument,then,the transcendentaldeductionarguesthatwebecomeself-consciousby representinganobjectiveworldofsubstancesthatinteractaccording tocausallaws. 4.3Thelaw-giverofnature Thefinalconditionofself-consciousnessthatKantaddstothe precedingconditionsisthatourunderstandingmustcooperatewith sensibilitytoconstructone,unbounded,andunifiedspace-timeto whichallofourrepresentationsmayberelated. Toseewhythisfurtherconditionisrequired,considerthatsofarwe haveseenwhyKantholdsthatwemustrepresentanobjectiveworldin ordertobeself-conscious,butwecouldrepresentanobjectiveworld evenifitwerenotpossibletorelateallofourrepresentationsto thisobjectiveworld.Forallthathasbeensaidsofar,wemight stillhaveunrulyrepresentationsthatwecannotrelateinanywayto theobjectiveframeworkofourexperience.OnKant’sview,thiswould beaproblembecause,aswehaveseen,heholdsthat self-consciousnessinvolvesuniversalityandnecessity:accordingto hisprincipleofapperception,“theIthinkmustbeableto accompanyallmyrepresentations”(B131).Yetif,ontheone hand,IhadrepresentationsthatIcouldnotrelateinsomewaytoan objectiveworld,thenIcouldnotaccompanythoserepresentationswith “Ithink”orrecognizethemasmyrepresentations,because Icansay“Ithink…”aboutanygivenrepresentationonly byrelatingittoanobjectiveworld,accordingtotheargumentjust discussed.SoImustbeabletorelateanygivenrepresentationtoan objectiveworldinorderforittocountasmine.Ontheotherhand, self-consciousnesswouldalsobeimpossibleifIrepresentedmultiple objectiveworlds,evenifIcouldrelateallofmyrepresentationsto someobjectiveworldorother.Inthatcase,Icouldnotbecome consciousofanidenticalselfthathas,say,representation1in space-timeAandrepresentation2inspace-timeB.Itmaybepossible toimaginedisjointedspacesandtimes,butitisnotpossibleto representthemasobjectivelyreal.Soself-consciousnessrequires thatIcanrelateallofmyrepresentationstoasingleobjective world. ThereasonwhyImustrepresentthisoneobjectiveworldbymeansofa unifiedandunboundedspace-timeisthat,asKantarguedinthe TranscendentalAesthetic,spaceandtimearethepureformsofhuman intuition.Ifwehaddifferentformsofintuition,thenourexperience wouldstillhavetoconstituteaunifiedwholeinorderforustobe self-conscious,butthiswouldnotbeaspatio-temporalwhole.Given thatspaceandtimeareourformsofintuition,however,our understandingmuststillcooperatewithsensibilitytoconstructa spatio-temporalwholeofexperiencebecause,onceagain,“wecan representnothingascombinedintheobjectwithouthavingpreviously combineditourselves,”and“allcombination[…]isanactionofthe understanding”(B130).SoKantdistinguishesbetweenspaceandtimeas pureformsofintuition,whichbelongsolelytosensibility;andthe formalintuitionsofspaceandtime(orspace-time),whichareunified bytheunderstanding(B160–161).Theseformalintuitionsarethe spatio-temporalwholewithinwhichourunderstandingconstructs experienceinaccordancewiththe categories.[18] ThemostimportantimplicationofKant’sclaimthattheunderstanding constructsasinglewholeofexperiencetowhichallofour representationscanberelatedisthat,sincehedefinesnature “regardedmaterially”as“thesumtotalofall appearances”andhehasarguedthatthecategoriesare objectivelyvalidofallpossibleappearances,onhisviewitfollows thatourcategoriesarethesourceofthefundamentallawsofnature “regardedformally”(B163,165).SoKantconcludesonthis basisthattheunderstandingisthetruelaw-giverofnature.Inhis words:“allappearancesinnature,asfarastheircombination isconcerned,standunderthecategories,onwhichnature(considered merelyasnatureingeneral)depends,astheoriginalgroundofits necessarylawfulness(asnatureregardedformally)”(B165).Or morestrongly:“weourselvesbringintotheappearancesthat orderandregularitythatwecallnature,andmoreoverwewouldnotbe abletofinditthereifwe,orthenatureofourmind,hadnot originallyputitthere.[…]Theunderstandingisthusnotmerelya facultyformakingrulesthroughthecomparisonoftheappearances:it isitselfthelegislationfornature,i.e.,withoutunderstanding therewouldnotbeanynatureatall”(A125–126). 5.Moralityandfreedom HavingexaminedtwocentralpartsofKant’spositiveprojectin theoreticalphilosophyfromtheCritiqueofPureReason,transcendental idealismandthetranscendentaldeduction,letusnowturntohis practicalphilosophyintheCritiqueofPractical Reason. SinceKant’s philosophyisdeeplysystematic,thissectionbeginswithapreliminary lookathowhistheoreticalandpracticalphilosophyfittogether(see alsosection 7). 5.1Theoreticalandpracticalautonomy ThefundamentalideaofKant’sphilosophyishumanautonomy.Sofar wehaveseenthisinKant’sconstructivistviewofexperience, accordingtowhichourunderstandingisthesourceofthegenerallaws ofnature.“Autonomy”literallymeansgivingthelawtooneself,andon Kant’sviewourunderstandingprovideslawsthatconstitutethea prioriframeworkofourexperience.Ourunderstandingdoesnotprovide thematterorcontentofourexperience,butitdoesprovidethebasic formalstructurewithinwhichweexperienceanymatterreceivedthrough oursenses.Kant’scentralargumentforthisviewisthetranscendental deduction,accordingtowhichitisaconditionofself-consciousness thatourunderstandingconstructsexperienceinthisway.Sowemay callself-consciousnessthehighestprincipleofKant’stheoretical philosophy,sinceitis(atleast)thebasisforallofourapriori knowledgeaboutthestructureofnature. Kant’smoralphilosophyisalsobasedontheideaofautonomy.Heholds thatthereisasinglefundamentalprincipleofmorality,onwhichall specificmoraldutiesarebased.Hecallsthismorallaw(asitis manifestedtous)thecategoricalimperative(see 5.4). Themorallawisaproductofreason,forKant,while thebasiclawsofnatureareproductsofourunderstanding.Thereare importantdifferencesbetweenthesensesinwhichweareautonomousin constructingourexperienceandinmorality.Forexample,Kantregards understandingandreasonasdifferentcognitivefaculties,althoughhe sometimesuses“reason”inawidesensetocover both.[19] Thecategories andthereforethelawsofnaturearedependentonourspecifically humanformsofintuition,whilereasonisnot.Themorallawdoesnot dependonanyqualitiesthatarepeculiartohumannaturebutonlyon thenatureofreasonassuch,althoughitsmanifestationtousasa categoricalimperative(asalawofduty)reflectsthefactthatthe humanwillisnotnecessarilydeterminedbypurereasonbutisalso influencedbyotherincentivesrootedinourneedsandinclinations; andourspecificdutiesderivingfromthecategoricalimperativedo reflecthumannatureandthecontingenciesofhumanlife.Despitethese differences,however,Kantholdsthatwegivethemorallawto ourselves,aswealsogivethegenerallawsofnatureto ourselves,thoughinadifferentsense.Moreover,weeachnecessarilygivethesame morallawtoourselves,justasweeachconstructourexperiencein accordancewiththesamecategories.Tosummarize: Theoreticalphilosophyisabouthowtheworldis(A633/B661).Its highestprincipleisself-consciousness,onwhichourknowledgeofthe basiclawsofnatureisbased.Givensensorydata,ourunderstanding constructsexperienceaccordingtotheseapriorilaws. Practicalphilosophyisabouthowtheworldoughttobe(ibid., A800–801/B828–829).Itshighestprincipleisthemorallaw,fromwhich wederivedutiesthatcommandhowweoughttoactinspecific situations.Kantalsoclaimsthatreflectiononourmoraldutiesand ourneedforhappinessleadstothethoughtofanidealworld,whichhe callsthehighestgood(seesection 6). Givenhowtheworldis(theoreticalphilosophy)andhowitoughttobe(practical philosophy),weaimtomaketheworldbetterbyconstructingor realizingthehighestgood. SobothpartsofKant’sphilosophyareaboutautonomously constructingaworld,butindifferentsenses.Intheoretical philosophy,weuseourcategoriesandformsofintuitiontoconstructa worldofexperienceornature.Inpracticalphilosophy,weusethe morallawtoconstructtheideaofamoralworldorarealmofends thatguidesourconduct(4:433),andultimatelytotransformthe naturalworldintothehighestgood.Finally,transcendentalidealism istheframeworkwithinwhichthesetwopartsofKant’sphilosophyfit together(20:311).Theoreticalphilosophydealswithappearances,to whichourknowledgeisstrictlylimited;andpracticalphilosophydeals withthingsinthemselves,althoughitdoesnotgiveusknowledgeabout thingsinthemselvesbutonlyprovidesrationaljustificationfor certainbeliefsaboutthemforpracticalpurposes. TounderstandKant’sargumentsthatpracticalphilosophyjustifies certainbeliefsaboutthingsinthemselves,itisnecessarytosee theminthecontextofhiscriticismofGermanrationalist metaphysics.ThethreetraditionaltopicsofLeibniz-Wolffianspecial metaphysicswererationalpsychology,rationalcosmology,andrational theology,whichdealt,respectively,withthehumansoul,the world-whole,andGod.InthepartoftheCritiqueofPureReason calledtheTranscendentalDialectic,Kantarguesagainstthe Leibniz-Wolffianviewthathumanbeingsarecapableofapriori knowledgeineachofthesedomains,andheclaimsthattheerrorsof Leibniz-Wolffianmetaphysicsareduetoanillusionthathasitsseat inthenatureofhumanreasonitself.AccordingtoKant,humanreason necessarilyproducesideasofthesoul,theworld-whole,andGod;and theseideasunavoidablyproducetheillusionthatwehaveapriori knowledgeabouttranscendentobjectscorrespondingtothem.Thisisan illusion,however,becauseinfactwearenotcapableofapriori knowledgeaboutanysuchtranscendentobjects.Nevertheless,Kant attemptstoshowthattheseillusoryideashaveapositive,practical use.HethusreframesLeibniz-Wolffianspecialmetaphysicsasa practicalsciencethathecallsthemetaphysicsofmorals.OnKant’s view,ourideasofthesoul,theworld-whole,andGodprovidethe contentofmorallyjustifiedbeliefsabouthumanimmortality,human freedom,andtheexistenceofGod,respectively;buttheyarenot properobjectsofspeculative knowledge.[20] 5.2Freedom ThemostimportantbeliefaboutthingsinthemselvesthatKant thinksonlypracticalphilosophycanjustifyconcernshumanfreedom. Freedomisimportantbecause,onKant’sview,moralappraisal presupposesthatwearefreeinthesensethatwehavetheabilityto dootherwise.Toseewhy,considerKant’sexampleofamanwhocommits atheft(5:95ff.).Kantholdsthatinorderforthisman’sactiontobe morallywrong,itmusthavebeenwithinhiscontrolinthesensethat itwaswithinhispoweratthetimenottohavecommittedthetheft.If thiswasnotwithinhiscontrolatthetime,then,whileitmaybe usefultopunishhiminordertoshapehisbehaviorortoinfluence others,itneverthelesswouldnotbecorrecttosaythathisactionwas morallywrong.Moralrightnessandwrongnessapplyonlytofreeagents whocontroltheiractionsandhaveitintheirpower,atthetimeof theiractions,eithertoactrightlyornot.AccordingtoKant,thisis justcommonsense. Onthesegrounds,Kantrejectsatypeofcompatibilismthathecalls the“comparativeconceptoffreedom”andassociateswith Leibniz(5:96–97).(NotethatKanthasaspecifictypeof compatibilisminmind,whichIwillrefertosimplyas “compatibilism,”althoughtheremaybeothertypesof compatibilismthatdonotfitKant’scharacterizationofthat view).Onthecompatibilistview,asKantunderstandsit,Iamfree wheneverthecauseofmyactioniswithinme.SoIamunfreeonlywhen somethingexternaltomepushesormovesme,butIamfreewhenever theproximatecauseofmybody’smovementisinternaltomeasan “actingbeing”(5:96).Ifwedistinguishbetween involuntaryconvulsionsandvoluntarybodilymovements,thenonthis viewfreeactionsarejustvoluntarybodilymovements.Kantridicules thisviewasa“wretchedsubterfuge”thattriestosolve anancientphilosophicalproblem“withalittlequibblingabout words”(ibid.).Thisview,hesays,assimilateshumanfreedomto “thefreedomofaturnspit,”oraprojectileinflight,or themotionofaclock’shands(5:96–97).Theproximatecausesof thesemovementsareinternaltotheturnspit,theprojectile,andthe clockatthetimeofthemovement.Thiscannotbesufficientformoral responsibility. Whynot?Thereason,Kantsays,isultimatelythatthecausesofthese movementsoccurintime.Returntothetheftexample.Acompatibilist wouldsaythatthethief’sactionisfreebecauseitsproximatecause isinsidehim,andbecausethetheftwasnotaninvoluntaryconvulsion butavoluntaryaction.Thethiefdecidedtocommitthetheft,andhis actionflowedfromthisdecision.AccordingtoKant,however,ifthe thief’sdecisionisanaturalphenomenonthatoccursintime,thenit mustbetheeffectofsomecausethatoccurredinaprevioustime.This isanessentialpartofKant’sNewtonianworldviewandisgroundedin theapriorilaws(specifically,thecategoryofcauseandeffect)in accordancewithwhichourunderstandingconstructsexperience:every eventhasacausethatbeginsinanearliertime.Ifthatcausetoowas aneventoccurringintime,thenitmustalsohaveacausebeginningin astillearliertime,etc.Allnaturaleventsoccurintimeandare thoroughlydeterminedbycausalchainsthatstretchbackwardsintothe distantpast.Sothereisnoroomforfreedominnature,whichis deterministicinastrongsense. Therootoftheproblem,forKant,istime.Again,ifthethief’s choicetocommitthetheftisanaturaleventintime,thenitisthe effectofacausalchainextendingintothedistantpast.Butthepast isoutofhiscontrolnow,inthepresent.Oncethepastispast,he can’tchangeit.OnKant’sview,thatiswhyhisactionswouldnotbe inhiscontrolinthepresentiftheyaredeterminedbyeventsinthe past.Evenifhecouldcontrolthosepasteventsinthepast,hecannot controlthemnow.Butinfactpasteventswerenotinhiscontrolin thepasteitheriftheytooweredeterminedbyeventsinthemore distantpast,becauseeventuallythecausalantecedentsofhisaction stretchbackbeforehisbirth,andobviouslyeventsthatoccurred beforehisbirthwereneverinhiscontrol.Soifthethief’schoiceto committhetheftisanaturaleventintime,thenitisnotnowand neverwasinhiscontrol,andhecouldnothavedoneotherwisethanto committhetheft.Inthatcase,itwouldbeamistaketoholdhim morallyresponsibleforit. Compatibilism,asKantunderstandsit,thereforelocatestheissuein thewrongplace.Evenifthecauseofmyactionisinternaltome,if itisinthepast–forexample,ifmyactiontodayis determinedbyadecisionImadeyesterday,orfromthecharacterI developedinchildhood–thenitisnotwithinmycontrol now.Therealissueisnotwhetherthecauseofmyactionisinternal orexternaltome,butwhetheritisinmycontrolnow.ForKant, however,thecauseofmyactioncanbewithinmycontrolnowonlyif itisnotintime.ThisiswhyKantthinksthattranscendental idealismistheonlywaytomakesenseofthekindoffreedomthat moralityrequires.Transcendentalidealismallowsthatthecause ofmyactionmaybeathinginitselfoutsideoftime:namely,my noumenalself,whichisfreebecauseitisnotpartofnature.No matterwhatkindofcharacterIhavedevelopedorwhatexternal influencesactonme,onKant’sviewallofmyintentional,voluntary actionsareimmediateeffectsofmynoumenalself,whichiscausally undetermined(5:97–98).Mynoumenalselfisanuncausedcause outsideoftime,whichthereforeisnotsubjecttothedeterministic lawsofnatureinaccordancewithwhichourunderstandingconstructs experience. ManypuzzlesariseonthispicturethatKantdoesnotresolve.For example,ifmyunderstandingconstructsallappearancesinmy experienceofnature,notonlyappearancesofmyownactions,thenwhy amIresponsibleonlyformyownactionsbutnotforeverythingthat happensinthenaturalworld?Moreover,ifIamnotaloneintheworld buttherearemanynoumenalselvesactingfreelyandincorporating theirfreeactionsintotheexperiencetheyconstruct,thenhowdo multipletranscendentallyfreeagentsinteract?Howdoyouintegratemy freeactionsintotheexperiencethatyourunderstanding constructs?[21] Inspiteofthese unsolvedpuzzles,Kantholdsthatwecanmakesenseofmoralappraisal andresponsibilityonlybythinkingabouthumanfreedominthisway, becauseitistheonlywaytopreventnaturalnecessityfrom underminingboth. Finally,sinceKantinvokestranscendentalidealismtomakesense offreedom,interpretinghisthinkingaboutfreedomleadsusbackto disputesbetweenthetwo-objectsandtwo-aspectsinterpretationsof transcendentalidealism.Onthefaceofit,thetwo-objects interpretationseemstomakebettersenseofKant’sviewof transcendentalfreedomthanthetwo-aspectsinterpretation.If moralityrequiresthatIamtranscendentallyfree,thenitseemsthat mytrueself,andnotjustanaspectofmyself,mustbeoutsideof time,accordingtoKant’sargument.Butapplyingthetwo-objects interpretationtofreedomraisesproblemsofitsown,sinceit involvesmakingadistinctionbetweennoumenalandphenomenalselves thatdoesnotariseonthetwo-aspectsview.Ifonlymynoumenalself isfree,andfreedomisrequiredformoralresponsibility,thenmy phenomenalselfisnotmorallyresponsible.Buthowaremynoumenal andphenomenalselvesrelated,andwhyispunishmentinflictedon phenomenalselves?Itisunclearwhetherandtowhatextentappealing toKant’stheoryoffreedomcanhelptosettledisputesaboutthe properinterpretationoftranscendentalidealism,sincethereare seriousquestionsaboutthecoherenceofKant’stheoryoneither interpretation. 5.3Thefactofreason Canweknowthatwearefreeinthistranscendentalsense?Kant’s responseistricky.Ontheonehand,hedistinguishesbetween theoreticalknowledgeandmorallyjustifiedbelief (A820–831/B848–859).Wedonothavetheoreticalknowledge thatwearefreeoraboutanythingbeyondthelimitsofpossible experience,butwearemorallyjustifiedinbelievingthatwearefree inthissense.Ontheotherhand,Kantalsousesstrongerlanguage thanthiswhendiscussingfreedom.Forexample,hesaysthat “amongalltheideasofspeculativereasonfreedomistheonly onethepossibilityofwhichweknowapriori,thoughwithouthaving anyinsightintoit,becauseitistheconditionofthemorallaw, whichwedoknow.”Inafootnotetothispassage,Kantexplains thatweknowfreedomaprioribecause“weretherenofreedom, themorallawwouldnotbeencounteredatallinourselves,”and onKant’svieweveryonedoesencounterthemorallawapriori (5:4).Forthisreason,Kantclaimsthatthemorallaw “proves”theobjective,“thoughonlypractical, undoubtedreality”offreedom(5:48–49).SoKantwantsto saythatwedohaveknowledgeoftherealityoffreedom,butthatthis ispracticalknowledgeofapracticalreality,orcognition “onlyforpracticalpurposes,”bywhichhemeansto distinguishitfromtheoreticalknowledgebasedonexperienceor reflectionontheconditionsofexperience(5:133).Ourpractical knowledgeoffreedomisbasedinsteadonthemorallaw.Thedifference betweenKant’sstrongerandweakerlanguageseemsmainlytobethat hisstrongerlanguageemphasizesthatourbelieforpractical knowledgeaboutfreedomisunshakeableandthatitinturnprovides supportforothermorallygroundedbeliefsinGodandtheimmortality ofthesoul. Kantcallsourconsciousnessofthemorallaw,ourawarenessthatthe morallawbindsusorhasauthorityoverus,the“factof reason”(5:31–32,42–43,47,55).So,onhisview, thefactofreasonisthepracticalbasisforourbelieforpractical knowledgethatwearefree.Kantinsiststhatthismoral consciousnessis“undeniable,”“apriori,”and “unavoidable”(5:32,47,55).Everyhumanbeinghasa conscience,acommonsensegraspofmorality,andafirmconviction thatheorsheismorallyaccountable.Wemayhavedifferentbeliefs aboutthesourceofmorality’sauthority–God,social convention,humanreason.Wemayarriveatdifferentconclusionsabout whatmoralityrequiresinspecificsituations.Andwemayviolateour ownsenseofduty.Butweallhaveaconscience,andanunshakeable beliefthatmoralityappliestous.AccordingtoKant,thisbelief cannotanddoesnotneedtobejustifiedor“provedbyany deduction”(5:47).Itisjustaground-levelfactabouthuman beingsthatweholdourselvesmorallyaccountable.ButKantismaking anormativeclaimhereaswell:itisalsoafact,whichcannotand doesnotneedtobejustified,thatwearemorallyaccountable,that moralitydoeshaveauthorityoverus.Kantholdsthatphilosophy shouldbeinthebusinessofdefendingthiscommonsensemoralbelief, andthatinanycasewecouldneverproveordisproveit(4:459). Kantmayholdthatthefactofreason,orourconsciousnessofmoral obligation,impliesthatwearefreeonthegroundsthatoughtimplies can.Inotherwords,Kantmaybelievethatitfollowsfromthefact thatweought(morally)todosomethingthatwecanorareabletodo it.Thisissuggested,forexample,byapassageinwhichKantasksus toimaginesomeonethreatenedbyhisprincewithimmediateexecution unlesshe“give[s]falsetestimonyagainstanhonorablemanwhomthe princewouldliketodestroyunderaplausiblepretext.”Kantsaysthat “[h]ewouldperhapsnotventuretoassertwhetherhewoulddoitor not,buthemustadmitwithouthesitationthatitwouldbepossiblefor him.Hejudges,therefore,thathecandosomethingbecauseheisaware thatheoughttodoitandcognizesfreedomwithinhim,which,without themorallaw,wouldhaveremainedunknowntohim”(5:30).Thisisa hypotheticalexampleofanactionnotyetcarriedout.Itseemsthat pangsofguiltabouttheimmoralityofanactionthatyoucarriedout inthepast,onthisreasoning,wouldimplymoredirectlythatyouhave (oratleasthad)theabilitytoactotherwisethanyoudid,and thereforethatyouarefreeinKant’ssense. 5.4Thecategoricalimperative InboththeGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMoralsandtheCritique ofPracticalReason,Kantalsogivesamoredetailedargumentforthe conclusionthatmoralityandfreedomreciprocallyimplyoneanother, whichissometimescalledthereciprocitythesis(Allison1990).On thisview,toactmorallyistoexercisefreedom,andtheonlywayto fullyexercisefreedomistoactmorally.Kant’sargumentsforthis viewdifferinthesetexts,butthegeneralstructureofhisargument intheCritiqueofPracticalReasonmaybesummarizedasfollows. First,itfollowsfromthebasicideaofhavingawillthattoactat allistoactonsomeprinciple,orwhatKantcallsamaxim.Amaxim isasubjectiveruleorpolicyofaction:itsayswhatyouaredoing andwhy.Kantgivesasexamplesthemaxims“toletno insultpassunavenged”and“toincreasemywealthbyevery safemeans”(5:19,27).Wemaybeunawareofourmaxims,wemay notactconsistentlyonthesamemaxims,andourmaximsmaynotbe consistentwithoneanother.ButKantholdsthatsincewearerational beingsouractionsalwaysaimatsomesortofendorgoal,whichour maximexpresses.Thegoalofanactionmaybesomethingasbasicas gratifyingadesire,oritmaybesomethingmorecomplexsuchas becomingadoctororalawyer.Inanycase,thecausesofouractions areneverourdesiresorimpulses,onKant’sview.IfIacttogratify somedesire,thenIchoosetoactonamaximthatspecifiesthe gratificationofthatdesireasthegoalofmyaction.Forexample,if Idesiresomecoffee,thenImayactonthemaximtogotoacafeand buysomecoffeeinordertogratifythatdesire. Second,Kantdistinguishesbetweentwobasickindsofprinciplesor rulesthatwecanacton:whathecallsmaterialandformalprinciples. Toactinordertosatisfysomedesire,aswhenIactonthemaximto goforcoffeeatacafe,istoactonamaterialprinciple(5:21ff.). Herethedesire(forcoffee)fixesthegoal,whichKantcallsthe objectormatteroftheaction,andtheprinciplesayshowtoachieve thatgoal(gotoacafe).Correspondingtomaterialprinciples,on Kant’sview,arewhathecallshypotheticalimperatives.Ahypothetical imperativeisaprincipleofrationalitythatsaysIshouldactin acertainwayifIchoosetosatisfysomedesire.Ifmaximsingeneral arerulesthatdescribehowonedoesact,thenimperativesingeneral prescribehowoneshouldact.Animperativeishypotheticalifitsays howIshouldactonlyifIchoosetopursuesomegoalinorderto gratifyadesire(5:20).This,forexample,isahypothetical imperative:ifyouwantcoffee,thengotothecafe.Thishypothetical imperativeappliestoyouonlyifyoudesirecoffeeandchooseto gratifythatdesire. Incontrasttomaterialprinciples,formalprinciplesdescribehowone actswithoutmakingreferencetoanydesires.Thisiseasiestto understandthroughthecorrespondingkindofimperative,whichKant callsacategoricalimperative.Acategoricalimperativecommands unconditionallythatIshouldactinsomeway.Sowhilehypothetical imperativesapplytomeonlyontheconditionthatIhaveandsetthe goalofsatisfyingthedesiresthattheytellmehowtosatisfy, categoricalimperativesapplytomenomatterwhatmygoalsanddesires maybe.Kantregardsmorallawsascategoricalimperatives,whichapply toeveryoneunconditionally.Forexample,themoralrequirementtohelp othersinneeddoesnotapplytomeonlyifIdesiretohelpothersin need,andthedutynottostealisnotsuspendedifIhavesomedesire thatIcouldsatisfybystealing.Morallawsdonothavesuch conditionsbutratherapplyunconditionally.Thatiswhytheyapplyto everyoneinthesameway. Third,insofarasIactonlyonmaterialprinciplesorhypothetical imperatives,Idonotactfreely,butratherIactonlytosatisfysome desire(s)thatIhave,andwhatIdesireisnotultimatelywithinmy control.Tosomelimitedextentwearecapableofrationallyshaping ourdesires,butinsofaraswechoosetoactinordertosatisfy desireswearechoosingtoletnaturegovernusratherthangoverning ourselves(5:118).Wearealwaysfreeinthesensethatwealwayshave thecapacitytogovernourselvesrationallyinsteadoflettingour desiressetourendsforus.Butwemay(freely)failtoexercisethat capacity.Moreover,sinceKantholdsthatdesiresnevercauseusto act,butratherwealwayschoosetoactonamaximevenwhenthatmaxim specifiesthesatisfactionofadesireasthegoalofouraction,it alsofollowsthatwearealwaysfreeinthesensethatwefreelychoose ourmaxims.Nevertheless,ouractionsarenotfreeinthesenseof beingautonomousifwechoosetoactonlyonmaterialprinciples,becausein thatcasewedonotgivethelawtoourselves,butinsteadwechooseto allownatureinus(ourdesires)todeterminethelawforour actions. Finally,theonlywaytoactfreelyinthefullsenseofexercising autonomyisthereforetoactonformalprinciplesorcategorical imperatives,whichisalsotoactmorally.Kantdoesnotmeanthat actingautonomouslyrequiresthatwetakenoaccountofourdesires, whichwouldbeimpossible(5:25,61).Rather,heholdsthatwe typicallyformulatemaximswithaviewtosatisfyingourdesires,but that“assoonaswedrawupmaximsofthewillfor ourselves”webecomeimmediatelyconsciousofthemorallaw (5:29).Thisimmediateconsciousnessofthemorallawtakesthe followingform: Ihave,forexample,madeitmymaximtoincreasemywealthbyevery safemeans.NowIhaveadepositinmyhands,theownerofwhichhas diedandleftnorecordofit.Thisis,naturally,acaseformymaxim. NowIwantonlytoknowwhetherthatmaximcouldalsoholdasa universalpracticallaw.Ithereforeapplythemaximtothepresent caseandaskwhetheritcouldindeedtaketheformofalaw,and consequentlywhetherIcouldthroughmymaximatthesametimegive suchalawasthis:thateveryonemaydenyadepositwhichnoonecan provehasbeenmade.Iatoncebecomeawarethatsuchaprinciple,asa law,wouldannihilateitselfsinceitwouldbringitaboutthatthere wouldbenodepositsatall.(5:27) Inotherwords,toassessthemoralpermissibilityofmymaxim,Iask whethereveryonecouldactonit,orwhetheritcouldbewilledasauniversal law.Theissueisnotwhetheritwouldbegoodifeveryoneactedonmy maxim,orwhetherIwouldlikeit,butonlywhetheritwouldbe possibleformymaximtobewilledasauniversallaw.Thisgetsattheform,not thematterorcontent,ofthemaxim.Amaximhasmorallypermissible form,forKant,onlyifitcouldbewilledasauniversallaw.Ifmymaximfails thistest,asthisonedoes,thenitismorallyimpermissibleformeto actonit. Ifmymaximpassestheuniversallawtest,thenitismorally permissibleformetoactonit,butIfullyexercisemyautonomyonly ifmyfundamentalreasonforactingonthismaximisthatitis morallypermissibleorrequiredthatIdoso.ImaginethatIammoved byafeelingofsympathytoformulatethemaximtohelpsomeonein need.Inthiscase,myoriginalreasonforformulatingthismaximis thatacertainfeelingmovedme.Suchfeelingsarenotentirelywithin mycontrolandmaynotbepresentwhensomeoneactuallyneedsmy help.ButthismaximpassesKant’stest:itcouldbewilledasa universallawthateveryonehelpothersinneedfrommotivesof sympathy.Soitwouldnotbewrongtoactonthismaximwhenthe feelingofsympathysomovesme.Buthelpingothersinneedwouldnot fullyexercisemyautonomyunlessmyfundamentalreasonfordoingso isnotthatIhavesomefeelingordesire,butratherthatitwouldbe rightoratleastpermissibletodoso.Onlywhensuchapurelyformal principlesuppliesthefundamentalmotiveformyactiondoIact autonomously. Sothemorallawisalawofautonomyinthesensethat“freedom andunconditionalpracticallawreciprocallyimplyeachanother” (5:29).Evenwhenmymaximsareoriginallysuggestedbymyfeelings anddesires,ifIactonlyonmorallypermissible(orrequired)maxims becausetheyaremorallypermissible(orrequired),thenmyactions willbeautonomous.Andthereverseistrueaswell:forKantthisis theonlywaytoact autonomously.[22] 6.Thehighestgoodandpracticalpostulates Kantholdsthatreasonunavoidablyproducesnotonlyconsciousness ofthemorallawbutalsotheideaofaworldinwhichthereisboth completevirtueandcompletehappiness,whichhecallsthehighest good.Ourdutytopromotethehighestgood,onKant’sview,isthesum ofallmoralduties,andwecanfulfillthisdutyonlyifwebelieve thatthehighestgoodisapossiblestateofaffairs.Furthermore,we canbelievethatthehighestgoodispossibleonlyifwealsobelieve intheimmortalityofthesoulandtheexistenceofGod,accordingto Kant.Onthisbasis,heclaimsthatitismorallynecessarytobelieve intheimmortalityofthesoulandtheexistenceofGod,whichhecalls postulatesofpurepracticalreason.Thissectionbrieflyoutlines Kant’sviewofthehighestgoodandhisargumentforthesepractical postulatesintheCritiqueofPracticalReasonandotherworks. 6.1Thehighestgood Intheprevioussectionwesawthat,onKant’sview,themorallawis apurelyformalprinciplethatcommandsustoactonlyonmaximsthat havewhathecallslawgivingform,whichmaximshaveonlyiftheycan bewilledasuniversallaws.Moreover,ourfundamentalreasonfor choosingtoactonsuchmaximsshouldbethattheyhavethislawgiving form,ratherthanthatactingonthemwouldachievesomeendorgoal thatwouldsatisfyadesire(5:27).Forexample,Ishouldhelpothers inneednot,atbottom,becausedoingsowouldmakemefeelgood,even ifitwould,butratherbecauseitisright;anditisright(or permissible)tohelpothersinneedbecausethismaximcanbewilled asauniversallaw. AlthoughKantholdsthatthemoralityofanactiondependsonthe formofitsmaximratherthanitsendorgoal,heneverthelessclaims boththateveryhumanactionhasanendandthatweareunavoidably concernedwiththeconsequencesofouractions(4:437;5:34;6:5–7, 385).Thisisnotamoralrequirementbutsimplypartofwhatitmeans tobearationalbeing.Moreover,Kantalsoholdsthestrongerview thatitisanunavoidablefeatureofhumanreasonthatweformideas notonlyabouttheimmediateandnear-termconsequencesofouractions, butalsoaboutultimateconsequences.Thisisthepractical manifestationofreason’sgeneraldemandforwhatKantcalls“the unconditioned” (5:107–108).[23] Inparticular,since wenaturallyhavedesiresandinclinations,andourreasonhas“a commission”toattendtothesatisfactionofourdesiresand inclinations,onKant’sviewweunavoidablyformanideaofthemaximal satisfactionofallourinclinationsanddesires,whichhecalls happiness(5:61,22,124).Thisideaisindeterminate,however,since nobodycanknow“whathereallywishesandwills”andthuswhatwould makehimcompletelyhappy(4:418).Wealsoformtheideaofamoral worldorrealmofends,inwhicheveryoneactsonlyinaccordancewith maximsthatcanbeuniversallaws(A808/B836,4:433ff.). Butneitheroftheseideasbyitselfexpressesourunconditionally completeend,ashumanreasondemandsinitspracticaluse.Aperfectly moralworldbyitselfwouldnotconstituteour“wholeandcompletegood […]eveninthejudgmentofanimpartialreason,”becauseitishuman naturealsotoneedhappiness(5:110,25).Andhappinessbyitself wouldnotbeunconditionallygood,becausemoralvirtueisacondition ofworthinesstobehappy(5:111).Soourunconditionallycompleteend mustcombinebothvirtueandhappiness.InKant’swords,“virtueand happinesstogetherconstitutepossessionofthehighestgoodina person,andhappinessdistributedinexactproportiontomorality(as theworthofapersonandhisworthinesstobehappy)constitutesthe highestgoodofapossibleworld”(5:110–111).Itisthisidealworld combiningcompletevirtuewithcompletehappinessthatKantnormally hasinmindwhenhediscussesthehighestgood. Kantsaysthatwehaveadutytopromotethehighestgood,takenin thissense(5:125).Hedoesnotmean,however,tobeidentifyingsome newdutythatisnotderivedfromthemorallaw,inadditiontoallthe particulardutieswehavethatarederivedfromthemoral law.[24] Forexample,he isnotclaimingthatinadditiontomydutiestohelpothersinneed, nottocommittheft,etc.,Ialsohavetheadditionaldutytorepresent thehighestgoodasthefinalendofallmoralconduct,combinedwith happiness,andtopromotethatend.Rather,aswehaveseen,Kantholds thatitisanunavoidablefeatureofhumanreasoning,insteadofa moralrequirement,thatwerepresentallparticulardutiesasleading towardthepromotionofthehighestgood.Sothedutytopromotethe highestgoodisnotaparticulardutyatall,butthesumofallour dutiesderivedfromthemorallaw–it“doesnotincreasethenumberof morality’sdutiesbutratherprovidesthesewithaspecialpointof referencefortheunificationofallends”(6:5).NordoesKantmean thatanyonehasadutytorealizeoractuallybringaboutthehighest goodthroughtheirownpower,althoughhislanguagesometimessuggests this(5:113,122).Rather,atleastinhislaterworksKantclaimsthat onlythecommonstrivingofanentire“ethicalcommunity”canactually producethehighestgood,andthatthedutyofindividualsisto promote(butnotsingle-handedlyproduce)thisendwithalloftheir strengthbydoingwhatthemorallawcommands(6:97–98, 390–394).[25] Finally,accordingtoKantwemustconceiveofthehighestgoodasa possiblestateofaffairsinordertofulfillourdutytopromoteit. HereKantdoesnotmeanthatweunavoidablyrepresentthehighestgood aspossible,sincehisviewisthatwemustrepresentitaspossible onlyifwearetofulfillourdutyofpromotingit,andyetwemayfailat doingourduty.Rather,wehaveachoiceaboutwhethertoconceiveof thehighestgoodaspossible,toregarditasimpossible,ortoremain noncommittal(5:144–145).Butwecanfulfillourdutyofpromotingthe highestgoodonlybychoosingtoconceiveofthehighestgoodas possible,becausewecannotpromoteanyendwithoutbelievingthatit ispossibletoachievethatend(5:122).Sofulfillingthesumofall moraldutiestopromotethehighestgoodrequiresbelievingthata worldofcompletevirtueandhappinessisnotsimply“aphantomofthe mind”butcouldactuallyberealized(5:472). 6.2Thepostulatesofpurepracticalreason Kantarguesthatwecancomplywithourdutytopromotethehighest goodonlyifwebelieveintheimmortalityofthesoulandthe existenceofGod.Thisisbecausetocomplywiththatdutywemust believethatthehighestgoodispossible,andyettobelievethatthe highestgoodispossiblewemustbelievethatthesoulisimmortaland thatGodexists,accordingto Kant.[26] ConsiderfirstKant’smoralargumentforbeliefinimmortality.The highestgood,aswehaveseen,wouldbeaworldofcompletemorality andhappiness.ButKantholdsthatitisimpossiblefor“arational beingofthesensibleworld”toexhibit“completeconformityof dispositionswiththemorallaw,”whichhecalls“holiness,”becausewe canneverextirpatethepropensityofourreasontogivepriorityto theincentivesofinclinationovertheincentiveofduty,which propensityKantcallsradicalevil(5:122,6:37).Kantclaimsthat themorallawneverthelessrequiresholiness,however,andthatittherefore “canonlybefoundinanendlessprogresstowardthatcomplete conformity,”orprogressthatgoestoinfinity(5:122).Thisdoesnot meanthatwecansubstituteendlessprogresstowardcompleteconformity withthemorallawforholinessintheconceptofthehighestgood,but ratherthatwemustrepresentthatcompleteconformityasaninfinite progresstowardthelimitofholiness.Kantcontinues:“Thisendless progressis,however,possibleonlyonthepresuppositionofthe existenceandpersonalityofthesamerationalbeingcontinuing endlessly(whichiscalledtheimmortalityofthesoul).Hencethe highestgoodispracticallypossibleonlyonthepresuppositionofthe immortalityofthesoul,sothatthis,asinseparablewiththemoral law,isapostulateofpurepracticalreason”(ibid.).Kant’sideais notthatweshouldimagineourselvesattainingholinesslateralthough wearenotcapableofitinthislife.Rather,hisviewisthatwemust representholinessascontinualprogresstowardcompleteconformityof ourdispositionswiththemorallawthatbeginsinthislifeand extendsintoinfinity. Kant’smoralargumentforbeliefinGodintheCritiqueofPractical Reasonmaybesummarizedasfollows.Kantholdsthatvirtueand happinessarenotjustcombinedbutnecessarilycombinedintheideaof thehighestgood,becauseonlypossessingvirtuemakesoneworthyof happiness–aclaimthatKantseemstoregardaspartofthecontentof themorallaw(4:393;5:110,124).Butwecanrepresentvirtueand happinessasnecessarilycombinedonlybyrepresentingvirtueasthe efficientcauseofhappiness.Thismeansthatwemustrepresentthe highestgoodnotsimplyasastateofaffairsinwhicheveryoneisboth happyandvirtuous,butratherasoneinwhicheveryoneishappy becausetheyarevirtuous(5:113–114,124).However,itisbeyondthe powerofhumanbeings,bothindividuallyandcollectively,toguarantee thathappinessresultsfromvirtue,andwedonotknowanylawof naturethatguaranteesthiseither.Therefore,wemustconcludethat thehighestgoodisimpossible,unlesswepostulate“theexistenceofa causeofnature,distinctfromnature,whichcontainsthegroundof thisconnection,namelytheexactcorrespondenceofhappinesswith morality”(5:125).ThiscauseofnaturewouldhavetobeGodsinceit musthavebothunderstandingandwill.Kantprobablydoesnot conceiveofGodastheefficientcauseofahappinessthatisrewarded inafuturelifetothosewhoarevirtuousinthisone.Rather,his viewisprobablythatwerepresentourendlessprogresstoward holiness,beginningwiththislifeandextendingintoinfinity,asthe efficientcauseofourhappiness,whichlikewisebeginsinthislife andextendstoafutureone,inaccordancewithteleologicallawsthat Godauthorsandcausestoharmonizewithefficientcausesinnature (A809–812/B837–840;5:127–131,447–450). Bothoftheseargumentsaresubjectiveinthesensethat,ratherthan attemptingtoshowhowtheworldmustbeconstitutedobjectivelyin orderforthehighestgoodtobepossible,theypurporttoshowonly howwemustconceiveofthehighestgoodinordertobesubjectively capablebothofrepresentingitaspossibleandoffulfillingourduty topromoteit.ButKantalsoclaimsthatbothargumentshavean objectivebasis:first,inthesensethatitcannotbeproven objectivelyeitherthatimmortalityorGod’sexistenceareimpossible; and,second,inthesensethatbothargumentsproceedfromadutyto promotethehighestgoodthatisbasednotonthesubjectivecharacter ofhumanreasonbutonthemorallaw,whichisobjectivelyvalidfor allrationalbeings.Sowhileitisnot,strictlyspeaking,adutyto believeinGodorimmortality,wemustbelievebothinordertofulfill ourdutytopromotethehighestgood,giventhesubjectivecharacterof humanreason. Toseewhy,considerwhatwouldhappenifwedidnotbelieveinGodor immortality,accordingtoKant.IntheCritiqueofPureReason,Kant seemstosaythatthiswouldleaveuswithoutanyincentivetobe moral,andeventhatthemorallawwouldbeinvalidwithoutGodand immortality(A813/B841,A468/B496).ButKantlaterrejectsthisview (8:139).Hismatureviewisthatourreasonwouldbeinconflictwith itselfifwedidnotbelieveinGodandimmortality,becausepure practicalreasonwouldrepresentthemorallawasauthoritativeforus andsopresentuswithanincentivethatissufficienttodetermineour will;butpuretheoretical(i.e.,speculative)reasonwouldundermine thisincentivebydeclaringmoralityanemptyideal,sinceitwouldnot beabletoconceiveofthehighestgoodaspossible(5:121,143, 471–472,450–453).Inotherwords,themorallawwouldremainvalidand provideanyrationalbeingwithsufficientincentivetoactfromduty, butwewouldbeincapableofactingasrationalbeings,since“itisa conditionofhavingreasonatall[…]thatitsprinciplesand affirmationsmustnotcontradictoneanother”(5:120).Theonlywayto bringspeculativeandpracticalreason“intothatrelationofequality inwhichreasoningeneralcanbeusedpurposively”istoaffirmthe postulatesonthegroundsthatpurepracticalreasonhasprimacyover speculativereason.Thismeans,Kantexplains,thatifthecapacityof speculativereason“doesnotextendtoestablishingcertain propositionsaffirmatively,althoughtheydonotcontradictit,assoon asthesesamepropositionsbelonginseparablytothepracticalinterest ofpurereasonitmustacceptthem[…,]beingmindful,however,that thesearenotitsinsightsbutareyetextensionsofitsusefrom another,namelyapracticalperspective”(5:121).Theprimacyof practicalreasonisakeyelementofKant’sresponsetothecrisisof theEnlightenment,sinceheholdsthatreasondeservesthesovereign authorityentrustedtoitbytheEnlightenmentonlyonthisbasis. 7.Theunityofnatureandfreedom ThisfinalsectionbrieflydiscusseshowKantattemptstounifythe theoreticalandpracticalpartsofhisphilosophicalsysteminthe CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment. 7.1Thegreatchasm InthePrefaceandIntroductiontotheCritiqueofthePowerof Judgment,Kantannouncesthathisgoalintheworkisto“bring [his]entirecriticalenterprisetoanend”bybridgingthe “gulf”or“chasm”thatseparatesthedomainof histheoreticalphilosophy(discussedmainlyintheCritiqueofPure Reason)fromthedomainofhispracticalphilosophy(discussedmainly intheCritiqueofPracticalReason)(5:170,176,195).Inhiswords: “Theunderstandinglegislatesapriorifornature,asobjectof thesenses,foratheoreticalcognitionofitinapossible experience.Reasonlegislatesaprioriforfreedomanditsown causality,asthesupersensibleinthesubject,foranunconditioned practicalcognition.Thedomainoftheconceptofnatureundertheone legislationandthatoftheconceptoffreedomundertheotherare entirelybarredfromanymutualinfluencethattheycouldhaveoneach otherbythemselves(eachinaccordancewithitsfundamentallaws)by thegreatchasmthatseparatesthesupersensiblefromthe appearances”(5:195). OnewaytounderstandtheproblemKantisarticulatinghereisto consideritonceagainintermsofthecrisisofthe Enlightenment.[27] Thecrisiswasthat modernsciencethreatenedtounderminetraditionalmoralandreligious beliefs,andKant’sresponseistoarguethatinfacttheseessential interestsofhumanityareconsistentwithoneanotherwhenreasonis grantedsovereigntyandpracticalreasonisgivenprimacyover speculativereason.Butthetranscendentalidealistframeworkwithin whichKantdevelopsthisresponseseemstopurchasetheconsistencyof theseinterestsatthepriceofsacrificingaunifiedviewoftheworld andourplaceinit.Ifscienceappliesonlytoappearances,while moralandreligiousbeliefsrefertothingsinthemselvesor“the supersensible,”thenhowcanweintegratetheseintoasingle conceptionoftheworldthatenablesustotransitionfromtheone domaintotheother?Kant’ssolutionistointroduceathirdapriori cognitivefaculty,whichhecallsthereflectingpowerofjudgment, thatgivesusateleologicalperspectiveontheworld.Reflecting judgmentprovidestheconceptofteleologyorpurposivenessthat bridgesthechasmbetweennatureandfreedom,andthusunifiesthe theoreticalandpracticalpartsofKant’sphilosophyintoasingle system(5:196–197). ItisimportanttoKantthatathirdfacultyindependentofboth understandingandreasonprovidesthismediatingperspective,because heholdsthatwedonothaveadequatetheoreticalgroundsfor attributingobjectiveteleologytonatureitself,andyetregarding natureasteleologicalsolelyonmoralgroundswouldonlyheightenthe disconnectbetweenourscientificandmoralwaysofviewingtheworld. Theoreticalgroundsdonotjustifyusinattributingobjective teleologytonature,becauseitisnotaconditionof self-consciousnessthatourunderstandingconstructexperiencein accordancewiththeconceptofteleology,whichisnotamongKant’s categoriesortheprinciplesofpureunderstandingthatgroundthe fundamentallawsofnature.Thatiswhyhistheoreticalphilosophy licensesusonlyinattributingmechanicalcausationtonatureitself.Tothislimitedextent,Kantissympathetictothedominantstraininmodern philosophythatbanishesfinalcausesfromnatureandinsteadtreats natureasnothingbutmatterinmotion,whichcanbefullydescribed mathematically.ButKantwantssomehowtoreconcilethismechanistic viewofnaturewithaconceptionofhumanagencythatisessentially teleological.Aswesawintheprevioussection,Kantholdsthat everyhumanactionhasanendandthatthesumofallmoraldutiesis topromotethehighestgood.ItisessentialtoKant’sapproach, however,tomaintaintheautonomyofbothunderstanding(innature) andreason(inmorality),withoutallowingeithertoencroachonthe other’sdomain,andyettoharmonizetheminasinglesystem.This harmonycanbeorchestratedonlyfromanindependentstandpoint,from whichwedonotjudgehownatureisconstitutedobjectively(thatis thejobofunderstanding)orhowtheworldoughttobe(thejobof reason),butfromwhichwemerelyregulateorreflectonourcognition inawaythatenablesustoregarditassystematicallyunified. AccordingtoKant,thisisthetaskofreflectingjudgment,whosea prioriprincipleistoregardnatureaspurposiveorteleological, “butonlyasaregulativeprincipleofthefacultyof cognition”(5:197). 7.2Thepurposivenessofnature IntheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment,Kantdiscussesfourmain waysinwhichreflectingjudgmentleadsustoregardnatureas purposive:first,itleadsustoregardnatureasgovernedbyasystem ofempiricallaws;second,itenablesustomakeaestheticjudgments; third,itleadsustothinkoforganismsasobjectivelypurposive;and, fourth,itultimatelyleadsustothinkaboutthefinalendofnature asa whole.[28] First,reflectingjudgmentenablesustodiscoverempiricallawsof naturebyleadingustoregardnatureasifitweretheproductof intelligentdesign(5:179–186).Wedonotneedreflectingjudgmentto grasptheapriorilawsofnaturebasedonourcategories,suchasthat everyeventhasacause.Butinadditiontotheseapriorilawsnature isalsogovernedbyparticular,empiricallaws,suchasthatfire causessmoke,whichwecannotknowwithoutconsultingexperience.To discovertheselaws,wemustformhypothesesanddeviseexperimentson theassumptionthatnatureisgovernedbyempiricallawsthatwecan grasp(Bxiii–xiv).Reflectingjudgmentmakesthisassumptionthrough itsprincipletoregardnatureaspurposiveforourunderstanding, whichleadsustotreatnatureasifitsempiricallawsweredesigned tobeunderstoodbyus(5:180–181).Sincethisprincipleonlyregulates ourcognitionbutisnotconstitutiveofnatureitself,thisdoesnot amounttoassumingthatnaturereallyistheproductofintelligent design,whichaccordingtoKantwearenotjustifiedinbelievingon theoreticalgrounds.Rather,itamountsonlytoapproachingnaturein thepracticeofscienceasifitweredesignedtobeunderstoodbyus. Wearejustifiedindoingthisbecauseitenablesustodiscover empiricallawsofnature.Butitisonlyaregulativeprincipleof reflectingjudgment,notgenuinetheoreticalknowledge,thatnatureis purposiveinthisway. Second,Kantthinksthataestheticjudgmentsaboutbothbeautyand sublimityinvolveakindofpurposiveness,andthatthebeautyof natureinparticularsuggeststousthatnatureishospitabletoour ends.Accordingtohisaesthetictheory,wejudgeobjectstobe beautifulnotbecausetheygratifyourdesires,sinceaesthetic judgmentsaredisinterested,butratherbecauseapprehendingtheirform stimulateswhathecallstheharmonious“freeplay”ofour understandingandimagination,inwhichwetakeadistinctively aestheticpleasure(5:204–207,217–218,287).Sobeautyisnota propertyofobjects,butarelationbetweentheirformandthewayour cognitivefacultieswork.Yetwemakeaestheticjudgmentsthatclaim intersubjectivevaliditybecauseweassumethatthereisacommonsense thatenablesallhumanbeingstocommunicateaestheticfeeling (5:237–240,293–296).Beautifulartisintentionallycreatedto stimulatethisuniversallycommunicableaestheticpleasure,althoughit iseffectiveonlywhenitseemsunintentional(5:305–307).Natural beauty,however,isunintentional:landscapesdonotknowhowto stimulatethefreeplayofourcognitivefaculties,andtheydonot havethegoalofgivingusaestheticpleasure.Inbothcases,then, beautifulobjectsappearpurposivetousbecausetheygiveusaesthetic pleasureinthefreeplayofourfaculties,buttheyalsodonotappear purposivebecausetheyeitherdonotordonotseemtodothis intentionally.Kantcallsthisrelationbetweenourcognitivefaculties andtheformalqualitiesofobjectsthatwejudgetobebeautiful “subjectivepurposiveness”(5:221).Althoughitisonlysubjective,the purposivenessexhibitedbynaturalbeautyinparticularmaybe interpretedasasignthatnatureishospitabletoourmoralinterests (5:300).Moreover,Kantalsointerpretstheexperienceofsublimityin natureasinvolvingpurposiveness.Butinthiscaseitisnotsomuch thepurposivenessofnatureasourownpurposeor“vocation”asmoral beingsthatwebecomeawareofintheexperienceofthesublime,inwhichthe sizeandpowerofnaturestandinvividcontrasttothesuperior powerofourreason(5:257–260,267–269). Third,Kantarguesthatreflectingjudgmentenablesustoregardliving organismsasobjectivelypurposive,butonlyasaregulativeprinciple thatcompensatesforourinabilitytofullyunderstandthemmechanistically, whichreflectsthelimitationsofourcognitivefacultiesratherthan anyintrinsicteleologyinnature.Wecannotfullyunderstandorganisms mechanisticallybecausetheyare“self-organizing”beings,whoseparts are“combinedintoawholebybeingreciprocallythecauseandeffect oftheirform”(5:373–374).Thepartsofawatcharealsopossibleonly throughtheirrelationtothewhole,butthatisbecausethewatchis designedandproducedbysomerationalbeing.Anorganism,bycontrast, producesandsustainsitself,whichisinexplicabletousunlesswe attributetoorganismspurposesbyanalogywithhumanart(5:374–376). ButKantclaimsthatitisonlyaregulativeprincipleofreflecting judgmenttoregardorganismsinthisway,andthatwearenotjustified inattributingobjectivepurposivenesstoorganismsthemselves,since itisonly“becauseofthepeculiarconstitutionofmycognitive faculties[that]Icannotjudgeaboutthepossibilityofthosethings andtheirgenerationexceptbythinkingofacausefortheseactsin accordancewithintentions”(5:397–398).Specifically,wecannot understandhowawholecanbethecauseofitsownpartsbecausewe dependonsensibleintuitionforthecontentofourthoughtsand thereforemustthinktheparticular(intuition)firstbysubsumingit underthegeneral(aconcept).Toseethatthisisjustalimitationof thehuman,discursiveintellect,imagineabeingwithanintuitive understandingwhosethoughtdoesnotdepend,asoursdoes,onreceiving sensoryinformationpassively,butrathercreatesthecontentofits thoughtintheactofthinkingit.Sucha(divine)beingcould understandhowawholecanbethecauseofitsparts,sinceitcould graspawholeimmediatelywithoutfirstthinkingparticularsandthen combiningthemintoawhole(5:401–410).Therefore,sincewehavea discursiveintellectandcannotknowhowthingswouldappeartoabeing withanintuitiveintellect,andyetwecanonlythinkoforganisms teleologically,whichexcludesmechanism,Kantnowsaysthatwemust thinkofbothmechanismandteleologyonlyasregulativeprinciples thatweneedtoexplainnature,ratherthanasconstitutiveprinciples thatdescribehownatureisintrinsicallyconstituted(5:410ff.). Fourth,KantconcludestheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgmentwitha longappendixarguingthatreflectingjudgmentsupportsmoralityby leadingustothinkaboutthefinalendofnature,whichwecanonly understandinmoralterms,andthatconverselymoralityreinforcesa teleologicalconceptionofnature.Onceitisgrantedontheoretical groundsthatwemustunderstandcertainpartsofnature(organisms) teleologically,althoughonlyasaregulativeprincipleofreflecting judgment,Kantsayswemaygofurtherandregardthewholeofnatureas ateleologicalsystem(5:380–381).Butwecanregardthewholeof natureasateleologicalsystemonlybyemployingtheideaofGod, againonlyregulatively,asitsintelligentdesigner.Thisinvolves attributingwhatKantcallsexternalpurposivenesstonature–thatis, attributingpurposestoGodincreatingnature(5:425).What,then,is God’sfinalendincreatingnature?AccordingtoKant,thefinalendof naturemustbehumanbeings,butonlyasmoralbeings(5:435,444–445). Thisisbecauseonlyhumanbeingsusereasontosetandpursueends, usingtherestofnatureasmeanstotheirends(5:426–427).Moreover, Kantclaimsthathumanhappinesscannotbethefinalendofnature, becauseaswehaveseenheholdsthathappinessisnotunconditionally valuable(5:430–431).Rather,humanlifehasvaluenotbecauseofwhat wepassivelyenjoy,butonlybecauseofwhatweactivelydo(5:434).We canbefullyactiveandautonomous,however,onlybyactingmorally, whichimpliesthatGodcreatedtheworldsothathumanbeingscould exercisemoralautonomy.Sincewealsoneedhappiness,thistoomaybe admittedasaconditionedandconsequentend,sothatreflecting judgmenteventuallyleadsustothehighestgood(5:436).But reflectiononconditionsofthepossibilityofthehighestgoodleads againtoKant’smoralargumentforbeliefinGod’sexistence,whichinturnreinforcestheteleological perspectiveonnaturewithwhichreflectingjudgmentbegan. ThusKantarguesthatalthoughtheoreticalandpracticalphilosophy proceedfromseparateandirreduciblestartingpoints– self-consciousnessasthehighestprincipleforourcognitionof nature,andthemorallawasthebasisforourknowledgeoffreedom– reflectingjudgmentunifiesthemintoasingle,teleologicalworldview thatassignspreeminentvaluetohumanautonomy. Bibliography PrimaryLiterature WorksbyKant ThestandardGermaneditionofKant’sworksis:Königlichen Preußischen(laterDeutschen)AkademiederWissenschaften(ed.), 1900–,KantsgesammelteSchriften,Berlin:GeorgReimer(laterWalter DeGruyter). ThebestEnglisheditionofKant’sworksis:P.GuyerandA.Wood (eds.),1992–,TheCambridgeEditionoftheWorksofImmanuel Kant,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Itsindividual volumesare: Allison,H.,andHeath,P.(eds.),2002,Theoretical Philosophyafter1781,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Ameriks,K.,andNaragon,S.(eds.),1997,Lectureson Metaphysics,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Förster,E.(ed.),1993,OpusPostumum,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Gregor,M.(ed.),1996,PracticalPhilosophy,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Guyer,P.,andWood,A.(eds.),1998,CritiqueofPure Reason,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Guyer,P.(ed.),2000,CritiqueofthePowerof Judgment,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Guyer,P.(ed.),2005,NotesandFragments,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Heath,P.,andSchneewind,J.(eds.),1997,Lectureson Ethics,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Louden,R.,andWood,A.(eds.),2013,Lectureson Anthropology,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Rauscher,F.(ed.),2016,LecturesandDraftsonPolitical Philosophy,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Walford,D.,andMeerbote,R.(eds.),1992,Theoretical Philosophy,1755–1770,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Watkins,E.(ed.),2012,NaturalScience,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Wood,A.,anddiGiovanni,G.(eds.),1996,Religionand RationalTheology,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Young,J.(ed.),1992,LecturesonLogic,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Zöller,G.,andLouden,R.(eds.),2007,Anthropology, History,andEducation,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Zweig,A.(ed.),1999,Correspondence,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. OtherPrimarySources Jacobi,F.,1787,DavidHumeonFaithorIdealismandRealism:A Dialogue,inG.diGiovanni(ed.),TheMainPhilosophicalWritings andtheNovelAllwill,Montreal:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress, 1994. Fichte,J.,1792,AttemptataCritiqueofAllRevelation,in G.Green(ed.),AttemptataCritiqueofAllRevelation, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978. Locke,J.1689,AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding, inP.Nidditch(ed.),AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding, Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975. Reinhold,K.,1786–1790,LettersontheKantianPhilosophy, inK.Ameriks(ed.),LettersontheKantianPhilosophy, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005. Sassen,B.,2000,Kant’sEarlyCritics:TheEmpiricistCritiqueof theTheoreticalPhilosophy,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Tetens,J.,1777,PhilosophischeVersucheüberdie MenschlicheNaturundihreEntwicklung,Hildesheim:Olms, 1979. SecondaryLiterature Allais,L.,2015,ManifestReality:Kant’sIdealismand hisRealism,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Allison,H.,1990,Kant’sTheoryofFreedom, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1996,IdealismandFreedom, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,2001,Kant’sTheoryofTaste:AReading oftheCritiqueofAestheticJudgment,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. –––,2004,Kant’sTranscendentalIdealism: AnInterpretationandDefense,NewHavenandLondon:Yale UniversityPress,RevisedandEnlargedEdition. –––,2015,Kant’sTranscendental Deduction:AnAnalytical-HistoricalCommentary,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. –––,2020,Kant’sConceptionof Freedom:ADevelopmentalandCriticalAnalysis,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Altman,M.(ed.),2017,ThePalgraveKantHandbook, London:PalgraveMacmillan. Ameriks,K.,1978,“Kant’sTranscendentalDeductionas aRegressiveArgument,”Kant-Studien,69:273–87; reprintedinKitcher(ed.)1998,pp.85–102;andinAmeriks 2003,pp.51–66. –––,1982,“RecentWorkonKant’s TheoreticalPhilosophy,”AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly,19:1–24;reprintedinAmeriks2003, pp.67–97. –––,1992,“KantianIdealism Today,”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly,9: 329–342;reprintedinAmeriks2003,98–111. –––,2003,InterpretingKant’s Critiques,Oxford:ClarendonPress. Aquila,R.,1983,RepresentationalMind:AStudyofKant’s TheoryofKnowledge,Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress. Beck,L.,1960,ACommentaryonKant’sCritiqueofPractical Reason,ChicagoandLondon:UniversityofChicagoPress. –––,1965,“Thefactofreason:anessay onjustificationinethics,”inBeck(ed.),Studiesinthe PhilosophyofKant,Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill, pp.200–214;reprintedinBeck2002,pp.45–56. –––,1978,“DidtheSageof KönigsbergHaveNoDreams?”inBeck,EssaysonKantand Hume,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress;reprintedinBeck2002, pp.85–101;andinKitcher(ed.)1998,pp.103–116. –––,2002,SelectedEssaysonKant (Series:NorthAmericanKantSocietyStudiesinPhilosophy), H.Robinson(ed.),Rochester:UniversityofRochesterPress. Beiser,F.,1987,TheFateofReason:GermanPhilosophyfromKant toFichte,CambridgeandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress. –––,1992,“Kant’sIntellectual Development1746–1781,”inGuyer(ed.)1992, pp.26–61. –––,2000,“TheEnlightenmentand Idealism,”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoGerman Idealism,K.Ameriks(ed.),Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,pp.18–36. –––,2002,GermanIdealism:TheStruggle AgainstSubjectivism,1781–1801,CambridgeandLondon: HarvardUniversityPress. Bennett,J.,1966,Kant’sAnalytic,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1974,Kant’sDialectic, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Bird,G.,1962,Kant’sTheoryofKnowledge:AnOutline ofOneCentralArgumentintheCritiqueofPureReason,London: Routledge&KeganPaul. –––,2006,TheRevolutionaryKant:A CommentaryontheCritiqueofPureReason,ChicagoandLaSalle: OpenCourt. Engstrom,S.1992,“TheConceptoftheHighestGoodin Kant’sMoralTheory,”PhilosophyandPhenomenological Research,52(4):747–780. Förster,E.(ed.),1989,Kant’sTranscendental Deductions,Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress. Friedman,M.,2013,Kant’sConstructionofNature, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Gardner,S.,1999,KantandtheCritiqueofPureReason, LondonandNewYork:Routledge. Grier,M.2001,Kant’sDoctrineofTranscendental Illusion,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Ginsborg,H.,1990,TheRoleofTasteinKant’sTheory ofCognition,NewYork:Garland. –––,1997,“KantonAestheticandBiological Purposiveness,”inB.Herman,C.Korsgaard,andT.Hill(eds.), ReclaimingtheHistoryofEthics:EssaysinHonorofJohn Rawls,Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, pp.329–360. –––,2001,“KantonUnderstanding OrganismsasNaturalPurposes,”inE.Watkins(ed.),Kant andtheSciences,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. –––,2006,“Thinkingthe ParticularasContainedintheUniversal,”inKukla(ed.)2006,pp. 35–60. Guyer,P.,1987,KantandtheClaimsofKnowledge, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1992,“Thetranscendentaldeduction ofthecategories,”inGuyer(ed.)1992,pp. 123–160. –––,1993,KantandtheExperienceof Freedom,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1997,KantandtheClaimsof Taste,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2ndedition. –––,2000,KantonFreedom,Law,and Happiness,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,2005,Kant’sSystemofNatureand Freedom,Oxford:ClarendonPress. –––,2006,Kant,LondonandNewYork: Routledge. –––(ed.),1992,TheCambridgeCompanionto Kant,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––(ed.),2006,TheCambridgeCompanionto KantandModernPhilosophy,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. –––(ed.),2010,TheCambridgeCompanionto Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Henrich,D.,1969,“TheProof-StructureofKant’s TranscendentalDeduction,”ReviewofMetaphysics,22: 640–59. –––,1976,Identitätund Objektivität:EineUntersuchungüberKantstranszendentale Deduktion,Heidelberg:CarlWinterUniversitätsverlag. –––,1992,AestheticJudgmentandtheMoral ImageoftheWorld:StudiesinKant,Stanford:Stanford UniversityPress. –––,1994,TheUnityofReason:Essayson Kant’sPhilosophy,R.Velkley(ed.),CambridgeandLondon: HarvardUniversityPress. Hill,T.,1992,DignityandPracticalReasoninKant’sMoral Theory,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress. Höffe,O.,1994,ImmanuelKant,Albany:State UniversityofNewYorkPress. Jankowiak,T.,2017,“KantianPhenomenalismWithout BerkeleyanIdealism,”KantianReview, 22(2):205–231. Kanterian,E.,2018,Kant,God,andMetaphysics,London andNewYork:Routledge. KempSmith,N.,1923,CommentarytoKant’sCritiqueof PureReason,NewYork:HumanitiesPress,2ndedition(1992 reprint). Kitcher,P.(ed.),1998,Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason: CriticalEssays,Lanham,Maryland:Rowman&Littlefield. –––,2011,Kant’sThinker, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Kleingeld,P.,1995,“WhatdotheVirtuousHopefor? Re-readingKant’sDoctrineoftheHighestGood,”inH.Robinson (ed.),ProceedingsoftheEightInternationalKantCongress, Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1:91–112. Korsgaard,C.,1996,CreatingTheKingdomofEnds, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Kuehn,M.,2001,Kant:ABiography,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Kukla,R.(ed.),2006,AestheticsandCognitioninKant’s CriticalPhilosophy,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Langton,R.,1998,KantianHumility:OurIgnoranceofThings inThemselves,Oxford:ClarendonPress. Laywine,A.,1993,Kant’sEarlyMetaphysicsandthe OriginsoftheCriticalPhilosophy(NAKSStudiesinPhilosophy:3), Atascadero,CA:Ridgeview. Longuenesse,B.,1998.KantandtheCapacitytoJudge:Sensibility andDiscursivityintheTranscendentalAnalyticoftheCritiqueofPure Reason,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. –––,2005,Kantonthe HumanStandpoint,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,2006,“Kantonaprioriconcepts:The metaphysicaldeductionofthecategories,”inGuyer(ed.)2006, pp.129–168;alsoinLonguenesse2005,pp.81–116. McFarland,J.,1970,Kant’sConceptofTeleology, Edinburgh:UniversityofEdinburghPress. Neiman,S.,1994,TheUnityofReason:RereadingKant, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. O’Neill,Onora,1989,ConstructionsofReason,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Paton,H.,1936,Kant’sMetaphysicofExperience,London: Allen&Unwin. –––,1947,TheCategoricalImperative, Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress(1971reprint). Prauss,G.,1974,KantunddasProblemderDingeansich, Bonn:Bouvier. Rawls,J.,2000,LecturesontheHistoryofMoral Philosophy,B.Herman(ed.),CambridgeandNewYork:Harvard UniversityPress. Reath,A.,1988,“TwoConceptionsoftheHighestGoodinKant,” JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,26:593–619. Robinson,H.,1994,“TwoPerspectivesonKant’sAppearances andThingsinThemselves,”JournaloftheHistoryof Philosophy,32:411–441. Rohlf,M.,2008,“TheTransitionFromNaturetoFreedominKant’s ThirdCritique,”Kant-Studien,99(3):339–360. –––,2010,“TheIdeasof PureReason,”inGuyer(ed.)2010,pp.190–209. Schönfeld,M.,2000,ThePhilosophyoftheYoungKant: ThePrecriticalProject,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Silber,J.,1959,“Kant’sConceptionoftheHighestGoodas ImmanentandTranscendent,”ThePhilosophicalReview, 68:469–492. Strawson,P.,1966,TheBoundsofSense:AnEssayonKant’s CritiqueofPureReason,LondonandNewYork:Routledge. Sullivan,R.,1989,ImmanuelKant’sMoralTheory, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1994,AnIntroductiontoKant’s Ethics,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. VanCleve,J.,1999,ProblemsFromKant,NewYorkand Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Walford,D.andMeerbote,R.,1992,“General Introduction”and“Introductionstothe translations,”inImmanuelKant:TheoreticalPhilosophy, 1755–1770,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp. xxxv–lxxiv. Willaschek,M.,2018,KantontheSourcesofMetaphysics:The DialecticofPureReason,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Wood,A.,1970,Kant’sMoralReligion,Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress. –––,1984,“Kant’s Compatibilism,”inWood(ed.),SelfandNaturein Kant’sPhilosophy,IthacaandLondon:CornellUniversity Press,pp.73–101;reprintedinKitcher(ed.)1998, pp.239–263. –––,1999,Kant’sEthical Thought,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,2005,Kant,Oxford: Blackwell. Zuckert,R.,2007,KantonBeautyandBiology:An InterpretationoftheCritiqueofJudgment,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. AcademicTools Howtocitethisentry. PreviewthePDFversionofthisentryatthe FriendsoftheSEPSociety. Lookuptopicsandthinkersrelatedtothisentry attheInternetPhilosophyOntologyProject(InPhO). Enhancedbibliographyforthisentry atPhilPapers,withlinkstoitsdatabase. OtherInternetResources BonnerKant-Korpus Kantpapers.org NorthAmericanKantSociety RelatedEntries aesthetics:German,inthe18thcentury| categories| Fichte,JohannGottlieb| Kant,Immanuel:accountofreason| Kant,Immanuel:aestheticsandteleology| Kant,Immanuel:andHumeoncausality| Kant,Immanuel:andHumeonmorality| Kant,Immanuel:andLeibniz| Kant,Immanuel:critiqueofmetaphysics| Kant,Immanuel:moralphilosophy| Kant,Immanuel:philosophicaldevelopment| Kant,Immanuel:philosophyofmathematics| Kant,Immanuel:philosophyofreligion| Kant,Immanuel:philosophyofscience| Kant,Immanuel:socialandpoliticalphilosophy| Kant,Immanuel:theoryofjudgment| Kant,Immanuel:transcendentalarguments| Kant,Immanuel:viewofmindandconsciousnessofself| Kant,Immanuel:viewsonspaceandtime| Leibniz,GottfriedWilhelm| metaphysics| Reinhold,KarlLeonhard| Wolff,Christian Copyright©2020by MichaelRohlf OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. TheEncyclopediaNowNeedsYourSupport PleaseReadHowYouCanHelpKeeptheEncyclopediaFree Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries MirrorSites Viewthissitefromanotherserver: USA(MainSite) Philosophy,StanfordUniversity Infoaboutmirrorsites TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyiscopyright©2021byTheMetaphysicsResearchLab,DepartmentofPhilosophy,StanfordUniversity LibraryofCongressCatalogData:ISSN1095-5054