Moral Dilemmas - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Examples StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop MoralDilemmasFirstpublishedMonApr15,2002;substantiverevisionSatJun16,2018 Moraldilemmas,attheveryleast,involveconflictsbetweenmoral requirements.Considerthecasesgivenbelow. 1.Examples 2.TheConceptofMoralDilemmas 3.Problems 4.DilemmasandConsistency 5.ResponsestotheArguments 6.MoralResidueandDilemmas 7.TypesofMoralDilemmas 8.MultipleMoralities 9.Conclusion Bibliography CitedWorks OtherWorthwhileReadings AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.Examples InBookIofPlato’sRepublic,Cephalusdefines ‘justice’asspeakingthetruthandpayingone’sdebts. Socratesquicklyrefutesthisaccountbysuggestingthatitwouldbe wrongtorepaycertaindebts—forexample,toreturnaborrowed weapontoafriendwhoisnotinhisrightmind.Socrates’pointisnot thatrepayingdebtsiswithoutmoralimport;rather,hewantstoshow thatitisnotalwaysrighttorepayone’sdebts,atleastnotexactly whentheonetowhomthedebtisoweddemandsrepayment.Whatwehave hereisaconflictbetweentwomoralnorms:repayingone’sdebtsand protectingothersfromharm.Andinthiscase,Socratesmaintainsthat protectingothersfromharmisthenormthattakespriority. Nearlytwenty-fourcenturieslater,Jean-PaulSartredescribeda moralconflicttheresolutionofwhichwas,tomany,lessobviousthan theresolutiontothePlatonicconflict.Sartre(1957)tellsofa studentwhosebrotherhadbeenkilledintheGermanoffensiveof1940. Thestudentwantedtoavengehisbrotherandtofightforcesthathe regardedasevil.Butthestudent’smotherwaslivingwithhim,andhe washeroneconsolationinlife.Thestudentbelievedthathehad conflictingobligations.Sartredescribeshimasbeingtornbetweentwo kindsofmorality:oneoflimitedscopebutcertainefficacy,personal devotiontohismother;theotherofmuchwiderscopebutuncertain efficacy,attemptingtocontributetothedefeatofanunjust aggressor. WhiletheexamplesfromPlatoandSartrearetheonesmostcommonly cited,therearemanyothers.Literatureaboundswithsuchcases.In Aeschylus’sAgamemnon,theprotagonistoughttosavehis daughterandoughttoleadtheGreektroopstoTroy;heoughttodo eachbuthecannotdoboth.AndAntigone,inSophocles’splay ofthesamename,oughttoarrangefortheburialofherbrother, Polyneices,andoughttoobeythepronouncementsofthecity’s ruler,Creon;shecandoeachofthesethings,butnotboth.Areasof appliedethics,suchasbiomedicalethics,businessethics,andlegal ethics,arealsorepletewithsuchcases. 2.TheConceptofMoralDilemmas Whatiscommontothetwowell-knowncasesisconflict.Ineach case,anagentregardsherselfashavingmoralreasonstodoeachof twoactions,butdoingbothactionsisnotpossible.Ethicistshave calledsituationslikethesemoraldilemmas.Thecrucial featuresofamoraldilemmaarethese:theagentisrequiredtodoeach oftwo(ormore)actions;theagentcandoeachoftheactions;butthe agentcannotdoboth(orall)oftheactions.Theagentthusseems condemnedtomoralfailure;nomatterwhatshedoes,shewilldo somethingwrong(orfailtodosomethingthatsheoughttodo). ThePlatoniccasestrikesmanyastooeasytobecharacterizedasa genuinemoraldilemma.Fortheagent’ssolutioninthatcaseis clear;itismoreimportanttoprotectpeoplefromharmthantoreturn aborrowedweapon.Andinanycase,theborroweditemcanbereturned later,whentheownernolongerposesathreattoothers.Thusinthis casewecansaythattherequirementtoprotectothersfromserious harmoverridestherequirementtorepayone’sdebtsby returningaborroweditemwhenitsownersodemands.Whenoneofthe conflictingrequirementsoverridestheother,wehaveaconflictbut notagenuinemoraldilemma.Soinadditiontothefeaturesmentioned above,inordertohaveagenuinemoraldilemmaitmustalso betruethatneitheroftheconflictingrequirementsisoverridden (Sinnott-Armstrong1988,Chapter1). 3.Problems ItislessobviousinSartre’scasethatoneoftherequirements overridestheother.Whythisisso,however,maynotbesoobvious. Somewillsaythatouruncertaintyaboutwhattodointhiscaseis simplytheresultofuncertaintyabouttheconsequences.Ifwewere certainthatthestudentcouldmakeadifferenceindefeatingthe Germans,theobligationtojointhemilitarywouldprevail.Butifthe studentmadelittledifferencewhatsoeverinthatcause,thenhis obligationtotendtohismother’sneedswouldtakeprecedence,since thereheisvirtuallycertaintobehelpful.Others,though,willsay thattheseobligationsareequallyweighty,andthatuncertaintyabout theconsequencesisnotatissuehere. EthicistsasdiverseasKant(1971/1797),Mill(1979/1861),andRoss (1930,1939)haveassumedthatanadequatemoraltheoryshouldnot allowforthepossibilityofgenuinemoraldilemmas.Only recently—inthelastsixtyyearsorso—havephilosophers beguntochallengethatassumption.Andthechallengecantakeat leasttwodifferentforms.Somewillarguethatitisnot possibletoprecludegenuinemoraldilemmas.Otherswillargue thatevenifitwerepossible,itisnotdesirabletodo so. Toillustratesomeofthedebatethatoccursregardingwhetheritis possibleforanytheorytoeliminategenuinemoraldilemmas,consider thefollowing.TheconflictsinPlato’scaseandinSartre’scase arosebecausethereismorethanonemoralprecept(using ‘precept’todesignaterulesandprinciples),morethan onepreceptsometimesappliestothesamesituation,andinsomeof thesecasesthepreceptsdemandconflictingactions.Oneobvious solutionherewouldbetoarrangetheprecepts,howevermanythere mightbe,hierarchically.Bythisscheme,thehighestorderedprecept alwaysprevails,thesecondprevailsunlessitconflictswiththe first,andsoon.Thereareatleasttwoglaringproblemswiththis obvioussolution,however.First,itjustdoesnotseemcredibleto holdthatmoralrulesandprinciplesshouldbehierarchically ordered.Whiletherequirementstokeepone’spromisesandtoprevent harmtoothersclearlycanconflict,itisfarfromclearthatoneof theserequirementsshouldalwaysprevailovertheother.In thePlatoniccase,theobligationtopreventharmisclearly stronger.Buttherecaneasilybecaseswheretheharmthatcanbe preventedisrelativelymildandthepromisethatistobekeptis veryimportant.Andmostotherpairsofpreceptsarelikethis.This wasapointmadebyRossinTheRightandtheGood(1930, Chapter2). Thesecondproblemwiththiseasysolutionisdeeper.Evenifitwere plausibletoarrangemoralpreceptshierarchically,situationscan ariseinwhichthesamepreceptgivesrisetoconflictingobligations. Perhapsthemostwidelydiscussedcaseofthissortistakenfrom WilliamStyron’sSophie’sChoice(1980;see Greenspan1983andTessman2015,160–163).Sophieandhertwo childrenareataNaziconcentrationcamp.AguardconfrontsSophie andtellsherthatoneofherchildrenwillbeallowedtoliveandone willbekilled.ButitisSophiewhomustdecidewhichchildwillbe killed.Sophiecanpreventthedeathofeitherofherchildren,but onlybycondemningtheothertobekilled.Theguardmakesthe situationevenmoreexcruciatingbyinformingSophiethatifshe choosesneither,thenbothwillbekilled.Withthisaddedfactor, Sophiehasamorallycompellingreasontochooseoneofherchildren. Butforeachchild,Sophiehasanapparentlyequallystrongreasonto savehimorher.Thusthesamemoralpreceptgivesrisetoconflicting obligations.Somehavecalledsuchcasessymmetrical (Sinnott-Armstrong1988,Chapter2). 4.DilemmasandConsistency Weshallreturntotheissueofwhetheritispossibletopreclude genuinemoraldilemmas.Butwhataboutthedesirabilityofdoingso? Whyhaveethiciststhoughtthattheirtheoriesshouldprecludethe possibilityofdilemmas?Attheintuitivelevel,theexistenceof moraldilemmassuggestssomesortofinconsistency.Anagentcaughtin agenuinedilemmaisrequiredtodoeachoftwoactsbutcannotdo both.Andsincehecannotdoboth,notdoingoneisaconditionof doingtheother.Thus,itseemsthatthesameactisbothrequiredand forbidden.Butexposingalogicalinconsistencytakessomework;for initialinspectionrevealsthattheinconsistencyintuitivelyfeltis notpresent.Allowing\(OA\)todesignatethattheagentin questionoughttodo\(A\)(orismorallyobligatedtodo \(A\),orismorallyrequiredtodo\(A)\),that\(OA\) and\(OB\)arebothtrueisnotitselfinconsistent,evenifone addsthatitisnotpossiblefortheagenttodoboth\(A\)and \(B\).Andevenifthesituationisappropriatelydescribedas \(OA\)and\(O\negA\),thatisnota contradiction;thecontradictoryof\(OA\)is \(\negOA\).(SeeMarcus1980andMcConnell1978,273.) Similarlyrulesthatgeneratemoraldilemmasarenotinconsistent,at leastontheusualunderstandingofthatterm.RuthMarcussuggests plausiblythatwe“defineasetofrulesasconsistentifthere issomepossibleworldinwhichtheyareallobeyableinall circumstancesinthatworld.”Thus,“rulesare consistentiftherearepossiblecircumstancesinwhichnoconflict willemerge,”and“asetofrulesisinconsistentifthere arenocircumstances,nopossibleworld,inwhichallthe rulesaresatisfiable”(Marcus1980,128and129).Kant,Mill,andRosswerelikelyawarethatadilemma-generatingtheory neednotbeinconsistent.Evenso,theywouldbedisturbediftheir owntheoriesallowedforsuchpredicaments.Ifthisspeculationiscorrect,itsuggeststhatKant,Mill,Ross,andothersthought thatthereisanimportanttheoreticalfeaturethatdilemma-generating theorieslack.Andthisisunderstandable.Itiscertainlynocomfort toanagentfacingareputedmoraldilemmatobetoldthatatleast theruleswhichgeneratethispredicamentareconsistentbecausethere isapossibleworldinwhichtheydonotconflict.Foragood practicalexample,considerthesituationofthecriminaldefense attorney.Sheissaidtohaveanobligationtoholdinconfidencethe disclosuresmadebyaclientandtoberequiredtoconductherself withcandorbeforethecourt(wherethelatterrequiresthatthe attorneyinformthecourtwhenherclientcommitsperjury)(Freedman 1975,Chapter3).Itisclearthatinthisworldthesetwo obligationsoftenconflict.Itisequallyclearthatinsomepossible world—forexample,oneinwhichclientsdonotcommit perjury—thatbothobligationscanbesatisfied.Knowingthisis ofnoassistancetodefenseattorneyswhofaceaconflictbetween thesetworequirementsinthisworld. Ethicistswhoareconcernedthattheirtheoriesnotallowformoral dilemmashavemorethanconsistencyinmind.Whatis troublingisthattheoriesthatallowfordilemmasfailtobe uniquelyaction-guiding.Atheorycanfailtobeuniquely action-guidingineitheroftwoways:byrecommendingincompatible actionsinasituationorbynotrecommendinganyactionatall. Theoriesthatgenerategenuinemoraldilemmasfailtobeuniquely action-guidingintheformerway.Theoriesthathavenoway,evenin principle,ofdeterminingwhatanagentshoulddoinaparticular situationhavewhatThomasE.Hill,Jr.calls“gaps”(Hill1996, 179–183);theyfailtobeaction-guidinginthelatterway.Sinceone ofthemainpointsofmoraltheoriesistoprovideagentswith guidance,thatsuggeststhatitisdesirablefortheoriestoeliminate dilemmasandgaps,atleastifdoingsoispossible. Butfailingtobeuniquelyaction-guidingisnottheonlyreason thattheexistenceofmoraldilemmasisthoughttobetroublesome.Just asimportant,theexistenceofdilemmasdoesleadtoinconsistenciesif certainotherwidelyheldthesesaretrue.Hereweshallconsidertwo differentarguments,eachofwhichshowsthatonecannotconsistently acknowledgetherealityofmoraldilemmaswhileholdingselected(andseeminglyplausible) principles. Thefirstargumentshowsthattwostandardprinciplesofdeonticlogic are,whenconjoined,incompatiblewiththeexistenceofmoral dilemmas.Thefirstoftheseistheprincipleofdeontic consistency \[\tag{PC} OA\rightarrow\negO\negA. \] Intuitivelythisprinciplejustsaysthatthesameactioncannotbe bothobligatoryandforbidden.Notethatasinitiallydescribed,the existenceofdilemmasdoesnotconflictwithPC.Forasdescribed, dilemmasinvolveasituationinwhichanagentoughttodo\(A\), oughttodo\(B\),butcannotdoboth\(A\)and\(B\).Butifweadd aprincipleofdeonticlogic,thenweobtainaconflictwith PC: \[\tag{PD} \Box(A\rightarrowB)\rightarrow(OA\rightarrowOB). \] Intuitively,PDjustsaysthatifdoing\(A\)bringsabout \(B\),andif\(A\)isobligatory(morallyrequired),then \(B\)isobligatory(morallyrequired).Thefirst argumentthatgeneratesinconsistencycannowbestated.Premises (1),(2),and(3)representtheclaimthatmoraldilemmasexist. 1. \(OA\) 2. \(OB\) 3. \(\negC(A\ampB)\) [where‘\(\negC\)’means‘cannot’] 4. \(\Box(A\rightarrowB)\rightarrow(OA\rightarrowOB)\) [where‘\(\Box\)’meansphysicalnecessity] 5. \(\Box\neg(B\ampA)\) (from3) 6. \(\Box(B\rightarrow\negA)\) (from5) 7. \(\Box(B\rightarrow\negA)\rightarrow(OB\rightarrowO\negA)\) (aninstantiationof4) 8. \(OB\rightarrowO\negA\) (from6and7) 9. \(O\negA\) (from2and8) 10. \(OA\text{and}O\negA\) (from1and9) Line(10)directlyconflictswithPC.AndfromPCand(1),wecan conclude: 11. \(\negO\negA\) And,ofcourse,(9)and(11)arecontradictory.SoifweassumePCand PD,thentheexistenceofdilemmasgeneratesaninconsistencyofthe old-fashionedlogicalsort.(Note:Instandarddeonticlogic,the ‘\(\Box\)’inPDtypicallydesignateslogicalnecessity. HereItakeittoindicatephysicalnecessitysothattheappropriate connectionwithpremise(3)canbemade.AndItakeitthatlogical necessityisstrongerthanphysicalnecessity.) Twootherprinciplesacceptedinmostsystemsofdeonticlogic entailPC.SoifPDholds,thenoneoftheseadditionaltwoprinciples mustbejettisonedtoo.Thefirstsaysthatifanactionisobligatory, itisalsopermissible.Thesecondsaysthatanactionispermissible ifandonlyifitisnotforbidden.Theseprinciplesmaybestated as: \[\tag{OP} OA\rightarrowPA; \] and \[\tag{D} PA\leftrightarrow\negO\negA. \] PrinciplesOPandDarebasic;theyseemtobeconceptualtruths (Brink1994,sectionIV). Thesecondargumentthatgeneratesinconsistency,likethe first,hasasitsfirstthreepremisesasymbolicrepresentationofa moraldilemma. 1. \(OA\) 2. \(OB\) 3. \(\negC(A\ampB)\) Andlikethefirst,thissecondargumentshowsthattheexistenceof dilemmasleadstoacontradictionifweassumetwoothercommonly acceptedprinciples.Thefirstoftheseprinciplesisthat ‘ought’implies‘can’.Intuitivelythissays thatifanagentismorallyrequiredtodoanaction,itmustbe possiblefortheagenttodoit.Thisprincipleseemsnecessaryifmoraljudgmentsaretobeuniquelyaction-guiding.Wemayrepresentthisas 4. \(OA\rightarrowCA\) (forall\(A\)) Theotherprinciple,endorsedbymostsystemsofdeonticlogic,says thatifanagentisrequiredtodoeachoftwoactions,sheisrequired todoboth.Wemayrepresentthisas 5. \((OA\ampOB)\rightarrowO(A\ampB)\) (forall\(A\)andall\(B\)) Theargumentthenproceeds: 6. \(O(A\ampB)\rightarrowC(A\ampB)\) (aninstanceof4) 7. \(OA\ampOB\) (from1and2) 8. \(O(A\ampB)\) (from5and7) 9. \(\negO(A\ampB)\) (from3and6) Soifoneassumesthat‘ought’implies‘can’ andifoneassumestheprinciplerepresentedin(5)—dubbedbysome theagglomerationprinciple(Williams1965)—thenagaina contradictioncanbederived. 5.ResponsestotheArguments Nowobviouslytheinconsistencyinthefirstargumentcanbeavoided ifonedenieseitherPCorPD.Andtheinconsistencyinthesecond argumentcanbeavertedifonegivesupeithertheprinciplethat ‘ought’implies‘can’ortheagglomeration principle.Thereis,ofcourse,anotherwaytoavoidthese inconsistencies:denythepossibilityofgenuinemoraldilemmas.Itis fairtosaythatmuchofthedebateconcerningmoraldilemmasinthe lastsixtyyearshasbeenabouthowtoavoidtheinconsistencies generatedbythetwoargumentsabove. Opponentsofmoraldilemmashavegenerallyheldthatthecrucial principlesinthetwoargumentsaboveareconceptuallytrue,and thereforewemustdenythepossibilityofgenuinedilemmas.(See,for example,Conee1982andZimmerman1996.)Mostofthedebate,from allsides,hasfocusedonthesecondargument.Thereisanoddity aboutthis,however.Whenoneexaminesthepertinentprinciplesin eachargumentwhich,incombinationwithdilemmas,generatesan inconsistency,thereislittledoubtthatthoseinthefirstargument haveagreaterclaimtobeingconceptuallytruethanthoseinthe second.(OnewhorecognizesthesalienceofthefirstargumentisBrink1994,sectionV.)Perhapsthefocusonthesecondargumentisduetotheimpact ofBernardWilliams’sinfluentialessay(Williams1965).Butnotice thatthefirstargumentshowsthatiftherearegenuinedilemmas,then eitherPCorPDmustberelinquished.Evenmostsupportersofdilemmas acknowledgethatPCisquitebasic.E.J.Lemmon,forexample,notes thatifPCdoesnotholdinasystemofdeonticlogic,thenallthat remainsaretruismsandparadoxes(Lemmon1965,p.51).Andgiving upPCalsorequiresdenyingeitherOPorD,eachofwhichalsoseems basic.TherehasbeenmuchdebateaboutPD—inparticular, questionsgeneratedbytheGoodSamaritanparadox—butstillit seemsbasic.Sothosewhowanttoargueagainstdilemmaspurelyon conceptualgroundsarebetterofffocusingonthefirstofthetwo argumentsabove. Someopponentsofdilemmasalsoholdthatthepertinentprinciples inthesecondargument—theprinciplethat‘ought’ implies‘can’andtheagglomerationprinciple—are conceptuallytrue.Butfoesofdilemmasneednotsaythis.Evenifthey believethataconceptualargumentagainstdilemmascanbemadeby appealingtoPCandPD,theyhaveseveraloptionsregardingthesecond argument.Theymaydefend‘ought’implies ‘can’,butholdthatitisasubstantivenormative principle,notaconceptualtruth.Ortheymayevendenythetruthof ‘ought’implies‘can’ortheagglomeration principle,thoughnotbecauseofmoraldilemmas,ofcourse. Defendersofdilemmasneednotdenyallofthepertinent principles.Ifonethinksthateachoftheprinciplesatleasthas someinitialplausibility,thenonewillbeinclinedtoretainasmany aspossible.Amongtheearliercontributorstothisdebate,sometook theexistenceofdilemmasasacounterexampleto‘ought’ implies‘can’(forexample,Lemmon1962andTrigg1971); others,asarefutationoftheagglomerationprinciple(forexample, Williams1965andvanFraassen1973).Acommonresponsetothefirst argumentistodenyPD.Amorecomplicatedresponseistograntthat thecrucialdeonticprincipleshold,butonlyinidealworlds.Inthe realworld,theyhaveheuristicvalue,biddingagentsinconflict casestolookforpermissibleoptions,thoughnonemayexist(Holbo 2002,especiallysections15–17). Friendsandfoesofdilemmashaveaburdentobearinrespondingto thetwoargumentsabove.Forthereisatleastaprimafacie plausibilitytotheclaimthattherearemoraldilemmasandtothe claimthattherelevantprinciplesinthetwoargumentsaretrue.Thus eachsidemustatleastgivereasonsfordenyingthepertinentclaims inquestion.Opponentsofdilemmasmustsaysomethinginresponseto thepositiveargumentsthataregivenfortherealityofsuch conflicts.Onereasoninsupportofdilemmas,asnotedabove,is simplypointingtoexamples.ThecaseofSartre’sstudentandthat fromSophie’sChoicearegoodones;andclearlythesecanbe multipliedindefinitely.Itwilltemptingforsupportersofdilemmas tosaytoopponents,“Ifthisisnotarealdilemma,thentell mewhattheagentoughttodoandwhy?”Itis obvious,however,thatattemptingtoanswersuchquestionsis fruitless,andforatleasttworeasons.First,anyanswergivento thequestionislikelytobecontroversial,certainlynotalways convincing.Andsecond,thisisagamethatwillneverend;example afterexamplecanbeproduced.Themoreappropriateresponseonthe partoffoesofdilemmasistodenythattheyneedtoanswerthe question.Examplesassuchcannotestablishtherealityof dilemmas.Surelymostwillacknowledgethattherearesituationsin whichanagentdoesnotknowwhatheoughttodo.Thismaybebecause offactualuncertainty,uncertaintyabouttheconsequences, uncertaintyaboutwhatprinciplesapply,orahostofotherthings.So foranygivencase,themerefactthatonedoesnotknowwhichoftwo (ormore)conflictingobligationsprevailsdoesnotshowthatnone does. Anotherreasoninsupportofdilemmastowhichopponentsmust respondisthepointaboutsymmetry.AsthecasesfromPlatoandSartre show,moralrulescanconflict.Butopponentsofdilemmascanargue thatinsuchcasesoneruleoverridestheother.Mostwillgrantthis inthePlatoniccase,andopponentsofdilemmaswilltrytoextendthis pointtoallcases.Butthehardestcaseforopponentsisthe symmetricalone,wherethesamepreceptgeneratestheconflicting requirements.ThecasefromSophie’sChoiceisofthissort. Itmakesnosensetosaythataruleorprincipleoverridesitself.So whatdoopponentsofdilemmassayhere?Theyareapttoarguethatthe pertinent,all-things-consideredrequirementinsuchacaseis disjunctive:Sophieshouldacttosaveoneortheotherofher children,sincethatisthebestthatshecando(forexample, Zimmerman1996,Chapter7).Suchamoveneednotbeadhoc, sinceinmanycasesitisquitenatural.Ifanagentcanaffordtomake ameaningfulcontributiontoonlyonecharity,thefactthatthereare severalworthwhilecandidatesdoesnotpromptmanytosaythatthe agentwillfailmorallynomatterwhathedoes.Nearlyallofusthink thatheshouldgivetooneortheotheroftheworthycandidates. Similarly,iftwopeoplearedrowningandanagentissituatedsothat shecansaveeitherofthetwobutonlyone,fewsaythatsheisdoing wrongnomatterwhichpersonshesaves.Positingadisjunctiverequirementin thesecasesseemsperfectlynatural,andsosuchamoveisavailableto opponentsofdilemmasasaresponsetosymmetricalcases. Supportersofdilemmashaveaburdentobeartoo.Theyneedtocast doubtontheadequacyofthepertinentprinciplesinthetwoarguments thatgenerateinconsistencies.Andmostimportantly,theyneedto provideindependentreasonsfordoubtingwhicheveroftheprinciples theyreject.Iftheyhavenoreasonotherthancasesofputative dilemmasfordenyingtheprinciplesinquestion,thenwehaveamere standoff.Oftheprinciplesinquestion,themostcommonlyquestioned onindependentgroundsaretheprinciplethat‘ought’ implies‘can’andPD.Amongsupportersofdilemmas,Walter Sinnott-Armstrong(Sinnott-Armstrong1988,Chapters4and5)hasgone tothegreatestlengthstoprovideindependentreasonsforquestioning someoftherelevantprinciples. 6.MoralResidueandDilemmas Onewell-knownargumentfortherealityofmoraldilemmashasnot beendiscussedyet.Thisargumentmightbecalled “phenomenological.”Itappealstotheemotionsthatagents facingconflictsexperienceandourassessmentofthoseemotions. ReturntothecaseofSartre’sstudent.Supposethathejoinsthe FreeFrenchforces.Itislikelythathewillexperienceremorseor guiltforhavingabandonedhismother.Andnotonlywillheexperience theseemotions,thismoralresidue,butitisappropriatethathedoes. Yet,hadhestayedwithhismotherandnotjoinedtheFreeFrench forces,healsowouldhaveappropriatelyexperiencedremorseorguilt. Buteitherremorseorguiltisappropriateonlyiftheagentproperly believesthathehasdonesomethingwrong(orfailedtodosomething thathewasall-things-consideredrequiredtodo).Sincenomatterwhat theagentdoeshewillappropriatelyexperienceremorseorguilt,then nomatterwhathedoeshewillhavedonesomethingwrong.Thus,the agentfacesagenuinemoraldilemma.(Thebestknownproponentsof argumentsfordilemmasthatappealtomoralresidueareWilliams1965 andMarcus1980;foramorerecentcontribution,seeTessman2015,especiallyChapter2.) ManycasesofmoralconflictaresimilartoSartre’sexamplewithregardtotheagent’sreactionafteracting.Certainly thecasefromSophie’sChoicefitshere.Nomatterwhichof herchildrenSophiesaves,shewillexperienceenormousguiltforthe consequencesofthatchoice.Indeed,ifSophiedidnotexperiencesuch guilt,wewouldthinkthattherewassomethingmorallywrongwithher. Inthesecases,proponentsoftheargument(fordilemmas)frommoral residuemustclaimthatfourthingsaretrue:(1)whentheagents acts,sheexperiencesremorseorguilt;(2)thatsheexperiencesthese emotionsisappropriateandcalledfor;(3)hadtheagentactedonthe otheroftheconflictingrequirements,shewouldalsohaveexperienced remorseorguilt;and(4)inthelattercasetheseemotionswouldhave beenequallyappropriateandcalledfor(McConnell1996, pp.37–38).Inthesesituations,then,remorseorguiltwillbe appropriatenomatterwhattheagentdoesandtheseemotionsare appropriateonlywhentheagenthasdonesomethingwrong.Therefore, thesesituationsaregenuinelydilemmaticandmoralfailureisinevitableforagentswhofacethem. Thereismuchtosayaboutthemoralemotionsandsituationsof moralconflict;thepositionsarevariedandintricate.Without pretendingtoresolvealloftheissueshere,itwillbepointedout thatopponentsofdilemmashaveraisedtwodifferentobjectionstothe argumentfrommoralresidue.Thefirstobjection,ineffect,suggests thattheargumentisquestion-begging(McConnell1978andConee 1982);thesecondobjectionchallengestheassumptionthatremorse andguiltareappropriateonlywhentheagenthasdonewrong. Toexplainthefirstobjection,notethatitisuncontroversialthat somebadfeelingorotheriscalledforwhenanagentisina situationlikethatofSartre’sstudentorSophie.Butthenegative moralemotionsarenotlimitedtoremorseandguilt.Amongtheseother emotions,considerregret.Anagentcanappropriatelyexperience regretevenwhenshedoesnotbelievethatshehasdonesomething wrong.Forexample,aparentmayappropriatelyregretthatshemust punishherchildeventhoughshecorrectlybelievesthatthe punishmentisdeserved.Herregretisappropriatebecauseabadstate ofaffairsisbroughtintoexistence(say,thechild’sdiscomfort), evenwhenbringingthisstateofaffairsintoexistenceismorally required.Regretcanevenbeappropriatewhenapersonhasnocausal connectionatallwiththebadstateofaffairs.Itisappropriatefor metoregretthedamagethatarecentfirehascausedtomyneighbor’s house,thepainthatseverebirthdefectscauseininfants,andthe sufferingthatastarvinganimalexperiencesinthewilderness.Not onlyisitappropriatethatIexperienceregretinthesecases,butI wouldprobablyberegardedasmorallylackingifIdidnot.(For accountsofmoralremaindersastheyrelatespecificallytoKantianism andvirtueethics,see,respectively,Hill1996,183–187and Hursthouse1999,44–48and68–77.) Withremorseorguilt,atleasttwocomponentsarepresent:the experientialcomponent,namely,thenegativefeelingthatthe agenthas;andthecognitivecomponent,namely,thebelief thattheagenthasdonesomethingwrongandtakesresponsibilityfor it.Althoughthissamecognitivecomponentisnotpartofregret,the negativefeelingis.Andtheexperientialcomponentalonecannotserve asagaugetodistinguishregretfromremorse,forregretcanrange frommildtointense,andsocanremorse.Inpart,whatdistinguishes thetwoisthecognitivecomponent.Butnowwhenweexaminethecaseof anallegeddilemma,suchasthatofSartre’sstudent,itis question-beggingtoassertthatitisappropriateforhimtoexperience remorsenomatterwhathedoes.Nodoubt,itisappropriateforhimto experiencesomenegativefeeling.Tosay,however,thatitis remorsethatiscalledforistoassumethattheagentappropriately believesthathehasdonesomethingwrong.Sinceregretiswarranted evenintheabsenceofsuchabelief,toassumethatremorseis appropriateistoassume,notargue,thattheagent’s situationisgenuinelydilemmatic.Opponentsofdilemmascansaythat oneoftherequirementsoverridestheother,orthattheagentfacesa disjunctiverequirement,andthatregretisappropriatebecauseeven whenhedoeswhatheoughttodo,somebadwillensue.Eitherside, then,canaccountfortheappropriatenessofsomenegativemoral emotion.Togetmorespecific,however,requiresmorethaniswarranted bythepresentargument.Thisappealtomoralresidue,then,doesnotbyitself establishtherealityofmoraldilemmas. Mattersareevenmorecomplicated,though,asthesecondobjectionto theargumentfrommoralresidueshows.Theresiduescontemplatedby proponentsoftheargumentarediverse,rangingfromguiltorremorse toabeliefthattheagentoughttoapologizeorcompensatepersons whowerenegativelyimpactedbythefactthathedidnotsatisfyone oftheconflictingobligations.Theargumentassumesthat experiencingremorseorguiltorbelievingthatoneoughttoapologize orcompensateanotherareappropriateresponsesonlyiftheagent believesthathehasdonesomethingwrong.Butthisassumptionis debatable,formultiplereasons. First,evenwhenoneobligationclearlyoverridesanotherina conflictcase,itisoftenappropriatetoapologizetoortoexplain oneselftoanydisadvantagedparties.Rossprovidessuchacase (1930,28):onewhobreaksarelativelytrivialpromiseinorderto assistsomeoneinneedshouldinsomewaymakeituptothepromisee. Eventhoughtheagentdidnowrong,theadditionalactionspromote importantmoralvalues(McConnell1996,42–44). Second,asSimonBlackburnargues,compensationoritslikemaybe calledforevenwhentherewasnomoralconflictatall(Blackburn 1996,135–136).IfacoachrightlyselectedAgnesfortheteamrather thanBelinda,shestillislikelytotalktoBelinda,encourageher efforts,andoffertipsforimproving.Thiskindof“making up”isjustbasicdecency. Third,theconsequencesofwhatonehasdonemaybesohorribleasto makeguiltinevitable.Considerthecaseofamiddle-agedman,Bill, andaseven-year-oldboy,Johnny.Itissetinamidwesternvillageon asnowyDecemberday.Johnnyandseveralofhisfriendsareriding theirsledsdownanarrow,seldomusedstreet,onethatintersects withabusier,althoughstillnotheavilytraveled,street.Johnny,in hisenthusiasmforsledding,isnotbeingverycareful.Duringhis finalrideheskiddedunderanautomobilepassingthroughthe intersectionandwaskilledinstantly.Thecarwasdrivenby Bill.Billwasdrivingsafely,hadtherightofway,andwasnot exceedingthespeedlimit.Moreover,giventhephysicalarrangement, itwouldhavebeenimpossibleforBilltohaveseenJohnny coming.Billwasnotatfault,legallyormorally,forJohnny’s death.YetBillexperiencedwhatcanbestbedescribedasremorseor guiltabouthisroleinthishorribleevent(McConnell1996,39). Atonelevel,Bill’sfeelingsofremorseorguiltarenot warranted.Billdidnothingwrong.CertainlyBilldoesnotdeserveto feelguilt(Dahl1996,95–96).AfriendmightevenrecommendthatBill seektherapy.Butthisisnotallthereistosay.Mostofus understandBill’sresponse.FromBill’spointofview,the responseisnotinappropriate,notirrational,notuncalled-for.To seethis,imaginethatBillhadhadaverydifferentresponse.Suppose thatBillhadsaid,“IregretJohnny’sdeath.Itisa terriblething.Butitcertainlywasnotmyfault.Ihavenothingto feelguiltyaboutandIdon’towehisparentsany apologies.”EvenifBilliscorrectintellectually,itishard toimaginesomeonebeingabletoachievethissortofobjectivity abouthisownbehavior.Whenhumanbeingshavecausedgreatharm,it isnaturalforthemtowonderiftheyareatfault,evenifto outsidersitisobviousthattheybearnomoralresponsibilityforthe damage.Humanbeingsarenotsofinelytunedemotionallythatwhen theyhavebeencausallyresponsibleforharm,theycaneasily turnguiltonoroffdependingontheirdegreeof moralresponsibility.(SeeZimmerman1988,134–135.) Workinmoralpsychologycanhelptoexplainwhyself-directedmoral emotionslikeguiltorremorsearenaturalwhenanagenthasacted contrarytoamoralnorm,whetherjustifiablyornot.Manymoral psychologistsdescribedualprocessesinhumansforarrivingatmoral judgments(see,forexample,Greene2013,especiallyChapters4–5,and Haidt2012,especiallyChapter2).Moralemotionsareautomatic,the brain’simmediateresponsetoasituation.Reasonismorelike thebrain’smanualmode,employedwhenautomaticsettingsare insufficient,suchaswhennormsconflict.Moralemotionsarelikely theproductofevolution,reinforcingconductthatpromotessocial harmonyanddisapprovingactionsthatthwartthatend.Ifthisis correct,thennegativemoralemotionsareapttobeexperienced,to someextent,anytimeanagent’sactionsarecontrarytowhatis normallyamoralrequirement. Sobothsupportersandopponentsofmoraldilemmascangiveanaccount ofwhyagentswhofacemoralconflictsappropriatelyexperience negativemoralemotions.Butthereisacomplexarrayofissues concerningtherelationshipbetweenethicalconflictsandmoral emotions,andonlybook-lengthdiscussionscandothemjustice.(See Greenspan1995andTessman2015.) 7.TypesofMoralDilemmas Intheliteratureonmoraldilemmas,itiscommontodraw distinctionsamongvarioustypesofdilemmas.Onlysomeofthese distinctionswillbementionedhere.Itisworthnotingthatboth supportersandopponentsofdilemmastendtodrawsome,ifnotall,of thesedistinctions.Andinmostcasesthemotivationfordoingsois clear.Supportersofdilemmasmaydrawadistinctionbetweendilemmas oftype\(V\)and\(W\).Theupshotistypicallyamessageto opponentsofdilemmas:“Youthinkthatallmoralconflictsare resolvable.Andthatisunderstandable,becauseconflictsoftype \(V\)areresolvable.Butconflictsoftype\(W\)arenot resolvable.Thus,contrarytoyourview,therearesomegenuinemoral dilemmas.”Bythesametoken,opponentsofdilemmasmaydrawa distinctionbetweendilemmasoftype\(X\)and\(Y\).And theirmessagetosupportersofdilemmasisthis:“Youthinkthat therearegenuinemoraldilemmas,andgivencertainfacts,itis understandablewhythisappearstobethecase.Butifyoudrawa distinctionbetweenconflictsoftypes\(X\)and\(Y\),you canseethatappearancescanbeexplainedbytheexistenceoftype \(X\)alone,andtype\(X\)conflictsarenotgenuine dilemmas.”Withthisinmind,letusnoteafewofthe distinctions. Onedistinctionisbetweenepistemicconflictsand ontologicalconflicts.(Fordifferentterminology,see Blackburn1996,127–128.)Theformerinvolveconflictsbetweentwo(or more)moralrequirementsandtheagentdoesnotknowwhichofthe conflictingrequirementstakesprecedenceinhersituation.Everyone concedesthattherecanbesituationswhereonerequirementdoestake priorityovertheotherwithwhichitconflicts,thoughatthetime actioniscalledforitisdifficultfortheagenttotellwhich requirementprevails.Thelatterareconflictsbetweentwo(ormore) moralrequirements,andneitherisoverridden.Thisisnotsimply becausetheagentdoesnotknowwhichrequirementis stronger;neitheris.Genuinemoraldilemmas,ifthereareany,are ontological.Bothopponentsandsupportersofdilemmasacknowledge thatthereareepistemicconflicts. Therecanbegenuinemoraldilemmasonlyifneitheroftheconflicting requirementsisoverridden.Ross(1930,Chapter2)heldthatall moralpreceptscanbeoverriddeninparticularcircumstances.This providesaninvitingframeworkforopponentsofdilemmastoadopt. Butifsomemoralrequirementscannotbeoverridden—iftheyhold absolutely—thenitwillbeeasierforsupportersofdilemmasto maketheircase.LisaTessmanhasdistinguishedbetweennegotiable andnon-negotiablemoralrequirements(Tessman2015,especially Chapters1and3).Theformer,ifnotsatisfied,canbeadequately compensatedorcounterbalancedbysomeothergood.Non-negotiable moralrequirements,however,ifviolatedproduceacostthatnoone shouldhavetobear;suchaviolationcannotbecounterbalancedbyany benefits.Ifnon-negotiablemoralrequirementscanconflict—and Tessmanarguesthatthecan—thenthosesituationswillbe genuinedilemmasandagentsfacingthemwillinevitablyfailmorally. Itmightseemthatifthereismorethanonemoralpreceptthatholds absolutely,thenmoraldilemmasmustbepossible.AlanDonagan, however,arguesagainstthis.Hemaintainsthatmoralruleshold absolutely,andapparentexceptionsareaccountedforbecausetacit conditionsarebuiltintoeachmoralrule(Donagan1977,Chapters3 and6,especially92–93).Soevenifsomemoralrequirementscannot beoverridden,theexistenceofdilemmasmaystillbeanopen question. Anotherdistinctionisbetweenself-imposedmoraldilemmas anddilemmasimposedonanagentbytheworld,asitwere. Conflictsoftheformersortarisebecauseoftheagent’sown wrongdoing(Aquinas;Donagan1977,1984;andMcConnell1978).Ifan agentmadetwopromisesthatheknewconflicted,thenthroughhisown actionshecreatedasituationinwhichitisnotpossibleforhimto dischargebothofhisrequirements.Dilemmasimposedontheagentby theworld,bycontrast,donotarisebecauseoftheagent’s wrongdoing.ThecaseofSartre’sstudentisanexample,asisthe casefromSophie’sChoice.Forsupportersofdilemmas,this distinctionisnotallthatimportant.Butamongopponentsof dilemmas,thereisadisagreementaboutwhetherthedistinctionis important.Someoftheseopponentsholdthatself-imposeddilemmasare possible,butthattheirexistencedoesnotpointtoanydeepflawsin moraltheory(Donagan1977,Chapter5).Moraltheorytellsagentshow theyoughttobehave;butifagentsviolatemoralnorms,ofcourse thingscangoaskew.Otheropponentsdenythatevenself-imposed dilemmasarepossible.Theyarguethatanadequatemoraltheoryshould tellagentswhattheyoughttodointheircurrentcircumstances, regardlessofhowthosecircumstancesarose.AsHillputsit, “[M]oralityacknowledgesthathumanbeingsareimperfectandoften guilty,butitcallsuponeachateverynewmomentofmoral deliberationtodecideconscientiouslyandtoactrightlyfromthat pointon”(Hill1996,176).Giventheprevalenceofwrongdoing, ifamoraltheorydidnotissueuniquelyaction-guiding “contrary-to-dutyimperatives,”itspracticalimportwouldbelimited. Yetanotherdistinctionisbetweenobligationdilemmasand prohibitiondilemmas.Theformeraresituationsinwhichmore thanonefeasibleactionisobligatory.Thelatterinvolvecasesin whichallfeasibleactionsareforbidden.Some(especially,Valentyne 1987and1989)arguethatplausibleprinciplesofdeonticlogicmay wellrenderobligationdilemmasimpossible;buttheydonotpreclude thepossibilityofprohibitiondilemmas.ThecaseofSartre’sstudent, ifgenuinelydilemmatic,isanobligationdilemma;Sophie’scaseisa prohibitiondilemma.Thereisanotherreasonthatfriendsofdilemmas emphasizethisdistinction.Somethinkthatthe“disjunctive solution”usedbyopponentsofdilemmas—whenequally strongpreceptsconflict,theagentisrequiredtoactononeorthe other—ismoreplausiblewhenappliedtoobligation dilemmasthanwhenappliedtoprohibitiondilemmas. Asmoraldilemmasaretypicallydescribed,theyinvolveasingle agent.Theagentought,allthingsconsidered,todo\(A\), ought,allthingsconsidered,todo\(B\),andshecannotdoboth \(A\)and\(B\).Butwecandistinguish multi-persondilemmasfromsingleagentones.Thetwo-person caseisrepresentativeofmulti-persondilemmas.Thesituationissuch thatoneagent,P1,oughttodo\(A\),asecondagent,P2,ought todo\(B\),andthougheachagentcandowhatheoughttodo,it isnotpossiblebothforP1todo\(A\)andP2todo \(B\).(SeeMarcus1980,122andMcConnell1988.) Multi-persondilemmashavebeencalled“interpersonalmoral conflicts.”Suchconflictsaremosttheoreticallyworrisomeif thesamemoralsystem(ortheory)generatestheconflicting obligationsforP1andP2.Atheorythatprecludessingle-agentmoral dilemmasremainsuniquelyaction-guidingforeachagent.Butifthat sametheorydoesnotprecludethepossibilityofinterpersonalmoral conflicts,notallagentswillbeabletosucceedindischargingtheir obligations,nomatterhowwell-motivatedorhowhardtheytry.For supportersofmoraldilemmas,thisdistinctionisnotallthat important.Theynodoubtwelcome(theoretically)moretypesof dilemmas,sincethatmaymaketheircasemorepersuasive.Butifthey establishtherealityofsingle-agentdilemmas,inonesensetheir workisdone.Foropponentsofdilemmas,however,thedistinctionmay beimportant.Thisisbecauseatleastsomeopponentsbelievethatthe conceptualargumentagainstdilemmasappliesprincipallyto single-agentcases.Itdoessobecausetheought-to-dooperatorof deonticlogicandtheaccompanyingprinciplesareproperlyunderstood toapplytoentitieswhocanmakedecisions.Tobeclear, thispositiondoesnotprecludethatcollectives(suchasbusinesses ornations)canhaveobligations.Butanecessaryconditionforthis beingthecaseisthatthereis(orshouldbe)acentraldeliberative standpointfromwhichdecisionsaremade.Thisconditionisnot satisfiedwhentwootherwiseunrelatedagentshappentohave obligationsbothofwhichcannotbedischarged.Putsimply,whilean individualactinvolvingoneagentcanbetheobjectofchoice,a compoundactinvolvingmultipleagentsisdifficultsotoconceive. (SeeSmith1986andThomason1981.)ErinTaylor(2011)hasrecentlyargued thatneitheruniversalizabilitynortheprinciplethat‘ought’implies ‘can’ensurethattherewillbenointerpersonalmoralconflicts(what shecalls“irreconcilabledifferences”). Theseconflictswouldraisenodifficultiesifmoralityrequired tryingratherthanacting,butsuchaviewisnotplausible.Still,moraltheoriesshouldminimizecasesof interpersonalconflict(Taylor2011,pp.189–190).Totheextentthat thepossibilityofinterpersonalmoralconflictsraisesanintramural disputeamongopponentsofdilemmas,thatdisputeconcernshowto understandtheprinciplesofdeonticlogicandwhatcanreasonablybe demandedofmoraltheories. 8.MultipleMoralities Anotherissueraisedbythetopicofmoraldilemmasisthe relationshipamongvariouspartsofmorality.Considerthis distinction.Generalobligationsaremoralrequirementsthat individualshavesimplybecausetheyaremoralagents.Thatagents arerequirednottokill,nottosteal,andnottoassaultare examplesofgeneralobligations.Agencyalonemakestheseprecepts applicabletoindividuals.Bycontrast,role-relatedobligationsare moralrequirementsthatagentshaveinvirtueoftheirrole, occupation,orpositioninsociety.Thatlifeguardsarerequiredto saveswimmersindistressisarole-relatedobligation.Another example,mentionedearlier,istheobligationofadefenseattorneyto holdinconfidencethedisclosuresmadebyaclient.Thesecategories neednotbeexclusive.Itislikelythatanyonewhoisinaposition todosooughttosaveadrowningperson.Andifapersonhas particularlysensitiveinformationaboutanother,sheshouldprobably notrevealittothirdpartiesregardlessofhowtheinformationwas obtained.Butlifeguardshaveobligationstohelpswimmersin distresswhenmostothersdonotbecauseoftheirabilitiesand contractualcommitments.Andlawyershavespecialobligationsof confidentialitytotheirclientsbecauseofimplicitpromisesandthe needtomaintaintrust. Generalobligationsandrole-relatedobligationscan,andsometimes do,conflict.Ifadefenseattorneyknowsthewhereaboutsofa deceasedbody,shemayhaveageneralobligationtorevealthis informationtofamilymembersofthedeceased.Butifsheobtained thisinformationfromherclient,therole-relatedobligationof confidentialityprohibitsherfromsharingitwithothers.Supporters ofdilemmasmayregardconflictsofthissortasjustanother confirmationoftheirthesis.Opponentsofdilemmaswillhavetohold thatoneoftheconflictingobligationstakespriority.Thelatter taskcouldbedischargedifitwereshownthatonethesetwotypesof obligationsalwaysprevailsovertheother.Butsuchaclaimis implausible;foritseemsthatinsomecasesofconflictgeneral obligationsarestronger,whileinothercasesrole-relatedduties takepriority.Thecaseseemstobemadeevenbetterforsupporters ofdilemmas,andworseforopponents,whenweconsiderthatthesame agentcanoccupymultiplerolesthatcreateconflictingrequirements. Thephysician,HarveyKelekian,inMargaretEdson’s(1999/1993) PulitzerPrizewinningplay,Wit,isanoncologist,amedical researcher,andateacherofresidents.Theobligationsgeneratedby thoserolesleadDr.Kelekiantotreathispatient,VivianBearing,in waysthatseemmorallyquestionable(McConnell2009).Atfirstblush, anyway,itdoesnotseempossibleforKelekiantodischargeallofthe obligationsassociatedwiththesevariousroles. Inthecontextofissuesraisedbythepossibilityofmoral dilemmas,therolemostfrequentlydiscussedisthatofthepolitical actor.MichaelWalzer(1973)claimsthatthepoliticalruler,qua politicalruler,oughttodowhatisbestforthestate;thatishis principalrole-relatedobligation.Buthealsooughttoabidebythe generalobligationsincumbentonall.Sometimesthepolitical actor’srole-relatedobligationsrequirehimtodo evil—thatis,toviolatesomegeneralobligations.Amongthe examplesgivenbyWalzeraremakingadealwithadishonestwardboss (necessarytogetelectedsothathecandogood)andauthorizingthe tortureofapersoninordertouncoveraplottobombapublic building.Sinceeachoftheserequirementsisbinding,Walzer believesthatthepoliticianfacesagenuinemoraldilemma,though, strangely,healsothinksthatthepoliticianshouldchoosethegood ofthecommunityratherthanabidebythegeneralmoralnorms.(The issuehereiswhethersupportersofdilemmascanmeaningfullytalk aboutaction-guidanceingenuinelydilemmaticsituations.Foronewho answersthisintheaffirmative,seeTessman2015,especiallyChapter 5.)Suchasituationissometimescalled“thedirtyhands problem.”Theexpression,“dirtyhands,”istaken fromthetitleofaplaybySartre(1946).Theideaisthatnoone canrulewithoutbecomingmorallytainted.Theroleitselfisfraught withmoraldilemmas.Thistopichasreceivedmuchattentionrecently. JohnParrish(2007)hasprovidedadetailedhistoryofhow philosophersfromPlatotoAdamSmithhavedealtwiththeissue.And C.A.J.Coady(2008)hassuggestedthatthisrevealsa“messy morality.” Foropponentsofmoraldilemmas,theproblemofdirtyhands representsbothachallengeandanopportunity.Thechallengeisto showhowconflictsbetweengeneralobligationsandrole-related obligations,andthoseamongthevariousrole-relatedobligations,can beresolvedinaprincipledway.Theopportunityfortheoriesthat purporttohavetheresourcestoeliminatedilemmas—suchas Kantianism,utilitarianism,andintuitionism—istoshowhowthemany moralitiesunderwhichpeoplearegovernedarerelated. 9.Conclusion Debatesaboutmoraldilemmashavebeenextensiveduringthelastsix decades.Thesedebatesgototheheartofmoraltheory.Both supportersandopponentsofmoraldilemmashavemajorburdenstobear. Opponentsofdilemmasmustshowwhyappearancesaredeceiving.Whyare examplesofapparentdilemmasmisleading?Whyarecertainmoral emotionsappropriateiftheagenthasdonenowrong?Supportersmust showwhyseveralofmanyapparentlyplausibleprinciplesshouldbe givenup—principlessuchasPC,PD,OP,D,‘ought’ implies‘can’,andtheagglomerationprinciple.Andeach sidemustprovideageneralaccountofobligations,explainingwhether none,some,orallcanbeoverriddeninparticularcircumstances. Muchprogresshasbeenmade,butthedebateisapttocontinue. Bibliography CitedWorks Aquinas,St.Thomas,SummaTheologiae,Thomas Gilbyetal.(trans.),NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1964–1975. Blackburn,Simon,1996,“Dilemmas:Dithering,Plumping,andGrief,”inMason(1996):127–139. Brink,David,1994,“MoralConflictandItsStructure,”ThePhilosophicalReview,103:215–247;reprintedinMason(1996):102–126. Coady,C.A.J.,2008.MessyMorality:TheChallengeof Politics,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. 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