Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The term “epistemology” comes from the Greek words “episteme” and “logos”. “Episteme” can be translated as “knowledge” or “understanding” or ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop EpistemologyFirstpublishedWedDec14,2005;substantiverevisionSatApr11,2020 Theterm“epistemology”comesfromtheGreekwords “episteme”and“logos”.“Episteme” canbetranslatedas“knowledge”or “understanding”or“acquaintance”,while “logos”canbetranslatedas“account”or “argument”or“reason”.Justaseachofthese differenttranslationscapturessomefacetofthemeaningofthese Greekterms,sotoodoeseachtranslationcaptureadifferentfacetof epistemologyitself.Althoughtheterm“epistemology”is nomorethanacoupleofcenturiesold,thefieldofepistemologyis atleastasoldasanyin philosophy.[1] Indifferentpartsofitsextensivehistory,differentfacetsof epistemologyhaveattractedattention.Plato’sepistemologywas anattempttounderstandwhatitwastoknow,andhowknowledge (unlikemeretrueopinion)isgoodfortheknower.Locke’s epistemologywasanattempttounderstandtheoperationsofhuman understanding,Kant’sepistemologywasanattempttounderstand theconditionsofthepossibilityofhumanunderstanding,and Russell’sepistemologywasanattempttounderstandhowmodern sciencecouldbejustifiedbyappealtosensoryexperience.Much recentworkinformalepistemologyisanattempttounderstandhowour degreesofconfidencearerationallyconstrainedbyourevidence,and muchrecentworkinfeministepistemologyisanattempttounderstand thewaysinwhichinterestsaffectourevidence,andaffectour rationalconstraintsmoregenerally.Inallthesecases,epistemology seekstounderstandoneoranotherkindof cognitivesuccess(or,correspondingly,cognitive failure).Thisentrysurveysthevarietiesofcognitive success,andsomerecenteffortstounderstandsomeofthose varieties. 1.TheVarietiesofCognitiveSuccess 1.1WhatKindsofThingsEnjoyCognitiveSuccess? 1.2ConstraintsandValues 1.3SubstantiveandStructural 1.4.WhatExplainsWhat? 1.5WhatMakesItSuccess? 1.6EpistemicHarmsandEpistemicWrongs 2.WhatisKnowledge? 2.1KnowingIndividuals 2.2KnowingHow 2.3KnowingFacts 3.WhatisJustification? 3.1DeontologicalandNon-DeontologicalJustification 3.2WhatJustifiesBelief? 3.3Internalvs.External 4.TheStructureofKnowledgeandJustification 4.1Foundationalism 4.2Coherentism 4.3WhyFoundationalism? 4.4WhyCoherentism? 5.SourcesofKnowledgeandJustification 5.1Perception 5.2Introspection 5.3Memory 5.4Reason 5.5Testimony 6.TheLimitsofCognitiveSuccess 6.1GeneralSkepticismandSelectiveSkepticism 6.2ResponsestotheClosureArgument 6.3ResponsestotheUnderdeterminationArgument 6.4ResponsestotheDefeasibilityArgument 6.5ResponsestotheEpistemicPossibilityArgument Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.TheVarietiesofCognitiveSuccess Therearemanydifferentkindsofcognitivesuccess,andtheydiffer fromoneanotheralongvariousdimensions.Exactlywhatthesevarious kindsofsuccessare,andhowtheydifferfromeachother,andhow theyareexplanatorilyrelatedtoeachother,andhowtheycanbe achievedorobstructed,areallmattersofcontroversy.Thissection providessomebackgroundtothesevariouscontroversies. 1.1WhatKindsofThingsEnjoyCognitiveSuccess? Cognitivesuccessescandifferfromeachotherbyvirtueofqualifying differentkindsofthings.Forinstance,acognitive success—likethatofmakingadiscovery—maybethesuccess ofaperson(e.g.,MarieCurie),orofalaboratory(LosAlamos),or ofapeople(theHopi),oreven,perhaps,ofapsychologicalfragment ofaperson(theunconscious).Butsomekindsofcognitive success—likethatofhavingsuccessfullycultivatedahighly discriminatingpalate,say—maybethesuccessofaperson,and perhapsevenofapeople,butcannotbethesuccessofalaboratoryor ofapsychologicalfragment.Andotherkindsofcognitive success—likethatofbeingconclusivelyestablishedbyallthe availableevidence—maybethesuccessofatheory,butcannotbe thesuccessofaperson—orlikethatofbeingepistemically fruitful—maybethesuccessofaresearchprogram,orofa particularproof-strategy,butnotofatheory.Indeed,thereisa vastrangeofthings,spanningdifferentmetaphysicalcategories,that canenjoyoneoranotherkindofcognitivesuccess:wecanevaluate thecognitivesuccessofamentalstate(suchasthatofbelievinga particularproposition)orofanact(suchasthatofdrawinga particularconclusion),orofaprocedure(suchasaparticular procedureforrevisingdegreesofconfidenceinresponsetoevidence, oraparticularprocedureforacquiringnewevidence),orofa relation(suchasthemathematicalrelationbetweenanagent’s credencefunctioninoneevidentialstateandhercredencefunctionin anotherevidentialstate,ortherelationoftrustbetweenoneperson andanother). Someoftherecentcontroversiesconcerningtheobjectsofcognitive successconcernthemetaphysicalrelationsamongthecognitive successesofvariouskindsofobjects:Doesthecognitivesuccessofa processinvolveanythingoverandabovethecognitivesuccessofeach stateinthesuccessionofstatesthatcomprisetheexecutionofthat process?[2] Doesthecognitivesuccessofaparticularmentalstate,orofa particularmentalact,dependuponitsrelationtothelargerprocess inwhichit exists?[3] Isthecognitivesuccessofanorganizationconstitutedmerelybythe cognitivesuccessesofitsmembers,orisitsomethingoverandabove thoseindividual successes?[4] Isthecognitivesuccessofadoxasticagentcompletelyexplicablein termsofthesuccessesofitsdoxasticstates,orviceversa? Andeitherway,whatsortsofdoxasticstatesarethere,andwith respecttowhatkindsofpossiblesuccessaretheyassessible?The latterdisputeisespeciallyactiveinrecentyears,withsome epistemologistsregardingbeliefsasmetaphysicallyreducibletohigh credences,[5] whileothersregardcredencesasmetaphysicallyreducibletobeliefs aboutprobabilities(seeByrneinBrewer&Byrne2005),andstill othersregardbeliefsandcredencesasrelatedbutdistinctphenomena (seeKaplan1996,Neta2008). Otherrecentcontroversiesconcerntheissueofwhetheritisa metaphysicallyfundamentalfeatureoftheobjectsof cognitivesuccessthattheyare,insomesense,supposedtoenjoythe kindofcognitivesuccessinquestion.Forinstance,wemightthink thatwhatitisforsomegroupofpeopletoconstitutea laboratoryisthatthegroupis,insomesense, supposedtomakediscoveriesofacertainkind:thatisthe pointofbringingthatgroupintocollaborationinaparticularway, eveniftheindividualsarespreadoutacrossdifferentcontinentsand theirfundingsourcesdiverse.Butevenifalaboratoryisplausibly characterizedbyanormtowhichitisanswerable,issomething analogoustrueoftheotherobjectsthatcanenjoycognitivesuccess? Isit,forinstance,ametaphysicallyfundamentalfeatureofabelief thatitis,insomesense,supposedtobe knowledge?[6] Orcanbeliefbemetaphysicallycharacterizedwithoutappealtothis norm?Isit,forinstance,ametaphysicallyfundamentalfeatureofa personthatsuchacreatureis,insomesense,supposedtobe rational?[7] Orcanpersonsbemetaphysicallycharacterizedwithoutappealtothis norm?Similardisputesarisefortheotherobjectsofcognitive success:towhatextentcanweunderstandwhattheseobjectsare withoutappealtothekindsofsuccessthattheyaresupposedto enjoy? Inspeaking,aswehavejustnow,ofthekindsofsuccessthatobjects are“supposed”toenjoy,wehaveleftitopeninwhat sensetheobjectsofcognitivesuccessare“supposed”to enjoytheirsuccess:isitthattheirenjoymentofthatsuccessis good?(Ifso,thenhowisitgood?)Orisitratherthattheir enjoymentofthatsuccessisrequired?(Ifso,thenwhatrequiresit, andwhy?)Weturntothatgeneraltopicnext. 1.2ConstraintsandValues Somekindsofcognitivesuccessinvolvecompliancewitha constraint,whileothersinvolvetherealizationorpromotion ofvalues.Wecancontrastthesetwokindsofsuccessby contrastingtheassociatedkindsoffailure:failuretocomplywitha constraintresultsinimpermissibility,whereasfailureto realizesomevaluesresultsin sub-optimality.[8] Ofcourse,ifsub-optimalityisalwaysimpermissibleandvice versa,thentheextensionofthesetwocategoriesends upbeingthesame,evenifthetwocategoriesarenotthemselvesthe same.Butitisimplausibletoregardallsub-optimalityas epistemicallyimpermissible:cognitivesuccessdoesnot requireustobeperfectlycognitivelyoptimalineveryway. Ifcognitivesuccessiseverachievableeveninprinciple,thenat leastsomedegreeofcognitivesub-optimalitymustbepermissible. Achievinggreateroptimalitythanwhat’srequiredforcognitive permissibilitycouldthenbeunderstoodascognitive supererogation.Ifsuchsupererogationispossible,atleast inprinciple,thenthepermissiblecanfallshortoftheoptimal. Recentcontroversiesconcernnotmerelytherelationbetween permissibilityandoptimality,butalsothemetaphysicalbasisofeach kindofsuccess.Invirtueofwhatissomestate,oract,orprocess, orrelation,epistemicallypermissible?Andinvirtueofwhatisit optimaltowhateverdegreeitis?Epistemicconsequentialiststakethe answertotheformerquestiontobedeterminedbyappealtotheanswer tothelatter.Forinstance,onepopularformofepistemic consequentialismclaimsthataparticularwayofformingone’s beliefsabouttheworldisepistemicallypermissiblejustinsofaras itpromotesthepossessionoftruebeliefandtheavoidanceoffalse belief.[9] Anotherformofconsequentialism,consistentwithbutdistinctfrom thefirst,saysthata“credencefunction”(i.e.,a functionfrompropositionstodegreesofconfidence)isoptimaljust insofarasitpromotesasingleparameter—overall accuracy—whichismeasuredinsuchawaythat,thehigher one’sconfidenceintruepropositionsandthelowerone’s confidenceinfalsepropositions,thegreaterone’soverall accuracy.[10] Therearealsosomeformsofepistemicconsequentialismaccordingto whichoptimalityinvolvespromotionofendsthatarepracticalrather thansimply alethic.[11] Animportantcontroversyintherecentliteratureconcernsthe questionofwhetherepistemicconsequentialismistrue(seeBerker 2013,whichdevelopsalineofargumentfoundinFirth1978[1998]). Anotherprominentcontroversyiscarriedonamongconsequentialists themselves,andconcernsthequestionofwhatvaluesaresuchthat theirrealizationorpromotionconstitutesoptimality. We’veusedtheterm“constraint”todenotethe boundsofwhatisepistemicallypermissible.Ofcourse,asamatterof deonticlogic,whatispermissiblemustincludeatleastwhatis required:foraconditiontoberequiredissimplyforthecomplement ofthatconditiontonotbepermissible.Butthisleavesitopen whether,inaparticulardomain,whatispermissibleincludesmore thanwhatisrequired.Permissivistsarguethatitdoes(see Schoenfield2014foradefenseofpermissivism),while anti-permissivistsarguethatitdoesnot(seeWhite2005and Schultheis2018forargumentsagainstpermissivism). Anti-permissivistsconcerningconstraintsonourcredencesare sometimesdescribedasholdinga“uniqueness”view,but thislabelcaneasilymislead.Aphilosopherwhothinksthattherange ofpermissiblecredencesisnowiderthantherangeofrequired credencesisananti-permissivist—butananti-permissivistview, sounderstood,isconsistentwiththeclaimthatthecredencesweare requiredtohavearenotpoint-valuedbutareratherinterval-valued. Suchaphilosophercould,forinstance,claimthatthereisonlyone credencethatyouarepermittedtoassigntothepropositionthatthe catisonthemat,andthisrequiredcredenceisneither.6nor.7, butisrathertheopeninterval(.6,.7). 1.3SubstantiveandStructural Comparethefollowingtworules: (MP-Narrow)Ifyoubelievethatpistrue,andyoualso believethatifpistruethenqistrue,thenyououghtto believethatqistrue. (MP-Wide)Yououghtnotbesuchthatyoubelievethatpis true,andbelievethatifpistruethenqistrue,and notbelievethatqistrue. Thefirstrule,MP-Narrow,isobviouslynotarulewithwhichweought tocomply:ifqisobviouslyfalse,thenit’snotthecasethat Ioughttobelievethatqistrue—notevenifIbelieve thatpistrue,andthatifpistruethenqis true.Nonetheless,ifqisobviouslyfalse,then(perhaps)I oughtnotbothbelievethatpistrueandalsobelievethat ifpistruethenqistrue.That’sbecause,evenif MP-Narrowisnotarulewithwhichweoughttocomply,MP-Widemay stillbesucharule.Thedifferencebetweenthetworulesisinthe scopeofthe“ought”:inMP-Narrow,itsscopeincludes onlyonebelief(viz.,thebeliefthatqistrue),whereasinMP-Wide, itsscopeincludesacombinationoftwobeliefs(viz.,thatpistrue, andthatifpistruethenqistrue)andonelackofbelief(viz., thatqistrue). Thislinguisticdistinctionbetweenwidescopeandnarrowscope “oughts”isoneexpressionofageneralmetaphysical distinctionbetweentwokindsofcognitivesuccess.Ononesideof thisdistinctionarethosekindsofcognitivesuccessthatqualify particularobjects,e.g.,aparticularbelief,oraparticular procedure,oraparticularcredencefunction,oraparticularresearch program.Examplesofsuchsuccessincludeabelief’sbeing justified,aprocedure’sbeingrationallyrequired,acredence function’sbeingoptimal.Ineachcase,someobjectenjoysa particularcognitivesuccess,andthissuccessobtainsbyvirtueof variousfeaturesofthatobject:thefeaturesinquestionmaybe intrinsicorrelational,synchronicordiachronic,biologicalor phenomenological,etc.Wecancallsuchcognitivesuccesses “substantive”. Ontheothersideofthisdistinctionarethosekindsofcognitive successthatqualifytherelationsbetweenvariousthings,eachof whichisitselfindividuallyassessableforcognitivesuccess:e.g., therelationbetweenasetofbeliefsallheldbythesameagentata particulartime,ortherelationbetweentheuseofaparticular procedure,ontheonehand,andone’sbeliefsaboutthat procedure,ontheother,ortherelationbetweenanagent’s credencefunctionjustbeforereceivingnewevidence,andhercredence functionjustafterreceivingnewevidence.Examplesofthislatter kindofsuccessincludeanagent’sbeliefsatamomentallbeing consistent,orthecoherencebetweentheproceduresanagentusesand herbeliefsaboutwhichproceduressheoughttouse.Ineachcase,a particularcognitivesuccessqualifiestherelationsamongvarious objects,quiteindependentlyofwhetheranyparticularoneofthose objectsitselfenjoyssubstantivecognitivesuccess.Wecancallsuch cognitivesuccesses“structural”.Someepistemologists haveattemptedtoreducesubstantivesuccessesofaparticularkindto structural successes.[12] Othershaveattemptedtoreducestructuralsuccessesofsomekindto substantiveones(see,forinstance,Kiesewetter2017,Lasonen-Aarnio forthcoming,andLord2018).Andstillothershavedeniedthatany suchreductionispossibleineitherdirection(see,forinstance, Worsnip2018andNeta2018).Inrecentyears,thiscontroversyhas beenmostactiveinconnectionwithrationalpermissibility ofbeliefs,orofcredences.Butsuchacontroversycould,in principle,ariseconcerninganyofthevarietiesofcognitivesuccess thatwe’vedistinguishedsofar. 1.4.WhatExplainsWhat? Manyepistemologistsattempttoexplainonekindofcognitivesuccess intermsofotherkinds.Forinstance,Chisholmtriestoexplainall cognitivesuccessnotionsintermsofjustoneprimitivenotion:that ofoneattitudebeingmorereasonablethananother,foran agentatatime(seeChisholm1966).Williamson,incontrast,treats knowledgeoffactsasanexplanatoryprimitive,andsuggeststhat otherkindsofcognitivesuccessbeexplainedintermsofsuch knowledge(seeWilliamson2002).Severalprominentphilosopherstreat thenotionofanormativereasonasprimitive(seeScanlon1998).And soon.Ineachcase,whatisatissueiswhichkindsofcognitive successareexplicableintermsofwhichotherkindsofcognitive success.Ofcourse,whetherthisissueisframedasanissue concerningtheexplicationofsomeconceptsintermsofother concepts,orintermsofthegroundingofsomepropertiesby otherproperties,orinsomeothertermsstill,dependsonthe metaphilosophicalcommitmentsofthoseframingtheissue. Theissueofwhichkindsofcognitivesuccessexplainwhich otherkindsofcognitivesuccessisorthogonaltotheissueofwhich particularcognitivesuccessesexplainwhichotherparticular cognitivesuccesses.Theformerissueconcernswhether,forinstance, thepropertyofknowledgeistobeexplainedintermsoftherelation ofonethingbeingareasonforanother,orwhethertherelationof beingareasonforistoexplainedintermsofknowledge.Butthe latterissueconcernswhether,forinstance,Iamjustifiedinholding someparticularbelief—say,thatthecatisonthemat—in virtueofmyknowingvariousspecificthings,e.g.,thatmyvisionis workingproperlyunderthepresentcircumstances,andthattheobject thatIamlookingatnowisacat,etc.Thislatterissueisatthe heartofvariousepistemologicalregresspuzzles,andwewillreturn toitbelow.Butthoseregresspuzzlesarelargelyindependentofthe issueofmetaphysicalprioritybeingdiscussedhere. 1.5WhatMakesItSuccess? Whatmakesitthecasethatsomethingcountsasaformofcognitive success?Forinstance,whythinkthatknowingthecapital ofPakistanisacognitivesuccess,ratherthanjustanother cognitivestatethatanagentcanoccupy,likehaving70% confidencethatIslamabadisthecapitalofPakistan?Notevery cognitivestateenjoyscognitivesuccess.Knowing,understanding, mastering—thesearecognitivesuccesses.Butbeing70%confident inapropositionisnot,inandofitself,acognitivesuccess,even ifthatstateofconfidencemaybepartlyconstitutiveofan agent’scognitivesuccesswhentheagentholdsitintheright circumstancesandfortherightreason.Whatmakesthedifference? Recentworkonthisissuetendstodefendoneofthefollowingthree answerstothisquestion:contractualism,consequentialism,or constitutivism.Thecontractualistsaysthataparticularcognitive statecountsasakindofsuccessbecausethepracticeofsocounting itservescertainwidelyheldpracticalinterests.Forinstance, accordingtoCraig(1990),wedescribeapersonas “knowing”somethingasawayofsignalingthather testimonywithrespecttothatthingistobetrusted.The consequentialistsaysthataparticularcognitivestatecountsasa kindofsuccessbecauseittendstoconstituteortendstopromote somecrucialbenefit.Accordingtosomeconsequentialists,thebenefit inquestionisthatofhavingtruebeliefsandlackingfalsebeliefs (seeBonJour1985,Audi1993).Accordingtoothers,itisthebenefit ofhavingacomprehensiveunderstandingofreality.Accordingto others,itisabenefitthatisnotnarrowlyepistemic,e.g.,livinga goodlife,orbeinganeffectiveagent,orspreadingone’sgene pool.Finally,theconstitutivistmaysaythataparticularcognitive statecountsasakindofsuccessifitistheconstitutiveaimof somefeatureofourlivestoachievethatstate(seeKorsgaard2009 foradefenseofconstitutivismconcerningnormsofrationality).For instance,theconstitutivistmightsaythatknowledgeisakindof cognitivesuccessbyvirtueofbeingtheconstitutiveaimofbelief, orthatunderstandingisakindofcognitivesuccessbyvirtueof beingtheconstitutiveaimofreasoning,orthatpracticalwisdomisa kindofcognitivesuccessbyvirtueofbeingtheconstitutiveaimof allhumanactivity.Ofcourse,therearephilosopherswhocountas “constitutivists”byvirtueofthinking,say,that knowledgeistheconstitutiveaimofbelief—butthesesame philosophersarenottherebycommittedtotheconstitutivismdescribed here,sincetheyarenotcommittedtothisexplanationofwhat makesknowledgeakindofcognitivesuccess. Ofcourse,it’spossiblethatoneofthethreeanswersmentioned aboveiscorrectforsomekindsofsuccess,whileanotherofthethree answersiscorrectforotherkindsofsuccess.Consider,forinstance, thedifferencebetweenthekindofsuccessinvolvedinhavingastate thatisfitting(forinstance,holdingabelief knowledgeably),andthekindofsuccessinvolvedinhavinga statethatisvaluable(forinstance,holdingabelieftheholdingof whichisbeneficial).Perhapstheconstitutivistcanexplain theformerkindofsuccessbetterthantheconsequentialistcan,but theconsequentialistcanexplainthelatterkindofsuccessbetter thantheconstitutivistcan.Ofcourse,ifandwhenthedemandsof thesedifferentkindsofsuccessconflict,theagentwillfacethe questionofhowtoproceed.Muchrecentworkinepistemologyhas attemptedtoadjudicatethatquestion,ortointerrogatethe assumptionofpossibleconflictthatgivesrisetoit(see,for instance,Marušić2015,McCormick2015,andRinard2017a and2019b). Thesedifferentwaysofunderstandingcognitivesuccesseachgiverise toadifferentunderstandingoftherangeofwaysinwhichcognitive successcanbeobstructed,andsoadifferentunderstandingofthe rangeinwhichagentsmaybeharmed,andsometimesevenwronged,by suchobstructions.Forinstance,onthecontractualistview,epistemic harmsmaybebuiltintothetermsofthe“contract”.That istosay,suchharmsmaybedonenotmerelybythespecificwaysin whichweinterpretorimplementourpracticeofepistemicappraisal, butratherinthefundamentalfeaturesofthatpracticeitself.For instance,apracticethatgrantsthestatusofknowledgetoabelief formedonthebasisofclearlyconceptualizedsenseperception,but nottoabeliefformedonthebasisofalessclearlyconceptualized senseofapersonalneed,isapracticethatsystematicallydiscredits beliefsformedbyexercisesofempathy,relativetobeliefsformedin otherordinary ways.[13] 1.6EpistemicHarmsandEpistemicWrongs Obstructinganagent’scognitivesuccessconstitutesan epistemicharm.Wronglyobstructinganagent’scognitivesuccess constitutesanepistemicwrong.Inasituationinwhichfalse testimonywouldbeanepistemicharm,dishonesttestimonywouldbean epistemicwrong.Buttherangeofepistemicharmsandepistemicwrongs canbemuchbroaderthanthoseinvolvingfalsehoodanddeception. Insinuation,inattention,andindoctrinationcanallconstitute epistemicharmsorepistemicwrongs:eachonecanobstruct,and sometimeswronglyobstruct,anagent’scognitivesuccess.For instance,Icanmisleadyouintodrawingfalseconclusions,evenif whatIsayistrue:forinstance,whenIsay“thevictimswere killedbyanimmigrant”,evenifwhatIsayisliterallytrue, itcanmisleadmyhearerintothinkingthatthekiller’sbeing animmigrantwasinsomewayexplanatorilyrelevanttohercrime. Alternatively,Icanharmyou,andperhapsevenwrongyou,bygetting youtothinkpoorlyofyourowncapacitytograspasubjectbynot payingattentiontowhatyouthinkorsay.Andfinally,Icanharm you,andperhapsevenwrongyou,byindoctrinatingyouinaviewso stronglythatyoulosetheabilitytoconsideralternativeviews. Theepistemicharmsandwrongsthatwe’vejustmentionedoccur frequentlyinthecourseofdailylife,andtheyaretypically constitutedbysomeparticularactthatweperform(e.g.,lending greatercredencetothewordofamanoverthatofawoman,orusing rhetoricaldevicestoinsinuatethingsthatonedoesn’tknowto betrue).Butsomeoftheseharmsandwrongsareconstitutednotby anyparticularact,butratherbytheproceduresthatgiveriseto thoseacts:forinstance,whenaresearchprograminthelifesciences implicitlyassumesanideologically-drivenconceptionofhumannature (seeLongino1990andAnderson2004forfascinatingcasestudies).And sometimes,theharmsandwrongsmightevenbebuiltintoourpractice ofepistemicappraisal—perhapsevenatendencythatissomehow constitutiveofthatverypractice.Suppose,forinstance,thatitis constitutiveofourpracticeofepistemicappraisaltocountsomeone asknowingafactonlyiftheypossessconceptsadequateto conceptualizethatfact.Whatevermaybesaidinfavorofour practice’shavingsuchafeature,oneofitseffectsisclear: thoseindividualswhoarecognitivelymostsensitivetofactsfor whichadequateconceptualresourceshavenotyetbeendevised(e.g., someonelivinglongbeforeFreudwhoissensitivetofactsabout repression,orsomeonelivinginthenineteenthcenturywhois sensitivetofactsaboutsexualharassment)willfindthatthe deliverancesoftheiruniquecognitivesensitivitiesarenotcounted asknowledge.Andso,thesesameindividualswillnotbegrantedthe sameauthorityorcredibilityasotherindividuals,evenwhenthose latterarelesscognitivelysensitivetotherangeoffactsin question.Recentworkinfeministepistemologyhashelpedustogain anappreciationofjusthowwidespreadthisphenomenonis(seethe seminaldiscussionofepistemicinjusticeinM.Fricker2007,andthe developmentofthataccountinDotson2014). 2.WhatisKnowledge? Knowledgeisamongthemanykindsofcognitivesuccessthat epistemologyisinterestedinunderstanding.Becauseithasattracted vastlymoreattentioninrecentepistemologythananyothervariety ofcognitivesuccess,wedevotethepresentsectiontoconsideringit insomedetail.ButtheEnglishword“knowledge”lumps togethervariousstatesthataredistinguishedinotherlanguages:for instance,theverb“toknow”canbetranslatedintoFrench eitheras“connaitre”oras “savoir”,andthenoun“knowledge” canbetranslatedintoLatinaseither“cognitio” oras“scientia”.Exactlyhowtoindividuatethe variouskindsofcognitivesuccessisnotsomethingthatcanbe determinedsolelybyappealtothelexiconofanyparticularnatural language.Thepresentsectionprovidesabriefsurveyofsomeofthe kindsofcognitivesuccessthatareindicatedbytheuseof “knowledge”inEnglish,butthisisnotintendedtosignal thatthesekindsofcognitivesuccessareallspeciesofsomecommon genus.Neither,however,isitintendedtosignalthatthesekindsof cognitivesuccessarenotallspeciesofsomecommongenus:atleast somephilosophershavetakentheretobeagenus,awareness,ofwhich thevariouskindsofknowledgeareallspecies,andwithrespectto whichthesevariouskindsmayallbeexplained(seeSilva2019fora defenseof“awarenessfirst”epistemology). 2.1KnowingIndividuals EvenifyouknowmanyfactsaboutNapoleon,itdoesn’tfollow thatyouknowNapoleon.Youcouldn’teverhaveknownNapoleon, sincehediedlongbeforeyouwereborn.But,despitenothavingever knownNapoleon,youcouldstillknowagreatmanyfactsabout Napoleon—perhapsyouknowevenmorefactsaboutNapoleonthan didthosewhoknewhimmostintimately.Thisshowsthatknowinga personisnotthesameasknowingagreatmanyfactsabouttheperson: thelatterisnotsufficientfortheformer.Andperhapstheformeris notevensufficientforthelatter,sinceImightknowmynextdoor neighbor,andyetnotrealizethatheisanundercoveragent,andthat almosteverythinghetellsmeabouthimselfisfalse. Knowingapersonisamatterofbeingacquaintedwiththatperson,and acquaintanceinvolvessomekindofperceptualrelationtotheperson. Whatkindofperceptualrelation?Clearly,notjustanyperceptual relationwilldo:Iseeandhearthousandsofpeoplewhilewalking aroundabustlingcity,butitdoesn’tfollowthatIam acquaintedwithanyofthem.Mustacquaintanceinvolveanabilityto distinguishthatindividualfromothers?Itdependsuponwhatsuchan abilityamountsto.Iamacquaintedwithmynextdoorneighbor,even though,insomesense,Icannotdistinguishhimfromhisidentical twin:iftheyweretogetherIcouldn’ttellwhowaswho. Justaswecanbeacquaintedwithaperson,sotoocanwebe acquaintedwithacity,aspeciesofbird,aplanet,1960sjazzmusic, WatsonandCrick’sresearch,transphobia,andsoon.If it’snotclearpreciselywhatacquaintancedemandsinthecase ofpeople,it’sevenlessclearwhatitdemandsacrossallof thesevariouscases.Ifthereisagenusofcognitivesuccess expressedbytheverb“toknow”withadirectobject,or bytheFrench“connaitre”,wehavenotyetunderstoodthat genus. 2.2KnowingHow Inhisgroundbreakingbook,TheConceptofMind,GilbertRyle arguedthatknowinghowtodosomethingmustbedifferentfromknowing anysetoffacts.Nomatterhowmanyfactsyoumightknowabout swimming,say,itdoesn’tfollowfromyourknowledgeofthese factsthatyouknowhowtoswim.And,ofcourse,youmightknowhowto swimevenwithoutknowingverymanyfactsaboutswimming.ForRyle, knowinghowisfundamentallydifferentfromknowing that. ThisRyleandistinctionbetweenknowinghowandknowing thathasbeenprominentlychallenged,beginningin1975withthe publicationofCarlGinet’sKnowledge,Perception,and Memory.Ginetarguedthatknowinghowtodosomethingwassimply knowingthataparticularactwasawaytodothatthing.This challengewasextendedandsystematizedbyBoërandLycan(1975), whoarguedthatknowingwho,knowingwhich, knowingwhy,knowingwhere,knowingwhen, andknowinghow—allofthevarietiesofknowing wh-,astheycalledit—werealljustdifferentformsof knowingthat.ToknowwhoisF,forinstance,wassimplyto knowthataparticularpersonisF.Toknowwhy pissimplytoknowthataparticularthingisthereason whyp.AndtoknowhowtoFwassimplytoknow thataparticularactisawaytoF.Thisviewwas elaboratedinconsiderabledetailbyStanleyandWilliamson2001,and thenchallengedorrefinedbymanysubsequentwriters(see,for instance,theessaysinBengsonandMoffett2011,andalsoPavese2015 and2017). 2.3KnowingFacts Wheneveraknower(S)knowssomefact(p),several conditionsmustobtain.ApropositionthatSdoesn’teven believecannotbe,orexpress,afactthatSknows.Therefore, knowledgerequires belief.[14] Falsepropositionscannotbe,orexpress,facts,andsocannotbe known.Therefore,knowledgerequirestruth.Finally,S’s beingcorrectinbelievingthatpmightmerelybeamatterof luck.Forexample,ifHalbelieveshehasafatalillness,notbecause hewastoldsobyhisdoctor,butsolelybecauseasahypochondriache can’thelpbelievingit,anditturnsoutthatinfacthehasa fatalillness,Hal’sbeingrightaboutthisismerely accidental:amatterofluck(badluck,inthis case).[15] Therefore,knowledgerequiresathirdelement,onethatexcludesthe aforementionedluck,andsothatinvolvesS’sbelief being,insomesense,justifiablyorappropriately held.Ifwetakethesethreeconditionsonknowledgetobenotmerely necessarybutalsosufficient,then:Sknowsthatpif andonlyifpistrueandSjustifiablybelievesthat p.Accordingtothisaccount,thethreeconditions—truth, belief,andjustification—areindividuallynecessaryandjointly sufficientforknowledgeof facts.[16] Recallthatthejustificationconditionisintroducedtoensurethat S’sbeliefisnottruemerelybecauseofluck.Butwhat mustjustificationbe,ifitcanensurethat?Itmaybethoughtthat S’sbeliefthatpistruenotmerelybecauseof luckwhenitisreasonableorrational,fromS’sown pointofview,totakeptobetrue.Oritmaybethoughtthat S’sbeliefistruenotmerelybecauseofluckifthat beliefhasahighobjectiveprobabilityoftruth,thatis,ifitis formedorsustainedbyreliablecognitiveprocessesorfaculties.But, aswewillseeinthenextsection,ifjustificationisunderstoodin eitheroftheseways,itcannotensureagainstluck. Itturnsout,asEdmundGettiershowed,thattherearecasesofJTB thatarenotcasesofknowledge.JTB,therefore,isnot sufficientforknowledge.Caseslikethat—knownas Gettier cases[17]—arise becauseneitherthepossessionofadequateevidence,nororigination inreliablefaculties,northeconjunctionoftheseconditions,is sufficientforensuringthatabeliefisnottruemerelybecauseof luck.Considerthewell-knowncaseofbarn-facades:Henrydrives througharuralareainwhichwhatappeartobebarnsare,withthe exceptionofjustone,merebarnfacades.FromtheroadHenryis drivingon,thesefacadeslookexactlylikerealbarns.Henryhappens tobelookingattheoneandonlyrealbarnintheareaandbelieves thatthere’sabarnoverthere.SoHenry’sbeliefistrue, andfurthermorehisvisualexperiencemakesitreasonable,fromhis pointofview,toholdthatbelief.Finally,hisbelieforiginatesin areliablecognitiveprocess:normalvisionofordinary,recognizable objectsingoodlighting.YetHenry’sbeliefistrueinthis casemerelybecauseofluck:hadHenrynoticedoneofthebarn-facades instead,hisbeliefwouldhavebeenfalse.Thereis,therefore,broad agreementamongepistemologiststhatHenry’sbeliefdoesnot qualifyas knowledge.[18] Tostateconditionsthatarejointlysufficientforknowledge,what furtherelementmustbeaddedtoJTB?ThisisknownastheGettier problem.SomephilosophersattempttosolvetheGettierproblem byaddingafourthconditiontothethreeconditionsmentionedabove, whileothersattempttosolveitbyeitherreplacingorrefiningthe justificationcondition.Howweunderstandthecontrastbetween replacingthejustificationconditionandrefiningitdepends,of course,onhowweunderstandthejustificationconditionitself,which isthetopicofthenextsection. SomephilosophersrejecttheGettierproblemaltogether:theyreject theaspirationtounderstandknowledgebytryingtoaddtoJTB.Some suchphilosopherstrytoexplainknowledgeintermsofvirtues:they saythattoknowafactisforthetruthofone’sbeliefto manifestepistemicvirtue(seeZagzebski1996andSosa1997).Other suchphilosopherstrytoexplainknowledgebyidentifyingitasa genusofmanyfamiliarspecies:theysaythatknowledgeisthemost generalfactivementalstateoperator(seeWilliamson2002).Andstill othersuchphilosopherstrytoexplainknowledgebyexplainingits distinctiveroleinsomeotheractivity.Accordingtosome,toknowa factisforthatfacttobeareasonforwhichonecandoorthink something.[19] Accordingtoothers,toknowafactistobeentitledtoassertthat fact(seeUnger1975,Williamson2002,DeRose2002fordefensesof thisview;seeBrown2008band2010fordissent).Accordingtostill others,toknowafactistobeentitledtouseitasapremisein reasoning(seeHawthorne&Stanley2008fordefenseofthisview; seeNeta2009andBrown2008afordissent).Andaccordingtostill others,toknowafactistobeatrustworthyinformantconcerning whetherthatfactobtains.Finally,therearethosewhothinkthatthe question“whatisittoknowafact?”ismisconceived:the verb“toknow”doesnotdotheworkofdenotinganything, butdoesadifferentkindofworkaltogether,forinstance,thework ofassuringone’slistenersconcerningsomefactorother,or theworkofindicatingtoone’saudiencethataparticular personisatrustworthyinformantconcerningsomematter(seeLawlor 2013foranarticulationoftheassuranceview,andCraig1990foran articulationofthetrustworthyinformantview). 3.WhatisJustification? Whateverpreciselyisinvolvedinknowingafact,itiswidely recognizedthatsomeofourcognitivesuccessesfallshortof knowledge:anagentmay,forexample,conductherselfinawaythatis intellectuallyunimpeachable,andyetstillenduptherebybelievinga falseproposition.Juliahaseveryreasontobelievethatherbirthday isJuly15:itsayssoonherbirthcertificateandallofhermedical records,andeveryoneinherfamilyinsiststhatitisJuly15. Nonetheless,ifallofthisevidenceistheresultofsome time-keepingmistakemadeatthetimeofherbirth,herbeliefabout herbirthdaycouldbefalse,despitebeingsothoroughlyjustified. Debatesconcerningthenatureof justification[20] canbeunderstoodasdebatesconcerningthenatureofsuch non-knowledge-guaranteeingcognitivesuccessesastheonethatJulia enjoysinthis example.[21] 3.1DeontologicalandNon-DeontologicalJustification Howistheterm“justification”usedinordinarylanguage? Hereisanexample:TomaskedMarthaaquestion,andMartharesponded withalie.Wasshejustifiedinlying?Janethinksshewas,for Tom’squestionwasaninappropriateone,theanswertowhichwas noneofTom’sbusiness.WhatmightJanemeanwhenshethinks thatMarthawasjustifiedinrespondingwithalie?Anaturalanswer isthis:ShemeansthatMarthawasundernoobligationto refrainfromlying.DuetotheinappropriatenessofTom’s question,itwasn’tMartha’sdutytotellthe truth.Thisunderstandingofjustification,commonlylabeled deontological,maybedefinedasfollows:Sis justifiedindoingxifandonlyifSisnotobligedto refrainfromdoing x.[22] If,whenweapplythewordjustificationnottoactionsbutto beliefs,wemeansomethinganalogous,thenthefollowingholds: DeontologicalJustification(DJ) Sisjustifiedinbelievingthatpifandonlyif Sisnotobligedtorefrainfrombelievingthat p.[23] Whatkindofobligationsarerelevantwhenwewishtoassesswhethera belief,ratherthananaction,isjustifiedorunjustified? Whereaswhenweevaluateanaction,weareinterestedinassessingthe actionfromeitheramoraloraprudentialpointofview,whenit comestobeliefs,whatmattersmaybesomething else,[24] e.g.,thepursuitoftruth,orofunderstanding,or ofknowledge. Exactlywhat,though,mustwedointhepursuitofsomesuch distinctivelyepistemicaim?Accordingtooneanswer,theonefavored byevidentialists,weoughttobelieveinaccordwithour evidence.[25] Forthisanswertobehelpful,weneedanaccountofwhatour evidenceconsistsof,andwhatitmeanstobelieveinaccordwithit. Otherphilosophersmightdenythisevidentialistanswer,butstillsay thatthepursuitofthedistinctivelyepistemicaimsentailsthatwe oughttofollowthecorrectepistemicnorms.Ifthisanswerisgoing tohelpusfigureoutwhatobligationsthedistinctivelyepistemic aimsimposeonus,weneedtobegivenanaccountofwhatthecorrect epistemicnorms are.][26] Thedeontologicalunderstandingoftheconceptofjustificationis commontothewayphilosopherssuchasDescartes,Locke,Mooreand Chisholmhavethoughtaboutjustification.Recently,however,two chiefobjectionshavebeenraisedagainstconceivingofjustification deontologically.First,ithasbeenarguedthatDJpresupposesthatwe canhaveasufficientlyhighdegreeofcontroloverourbeliefs.But beliefs—thisobjectionalleges—areakinnottoactionsbut ratherthingssuchasdigestiveprocesses,sneezes,orinvoluntary blinkingsoftheeye.Theideaisthatbeliefssimplyariseinor happentous.Therefore,beliefsarenotsuitablefordeontological evaluation(seeAlston1985&1988;also,seeChrisman2008).To thisobjection,someadvocatesofDJhaverepliedthatlackofcontrol overourbeliefsisnoobstacletothinkingofjustificationasa deontologicalstatus(seeR.Feldman2001a).OtheradvocatesofDJ havearguedthatweenjoynolesscontroloverourbeliefsthanwedo overourintentionalactions(seeRyan2003;Sosa2015;Steup2000, 2008,2012,2017;andRinard2019b). AccordingtothesecondobjectiontoDJ,deontologicaljustification cannotsufficeforanagenttohaveajustifiedbelief.Thisclaimis typicallysupportedbydescribingcasesinvolvingeitherabenighted, culturallyisolatedsocietyorsubjectswhoarecognitivelydeficient. Suchcasesinvolvesubjectswhosecognitivelimitationsmakeitthe casethattheyareundernoobligationtorefrainfrombelievingas theydo,butwhoselimitationsnonethelessrenderthemincapableof formingjustifiedbeliefs(foraresponsetothisobjection,seeSteup 1999). ThosewhorejectDJthinkofjustificationnotdeontologically,but ratherasapropertythatthatabeliefhaswhenitis,insomesense, sufficientlylikelytobe true.[27] Wemay,then,definejustificationasfollows: SufficientLikelihoodJustification(SLJ) Sisjustifiedinbelievingthatpifandonlyif Sbelievesthatpinawaythatmakesitsufficiently likelythatherbeliefistrue. Ifwewishtopindownexactlywhatthelikelihoodatissueamounts to,wewillhavetodealwithavarietyoftricky issues.[28] Fornow,letusjustfocusonthemainpoint.ThosewhopreferSLJto DJwouldsaythatsufficientlikelihoodoftruthanddeontological justificationcandiverge:it’spossibleforabelieftobe deontologicallyjustifiedwithoutbeingsufficientlylikelytobe true.Thisisjustwhatcasesinvolvingbenightedculturesor cognitivelydeficientsubjectsaredesignedtoshow(forelaboration onthenon-deontologicalconceptofjustification,seeAlston 1988). 3.2WhatJustifiesBelief? Whatmakesabeliefthatpjustified,whenitis?Whethera beliefisjustifiedorunjustified,thereissomethingthat makesitso.Let’scallthethingsthatmakeabelief justifiedorunjustifiedJ-factors.Whichfeaturesofabeliefare J-factors? Accordingto“evidentialists”,itisthebeliever’s possessionofevidenceforp.Whatisit,though,topossess evidenceforp?Someevidentialists(thoughnotall)wouldsay itistobeinanexperiencethatpresentspasbeingtrue. Accordingtotheseevidentialists,ifthecoffeeinyourcuptastes sweettoyou,thenyouhaveevidencethatthecoffeeissweet.Ifyou feelathrobbingpaininyourhead,youhaveevidencethatyouhavea headache.Ifyouhaveamemoryofhavinghadcerealforbreakfast, thenyouhaveevidenceaboutwhatyouhadforbreakfast.Andwhenyou clearly“see”or“intuit”thattheproposition “IfJackhadmorethanfourcupsofcoffee,thenJackhadmore thanthreecupsofcoffee”istrue,thenyouhaveevidencefor thatproposition.Onthisview,evidenceconsistsofperceptual, introspective,memorial,andintuitionalexperiences,andtopossess evidenceistohaveanexperienceofthatkind.Soaccordingtothis “experientialist”versionofevidentialism,whatmakesyou justifiedinbelievingthatpisyourhavinganexperiencethat representspasbeingtrue(seeConeeandFeldman2008and McCain2014fordefensesofsuchaview).Otherversionsof evidentialismmightidentifyotherfactorsasyourevidence,butwould stillinsistthatthosefactorsaretheJ-factors. Evidentialismisoftencontrastedwithreliabilism,whichistheview thatabeliefisjustifiedbyresultingfromareliablesource,where asourceisreliablejustincaseittendstoresultinmostlytrue beliefs.Reliabilists,ofcourse,canalsograntthattheexperiences mentionedinthepreviousparagraphcanmattertothejustificationof yourbeliefs.However,theydenythatjustificationis essentiallyamatterofhavingsuitableexperiences.Rather, theysay,thoseexperiencesmattertothejustificationofyour beliefsnotmerelybyvirtueofbeingevidenceinsupportofthose beliefs,butmorefundamentally,byvirtueofbeingpartofthe reliablesourceofthosebeliefs.Differentversionsofreliabilism havebeendefended:somephilosophersclaimthatwhatjustifiesa beliefisthatitisproducedbyaprocessthatisreliable(for instance,seeGoldman1986),othersclaimthatwhatjustifiesabelief isthatitisresponsivetogroundsthatreliablycovarywiththethe truthofthatbelief,otherclaimthatwhatjustifiesabeliefisthat itisformedbythevirtuousexerciseofacapacity,andsoon. 3.3Internalvs.External Considerasciencefictionscenarioconcerningahumanbrainthatis removedfromitsskull,keptaliveinavatofnutrientfluid,and electrochemicallystimulatedtohavepreciselythesametotalseries ofexperiencesthatyouhavehad.Callsuchabraina “BIV”:aBIVwouldbelieveeverythingthatyoubelieve, andwould(itisoftenthought)bejustifiedinbelievingthosethings topreciselythesameextentthatyouarejustifiedinbelievingthem. Therefore,justificationisdeterminedsolelybythoseinternal factorsthatyouandyourenvattedbraindoppelgangershare.Thisview iswhathascometobecalled“internalism”about justification.[29] Externalismissimplythedenialofinternalism.Externalistssaythat whatwewantfromjustificationisthekindoflikelihoodoftruth neededforknowledge,andtheinternalconditionsthatyousharewith yourBIVdoppelgangerdonotgeneratesuchlikelihoodoftruth.So justificationinvolvesexternal conditions.[30] Amongthosewhothinkthatjustificationisinternal,thereisno unanimityonhowtounderstandthenotionofinternality—i.e., whatitisaboutthefactorsthatyousharewithyourBIVdoppelganger thatmakesthosefactorsrelevanttojustification.Wecandistinguish betweentwoapproaches.Accordingtothefirst,justificationis internalbecauseweenjoyaspecialkindofaccesstoJ-factors:they arealwaysrecognizableon reflection.[31] Hence,assumingcertainfurtherpremises(whichwillbementioned momentarily),justificationitselfisalwaysrecognizableon reflection.[32] Accordingtothesecondapproach,justificationisinternalbecause J-factorsarealwaysmentalstates(seeConeeandFeldman2001). Let’scalltheformeraccessibilityinternalismandthe lattermentalistinternalism. Evidentialismistypicallyassociatedwithinternalismofatleastone ofthesetwovarieties,andreliabilismwith externalism.[33] Letusseewhy.Evidentialismsays,ataminimum,twothings: E1Whatmakes onejustifiedinbelievingpisnothingoverandabovethe evidencethatonepossesses. E2What evidenceonepossessesisfixedbyone’smental states. ByvirtueofE2,evidentialismisaninstanceofmentalist internalism.Whetherevidentialismisalsoaninstanceof accessibilityinternalismisamorecomplicatedissue.Theconjunction ofE1andE2byitselfimpliesnothingabouttheaccessibilityof justification.Butmentalistinternalistswhoendorsethefirst principlebelowwillalsobecommittedtoaccessibilityinternalism, andevidentialistswhoalsoendorsethesecondprinciplebelowwillbe committedtotheaccessibilityofjustification: Luminosity One’sownmindiscognitivelyluminous:Wheneveroneisina particularmentalstate,onecanalwaysrecognizeonreflectionwhat mentalstatesoneisin,andinparticular,onecanalwaysrecognize onreflectionwhatevidenceone possesses.[34] Necessity Theprinciplesthatdeterminewhatisevidenceforwhatare apriori recognizable.[35] Relyingonaprioriinsight,onecanthereforealways recognizeonreflectionwhether,ortheextent,towhichaparticular bodyofevidenceisevidencefor p.[36] AlthoughE1andE2bythemselvesdonotimplyaccessinternalism, theirconjunctionwithLuminosityandNecessitymayimplyaccess internalism.[37] Next,letusconsiderwhyreliabilismisanexternalisttheory. Reliabilismsaysthatthejustificationofone’sbeliefsisa functionofthereliabilityofone’sbeliefsourcessuchas memorial,perceptualandintrospectivestatesandprocesses.Evenif theoperationsofthesourcesarementalstates,theirreliabilityis notitselfbeamentalstate.Therefore,reliabilistsrejectmentalist internalism.Moreover,insofarasthereliabilityofone’s beliefsourcesisnotitselfrecognizablebymeansofreflection,how couldreflectionenableustorecognizewhensuchjustification obtains?[38] Reliabilistswhotaketheretobenogoodanswertothisquestion alsorejectaccess internalism.[39] 4.TheStructureofKnowledgeandJustification Anyonewhoknowsanythingnecessarilyknowsmanythings.Ourknowledge formsabody,andthatbodyhasastructure:knowingsomethings requiresknowingotherthings.Butwhatisthisstructure? Epistemologistswhothinkthatknowledgeinvolvesjustificationtend toregardthestructureofourknowledgeasderivingfromthe structureofourjustifications.Wewill,therefore,focusonthe latter. 4.1Foundationalism Accordingtofoundationalism,ourjustifiedbeliefsarestructured likeabuilding:theyaredividedintoafoundationanda superstructure,thelatterrestingupontheformer.Beliefsbelonging tothefoundationarebasic.Beliefsbelongingtothe superstructurearenonbasicandreceivejustificationfrom thejustifiedbeliefsinthe foundation.[40] Beforeweevaluatethisfoundationalistaccountofjustification,let usfirsttrytospellitoutmoreprecisely.Whatisitfora justifiedbelieftobebasic?Accordingtooneapproach,whatmakesa justifiedbeliefbasicisthatitdoesn’treceiveits justificationfromanyotherbeliefs.Thefollowingdefinition capturesthisthought: DoxasticBasicality(DB) S’sjustifiedbeliefthatpisbasicifandonly ifS’sbeliefthatpisjustifiedwithoutowing itsjustificationtoanyofS’sotherbeliefs. Let’sconsiderwhatwould,accordingtoDB,qualifyasan exampleofabasicbelief.Supposeyounotice(forwhateverreason) someone’shat,andyoualsonoticethatthathatlooksblueto you.Soyoubelieve (B)Itappears tomethatthathatisblue. Unlesssomethingverystrangeisgoingon,(B)isanexampleofa justifiedbelief.DBtellsusthat(B)isbasicifandonlyifitdoes notoweitsjustificationtoanyotherbeliefsofyours.Soif(B)is indeedbasic,theremightbesomeitemorothertowhich(B)owesits justification,butthatitemwouldnotbeanotherbeliefofyours.We callthiskindofbasicality“doxastic”becauseitmakes basicalityafunctionofhowyourdoxasticsystem(yourbeliefsystem) isstructured. Letusturntothequestionofwherethejustificationthatattaches to(B)mightcomefrom,ifwethinkofbasicalityasdefinedbyDB. NotethatDBmerelytellsushow(B)isnotjustified.It saysnothingabouthow(B)isjustified.DB,therefore,does notanswerthatquestion.Whatweneed,inadditiontoDB,isan accountofwhatitisthatjustifiesabeliefsuchas(B). Accordingtoonestrandoffoundationalistthought,(B)isjustified becauseitcan’tbefalse,doubted,orcorrectedbyothers.On suchaview,(B)isjustifiedbecause(B)carrieswithitan epistemicprivilegesuchasinfallibility,indubitability,or incorrigibility(foradiscussionofvariouskindsofepistemic privilege,seeAlston1971[1989]). Notethat(B)isabeliefabouthowthehatappearstoyou. So(B)isabeliefaboutaperceptualexperienceofyours.According totheversionoffoundationalismjustconsidered,asubject’s basicbeliefsareintrospectivebeliefsaboutthesubject’sown mentalstates,ofwhichperceptualexperiencesmakeuponesubset. Othermentalstatesaboutwhichasubjectcanhavebasicbeliefsmay includesuchthingsashavingaheadache,beingtired,feeling pleasure,orhavingadesireforacupofcoffee.Beliefsabout externalobjectscannotqualifyasbasic,accordingtothiskindof foundationalism,foritisimpossibleforsuchbeliefstoenjoythe kindofepistemicprivilegenecessaryforbeingbasic. Accordingtoadifferentversionoffoundationalism,(B)isjustified bysomefurthermentalstateofyours,butnotbyafurther beliefofyours.Rather,(B)isjustifiedbythevery perceptualexperiencethat(B)itselfisabout:the hat’slookingbluetoyou.Let“(E)”representthat experience.Accordingtothisalternativeproposal,(B)and(E)are distinctmentalstates.Theideaisthatwhatjustifies(B)is(E). Since(E)isanexperience,notabeliefofyours,(B)can,according toDB,stillbebasic. Let’scallthetwoversionsoffoundationalismwehave distinguishedprivilegefoundationalismandexperiential foundationalism.Privilegefoundationalismisgenerallythought torestrictbasicbeliefssothatbeliefsaboutcontingent, mind-independentfactscannotbebasic,sincebeliefsaboutsuchfacts aregenerallythoughttolacktheprivilegethatattendsour introspectivebeliefsaboutourownpresentmentalstates,orour beliefsaboutapriorinecessities.Experiential foundationalismisnotrestrictiveinthesameway.Supposeinsteadof (B),youbelieve (H)Thathat isblue. Unlike(B),(H)isaboutthehatitself,andnotthewaythehat appearstoyou.Suchabeliefisnotoneaboutwhichweareinfallible orotherwiseepistemicallyprivileged.Privilegefoundationalism would,therefore,classify(H)asnonbasic.Itis,however,quite plausibletothinkthat(E)justifiesnotonly(B)but(H)aswell.If (E)isindeedwhatjustifies(H),and(H)doesnotreceiveany additionaljustificationfromanyfurtherbeliefsofyours,then(H) qualifies,accordingtoDB,asbasic. ExperientialFoundationalism,then,combinestwocrucialideas:(i) whenajustifiedbeliefisbasic,itsjustificationisnotowedtoany otherbelief;(ii)whatinfactjustifiesbasicbeliefsare experiences. Underordinarycircumstances,perceptualbeliefssuchas(H)arenot basedonanyfurtherbeliefsaboutone’sownperceptual experiences.Itisnotclear,therefore,howprivilegefoundationalism canaccountforthejustificationofordinaryperceptualbeliefslike (H).[41] Experientialfoundationalism,ontheotherhand,hasnotroubleat allexplaininghowordinaryperceptualbeliefsarejustified:theyare justifiedbytheperceptualexperiencesthatgiverisetothem.This couldbeviewedasareasonforpreferringexperiential foundationalismtoprivilegefoundationalism. DBarticulatesoneconceptionofbasicality.Here’san alternativeconception: EpistemicBasicality(EB) S’sjustifiedbeliefthatpisbasicifandonly ifS’sjustificationforbelievingthatpdoesnot dependonanyjustificationSpossessesforbelievingafurther proposition, q.[42] EBmakesitmoredifficultforabelieftobebasicthanDBdoes.To seewhy,weturntothechiefquestion(let’scallitthe “J-question”)thatadvocatesofexperiential foundationalismface: TheJ-Question Whyareperceptualexperiencesasourceofjustification? OnewayofansweringtheJ-questionisasfollows:perceptual experiencesareasourceofjustificationonlywhen,andonlybecause, wehavejustificationfortakingthemtobe reliable.[43] Notethatyourhavingjustificationforbelievingthatp doesn’tentailthatyouactuallybelievep.Thus,your havingjustificationforattributingreliabilitytoyourperceptual experiencesdoesn’tentailthatyouactuallybelievethemtobe reliable. Whatmightgiveusjustificationforthinkingthatourperceptual experiencesarereliable?That’sacomplicatedissue.Forour presentpurposes,let’sconsiderthefollowinganswer:We rememberthattheyhaveserveduswellinthepast.Wearesupposing, then,thatjustificationforattributingreliabilitytoyour perceptualexperiencesconsistsofmemoriesofperceptualsuccess.On thisview,aperceptualexperience(E)justifiesaperceptualbelief onlywhen,andonlybecause,youhavesuitabletrack-recordmemories thatgiveyoujustificationforconsidering(E)reliable.(Ofcourse, thisraisesthequestionwhythosememoriesgiveusjustification,but therearemanydifferentapproachestothisquestion,aswe’ll seemorefullybelow.) Ifthisviewiscorrect,thenitisclearhowDBandEBdiffer.Your havingjustificationfor(H)dependsonyourhavingjustificationfor believingsomethingelseinadditionto(H),namelythatyourvisual experiencesarereliable.Asaresult(H)isnotbasicinthesense definedbyEB.However,(H)mightstillbebasicinthesensedefined byDB.Ifyouarejustifiedinbelieving(H)andyourjustificationis owedsolelyto(E)and(M),neitherofwhichincludesanybeliefs, thenyourbeliefisdoxastically—thoughnot epistemically—basic. We’veconsideredonepossibleanswertotheJ-question,and consideredhowEBandDBdifferifthatansweriscorrect.Butthere areotherpossibleanswerstotheJ-question.Anotheransweristhat perceptualexperiencesareasourceofjustificationwhen,and because,theyareoftypesthatreliablyproducetrue beliefs.[44] Anotheransweristhatperceptualexperiencesareasourceof justificationwhen,andbecause,theyareoftypesthatreliably indicatethetruthoftheircontent.Yetanotheransweristhat perceptualexperiencesareasourceofjustificationwhen,and because,theyhaveacertainphenomenology:thatofpresentingtheir contentas true.[45] Toconcludethissection,letusbrieflyconsiderhowjustificationis supposedtobetransferredfrombasictononbasicbeliefs.Thereare twooptions:thejustificatoryrelationbetweenbasicandnonbasic beliefscouldbedeductiveornon-deductive.Ifwetaketherelation tobedeductive,eachofone’snonbasicbeliefswouldhavetobe suchthatitcanbededucedfromone’sbasicbeliefs.Butifwe considerarandomselectionoftypicalbeliefswehold,itisnoteasy toseefromwhichbasicbeliefstheycouldbededuced. Foundationalists,therefore,typicallyconceiveofthelinkbetween thefoundationandthesuperstructureinnon-deductiveterms.They wouldsaythat,foragivensetofbasicbeliefs,B,tojustifya nonbasicbelief,B*,itisn’tnecessarythatBentailsB*. Rather,itissufficientthat,theinferencefromBtoB*isa rationalone—howeversuchrationalityistobe understood.[46] 4.2Coherentism Foundationalismsaysthatknowledgeandjustificationarestructured likeabuilding,consistingofasuperstructurethatrestsupona foundation.Accordingtocoherentism,thismetaphorgetsthingswrong. Knowledgeandjustificationarestructuredlikeawebwhere thestrengthofanygivenareadependsonthestrengthofthe surroundingareas.Coherentists,then,denythatthereareanybasic beliefs.Aswesawintheprevioussection,therearetwodifferent waysofconceivingofbasicality.Consequently,therearetwo correspondingwaysofconstruingcoherentism:asthedenialof doxasticbasicalityorasthedenialofepistemicbasicality.Consider firstcoherentismasthedenialofdoxasticbasicality: DoxasticCoherentism Everyjustifiedbeliefreceivesitsjustificationfromotherbeliefs initsepistemicneighborhood. Letusapplythisthoughttothehatexampleweconsideredin Section3.1. Supposeagainyounoticesomeone’shatandbelieve (H)Thathatis blue. Let’sagreethat(H)isjustified.Accordingtocoherentism,(H) receivesitsjustificationfromotherbeliefsintheepistemic vicinityof(H).Theyconstituteyourevidenceoryourreasonsfor taking(H)tobetrue.Whichbeliefsmightmakeupthissetof justification-conferringneighborhoodbeliefs? Wewillconsidertwoapproachestoansweringthisquestion.Thefirst isknownasinferencetothebestexplanation.Such inferencesgeneratewhatiscalledexplanatorycoherence(see chapter7inHarman1986).Accordingtothisapproach,wemustsuppose youformabeliefaboutthewaythehatappearstoyouinyour perceptualexperiences,andasecondbelieftotheeffectthatyour perceptualexperience,thehat’slookingbluetoyou,isbest explainedbythehypothesisthat(H)istrue.Sotherelevantsetof beliefsisthefollowing: (1)Iam havingavisualexperience(E):thehatlooksbluetome. (2)Myhaving (E)isbestexplainedbyassumingthat(H)istrue. Thereareofcoursealternativeexplanationsofwhyyouhave(E). Perhapsyouarehallucinatingthatthehatisblue.Perhapsanevil demonmakesthehatlookbluetoyouwheninfactitisred.Perhaps youarethesortofpersontowhomhatsalwayslookblue.An explanatorycoherentistwouldsaythat,comparedwiththese,the hat’sactualbluenessisasuperiorexplanation.That’s whyyouarejustifiedinbelieving(H).Notethatanexplanatory coherentistcanalsoexplainthelackofjustification. Supposeyourememberthatyoujusttookahallucinatorydrugthat makesthingslookbluetoyou.Thatwouldpreventyoufrombeing justifiedinbelieving(H).Theexplanatorycoherentistcanaccount forthisbypointingoutthat,inthecaseweareconsideringnow,the truthof(H)wouldnotbethebestexplanationofwhyyouare havingexperience(E).Rather,yourhavingtakenthehallucinatory drugwouldexplainyourhaving(E)atleastaswellasthehypothesis (H)wouldexplainit.That’swhy,accordingtotheexplanatory coherentist,inthisvariationofouroriginalcaseyouarenot justifiedinbelieving(H). Onechallengeforexplanatorycoherentistsistoexplainwhatmakes oneexplanationbetterthananother.Let’susetheevildemon hypothesistoillustratethischallenge.Whatweneedisan explanationofwhyyouarehaving(E).Accordingtotheevildemon hypothesis,youarehaving(E)becausetheevildemoniscausingyou tohave(E),inordertotrickyou.Theexplanatorycoherentistwould saythat,ifthebulkofourbeliefsaboutthemind-independentworld arejustified,thenthis“evildemon”hypothesisisabad explanationofwhyyouarehaving(E).Butwhyisitbad?Whatweneed toanswerthisquestionisageneralandprincipledaccountofwhat makesoneexplanationbetterthananother.Supposeweappealtothe factthatyouarenotjustifiedinbelievingintheexistence ofevildemons.Thegeneralideawouldbethis:Iftherearetwo competingexplanations,E1andE2,andE1consistsoforincludesa propositionthatyouarenotjustifiedinbelievingwhereasE2does not,thenE2isbetterthanE1.Theproblemwiththisideaisthatit putsthecartbeforethehorse.Explanatorycoherentismissupposedto helpusunderstandwhatitisforbeliefstobejustified.It doesn’tdothatifitaccountsforthedifferencebetweenbetter andworseexplanationsbymakinguseofthedifferencebetween justifiedandunjustifiedbelief.Ifexplanatorycoherentismwereto proceedinthisway,itwouldbeacircular,andthusuninformative, accountofjustification.Sothechallengethatexplanatory coherentismmustmeetistogiveanaccount,withoutusingtheconcept ofjustification,ofwhatmakesoneexplanationbetterthan another. Letusmoveontothesecondwayinwhichthecoherentistapproach mightbecarriedout.Recallwhatasubject’sjustificationfor believingpisallabout:possessingalinkbetweenthebelief thatpandp’struth.Supposethesubjectknows thattheoriginofherbeliefthatpisreliable.Sosheknows thatbeliefscomingfromthissourcetendtobetrue.Suchknowledge wouldgiveheranexcellentlinkbetweenthebeliefanditstruth.So wemightsaythattheneighborhoodbeliefswhichconferjustification on(H)arethefollowing: (1)Iamhavinga visualexperience(E):thehatlooksbluetome. (3)Experiences like(E)arereliable. Callcoherentismofthiskindreliabilitycoherentism.Ifyou believe(1)and(3),youareinpossessionofagoodreasonfor thinkingthatthehatisindeedblue.Soyouareinpossessionofa goodreasonforthinkingthatthebeliefinquestion,(H),istrue. That’swhy,accordingtoreliabilitycoherentism,youare justifiedinbelieving(H). Likeexplanatorycoherentism,thisviewfacesacircularityproblem. If(H)receivesitsjustificationinpartbecauseyoualsobelieve (3),(3)itselfmustbejustified.Butwherewouldyourjustification for(3)comefrom?Oneanswerwouldbe:fromyourmemoryofperceptual successinthepast.Yourememberthatyourvisualexperienceshave hadagoodtrackrecord.Theyhaverarelyledyouastray.Theproblem isthatyoucan’tjustifiablyattributeagoodtrackrecordto yourperceptualfacultieswithoutusingyourperceptualfaculties.So ifreliabilitycoherentismisgoingtowork,itwouldhavetobe legitimatetouseafacultyfortheverypurposeofestablishingthe reliabilityofthatfacultyitself.Butitisnotclearthatthisis legitimate.[47] Wehaveseenthatexplanatorycoherentismandreliabilitycoherentism eachfaceitsowndistinctivecircularityproblem.Sincebothare versionsofdoxasticcoherentism,theybothfaceafurther difficulty:Dopeople,undernormalcircumstances,reallyformbeliefs like(1),(2),and(3)?Itwouldseemtheydonot.Itcouldbe objected,therefore,thatthesetwoversionsofcoherentismmake excessiveintellectualdemandsofordinarysubjectswhoareunlikely tohavethebackgroundbeliefsthat,accordingtotheseversionsof coherentism,areneededforjustification.Thisobjectioncouldbe avoidedbystrippingcoherentismofitsdoxasticelement.Theresult wouldbethefollowingversionofcoherentism,whichresultsfrom rejectingEB(theepistemicconceptionofbasicality): DependenceCoherentism Wheneveroneisjustifiedinbelievingaproposition p1,one’sjustificationforbelieving p1dependsonjustificationonehasforbelieving somefurtherpropositions,p1,p2, …pn. Anexplanatorycoherentistmightsaythat,foryoutobejustifiedin believing(H),it’snotnecessarythatyouactually believe (1) and (2). However,itisnecessarythatyouhavejustificationfor believing(1)and(2).Itisyourhavingjustificationfor(1)and(2) thatgivesyoujustificationforbelieving(H).Areliability coherentistmightmakeananalogouspoint.Shemightsaythat,tobe justifiedinbelieving(H),youneednotbelieveanythingaboutthe reliabilityofyourbelief’sorigin.Youmust,however,have justificationforbelievingthatyourbelief’soriginis reliable;thatis,youmusthavejustificationfor(1)and (3). Bothversionsofdependencecoherentism,then,restonthe suppositionthatitispossibletohavejustificationfora propositionwithoutactuallybelievingthatproposition. Dependencecoherentismisasignificantdeparturefromtheway coherentismhastypicallybeenconstruedbyitsadvocates.According tothetypicalconstrualofcoherentism,abeliefisjustified,only ifthesubjecthascertainfurtherbeliefsthatconstitute reasonsforthegivenbelief.Dependencecoherentismrejectsthis. Accordingtoit,justificationneednotcomeintheformofbeliefs. Itcancomeintheformofintrospectiveandmemorialexperience,so longassuchexperiencegivesasubjectjustificationforbeliefs abouteitherreliabilityorexplanatorycoherence.Infact,dependence coherentismallowsforthepossibilitythatabeliefisjustified,not byreceivinganyofitsjustificationfromotherbeliefs,but solelybysuitableperceptualexperiencesandmemory experience.[48] Next,letusexaminesomeofthereasonsprovidedinthedebateover foundationalismandcoherentism. 4.3WhyFoundationalism? Themainargumentforfoundationalismiscalledtheregress argument.It’sanargumentfromelimination.Withregardto everyjustifiedbelief,B1,thequestionarisesofwhere B1’sjustificationcomesfrom.IfB1is notbasic,itwouldhavetocomefromanotherbelief,B2. ButB2canjustifyB1onlyifB2is justifieditself.IfB2isbasic,thejustificatorychain wouldendwithB2.ButifB2isnotbasic,we needafurtherbelief,B3.IfB3isnotbasic, weneedafourthbelief,andsoforth.Unlesstheensuingregress terminatesinabasicbelief,wegettwopossibilities:theregress willeitherloopbacktoB1orcontinuead infinitum.Accordingtotheregressargument,bothofthese possibilitiesareunacceptable.Therefore,iftherearejustified beliefs,theremustbebasic beliefs.[49] Thisargumentsuffersfromvariousweaknesses.First,wemaywonder whetherthealternativestofoundationalismarereallyunacceptable. Intherecentliteratureonthissubject,weactuallyfindan elaboratedefenseofthepositionthatinfinitismisthecorrect solutiontotheregress problem.[50] Norshouldcircularitybedismissedtooquickly.Theissueisnot whetherasimpleargumentoftheformpthereforepcan justifythebeliefthatp.Ofcourseitcannot.Rather,the issueisultimatelywhether,intheattempttoshowthattrustinour facultiesisreasonable,wemaymakeuseoftheinputourfaculties deliver.Whethersuchcircularityisasunacceptableasa p-therefore-pinferenceisanopenquestion.Moreover,the avoidanceofcircularitydoesnotcomecheap.Experiential foundationalistsclaimthatperceptionisasourceofjustification. HencetheyneedtoanswertheJ-question:Whyisperceptiona sourceofjustification?Aswesawabove,ifwewishtoanswerthis questionwithoutcommittingourselvestothekindofcircularity dependencecoherentisminvolves,wemustchoosebetweenexternalism andanappealtobrutenecessity. Thesecondweaknessoftheregressargumentisthatitsconclusion merelysaysthis:Iftherearejustifiedbeliefs,theremustbe justifiedbeliefsthatdonotreceivetheirjustificationfromother beliefs.Itsconclusiondoesnotsaythat,iftherearejustified beliefs,theremustbebeliefswhosejustificationisindependentof anyjustificationforfurtherbeliefs.Sotheregressargument,ifit weresound,wouldmerelyshowthattheremustbedoxastic basicality.Dependencecoherentism,however,allowsfordoxastic basicality.Sotheregressargumentmerelydefendsexperiential foundationalismagainstdoxasticcoherentism.Itdoesnottelluswhy weshouldpreferexperientialfoundationalismtodependence coherentism. Experientialfoundationalismcanbesupportedbycitingcaseslikethe bluehatexample.Suchexamplesmakeitplausibletoassumethat perceptualexperiencesareasourceofjustification.Buttheydonot arbitratebetweendependencecoherentismandexperiential foundationalism,sincebothofthoseviewsappealtoperceptual experiencestoexplainwhyperceptualbeliefsarejustified. Finally,foundationalismcanbesupportedbyadvancingobjectionsto coherentism.Oneprominentobjectionisthatcoherentismsomehowfails toensurethatajustifiedbeliefsystemisincontactwithreality. Thisobjectionderivesitsforcefromthefactthatfictioncanbe perfectlycoherent.Whythink,therefore,thatabeliefsystem’s coherenceisareasonforthinkingthatthebeliefsinthatsystem tendtobetrue?Coherentistscouldrespondtothisobjectionby sayingthat,ifabeliefsystemcontainsbeliefssuchas“Many ofmybeliefshavetheirorigininperceptualexperiences”and “Myperceptualexperiencesarereliable”,itisreasonable forthesubjecttothinkthatherbeliefsystembringsherinto contactwithexternalreality.Thislookslikeaneffectiveresponse totheno-contact-with-realityobjection.Moreover,itisnoteasyto seewhyfoundationalismitselfshouldbebetterpositionedthan coherentismwhencontactwithrealityistheissue.Whatismeantby “ensuring”contactwithreality?Iffoundationalists expectalogicalguaranteeofsuchcontact,basicbeliefs mustbeinfallible.Thatwouldmakecontactwithrealityarather expensivecommodity.Givenitsprice,foundationalistsmightwantto lowertheirexpectations.Accordingtoanalternativeconstrual,we expectmerelythelikelihoodofcontactwithreality.Butif coherentistsaccountfortheepistemicvalueofperceptioninanyway, thentheycanmeetthatexpectationaswellasfoundationalists can. Sincecoherentismcanbeconstruedindifferentways,itisunlikely thatthereisonesingleobjectionthatsucceedsinrefutingall possibleversionsofcoherentism.Doxasticcoherentism,however,seems particularlyvulnerabletocriticismcomingfromthefoundationalist camp.Oneoftheseweconsideredalready:Itwouldseemthatdoxastic coherentismmakesexcessiveintellectualdemandsonbelievers.When dealingwiththemundanetasksofeverydaylife,wedon’t normallybothertoformbeliefsabouttheexplanatorycoherenceofour beliefsorthereliabilityofourbeliefsources.Accordingtoa secondobjection,doxasticcoherentismfailsbybeinginsensitiveto theepistemicrelevanceofperceptualexperiences.Foundationalists couldargueasfollows.SupposeKimisobservingachameleonthat rapidlychangesitscolors.Amomentagoitwasblue,nowit’s purple.Kimstillbelievesit’sblue.Herbeliefisnow unjustifiedbecauseshebelievesthechameleonisblueeventhoughit lookspurpletoher.Thenthechameleonchangesitscolor backtoblue.NowKim’sbeliefthatthechameleonisblueis justifiedagainbecausethechameleononceagainlooksblue toher.Thepointwouldbethatwhat’sresponsibleforthe changingjustificatorystatusofKim’sbeliefissolelytheway thechameleonlookstoher.Sincedoxasticcoherentismdoesnot attributeepistemicrelevancetoperceptualexperiencesbythemselves, itcannotexplainwhyKim’sbeliefisfirstjustified,then unjustified,andeventuallyjustified again.[51] 4.4WhyCoherentism? Coherentismistypicallydefendedbyattackingfoundationalismasa viablealternative.Toargueagainstprivilegefoundationalism, coherentistspickanepistemicprivilegetheythinkisessentialto foundationalism,andthenarguethateithernobeliefs,ortoofew beliefs,enjoysuchaprivilege.Againstexperientialfoundationalism, differentobjectionshavebeenadvanced.Onelineofcriticismisthat perceptualexperiencesdon’thavepropositionalcontent. Therefore,therelationbetweenaperceptualbeliefandtheperceptual experiencethatgivesrisetoitcanonlybecausal.Butitisnot clearthatthisiscorrect.Whenyouseethehatanditlooksblueto you,doesn’tyourvisualexperience—itslookingblueto you—havethepropositionalcontentthatthehatis blue?Ifitdoes,thenwhynotallowthatyourperceptual experiencecanplayajustificatory role?[52] Anotherlineofthoughtisthat,ifperceptualexperienceshave propositionalcontent,theycannotstopthejustificatoryregress becausetheywouldthenbeinneedofjustificationthemselves.That, however,isastrangethought.Inouractualepistemicpractice,we neverdemandofotherstojustifythewaythingsappeartothemin theirperceptualexperiences.Indeed,suchademandwouldseemabsurd. SupposeIaskyou:“Whydoyouthinkthatthehatis blue?”Youanswer:“Becauseitlooksbluetome”. TherearesensiblefurtherquestionsImightaskatthatpoint.For instance,Imightask:“Whydoyouthinkitslookingbluetoyou givesyouareasonforbelievingitisblue?”OrImightask: “Couldn’tyoubemistakeninbelievingitlooksblueto you?”ButnowsupposeIaskyou:“Whydoyousupposethe perceptualexperienceinwhichthehatlooksbluetoyouis justified?”Inresponsetothatquestion,youshouldaccuseme ofmisusingtheword“justification”.Imightaswellask youwhatitisthatjustifiesyourheadachewhenyouhaveone,orwhat justifiestheitchinyournosewhenyouhaveone.Thelatter questions,youshouldreply,wouldbeasabsurdasmyrequestfor statingajustifyingreasonforyourperceptual experience.[53] Experientialfoundationalism,then,isnoteasilydislodged.Onwhat groundscouldcoherentistsobjecttoit?Toraiseproblemsfor experientialfoundationalism,coherentistscouldpresstheJ-question: Whyareperceptualexperiencesasourceofjustification?If foundationalistsanswertheJ-questionappealingtoevidencethat warrantstheattributionofreliabilitytoperceptualexperiences, experientialfoundationalismmorphsintodependencecoherentism.To avoidthisoutcome,foundationalistswouldhavetogiveanalternative answer.Onewayofdoingthiswouldbetoadopttheepistemic conceptionofbasicality,andviewitasamatterofbrutenecessity thatperceptionisasourceofjustification.Itremainstobeseen whethersuchaviewissustainable. 5.SourcesofKnowledgeandJustification Beliefsariseinpeopleforawidevarietyofcauses.Amongthem,we mustlistpsychologicalfactorssuchasdesires,emotionalneeds, prejudice,andbiasesofvariouskinds.Obviously,whenbeliefs originateinsourceslikethese,theydon’tqualifyasknowledge eveniftrue.Fortruebeliefstocountasknowledge,itisnecessary thattheyoriginateinsourceswehavegoodreasontoconsider reliable.Theseareperception,introspection,memory,reason,and testimony.Letusbrieflyconsidereachofthese. 5.1Perception Ourperceptualfacultiesincludeatleastourfivesenses:sight, touch,hearing,smelling,andtasting.Wemustdistinguishbetweenan experiencethatcanbeclassifiedasperceivingthatp (forexample,seeingthatthereiscoffeeinthecupandtastingthat itissweet),whichentailsthatpistrue,andaperceptual experienceinwhichitseemstousasthoughp,butwhere pmightbefalse.Letusrefertothislatterkindof experienceasperceptualseemings.Thereasonformakingthis distinctionliesinthefactthatperceptualexperienceisfallible. Theworldisnotalwaysasitappearstousinourperceptual experiences.Weneed,therefore,awayofreferringtoperceptual experiencesinwhichpseemstobethecasethatallowsforthe possibilityofpbeingfalse.That’stheroleassignedto perceptualseemings.Sosomeperceptualseemingsthatpare casesofperceivingthatp,othersarenot.Whenitlooksto youasthoughthereisacupofcoffeeonthetableandinfactthere is,thetwostatescoincide.If,however,youhallucinatethatthere isacuponthetable,youhaveaperceptualseemingthatp withoutperceivingthatp. Onefamilyofepistemologicalissuesaboutperceptionariseswhenwe concernourselveswiththepsychologicalnatureoftheperceptual processesthroughwhichweacquireknowledgeofexternalobjects. Accordingtodirectrealism,wecanacquiresuchknowledge becausewecandirectlyperceivesuchobjects.Forexample,whenyou seeatomatoonthetable,whatyouperceiveisthetomato itself.Accordingtoindirectrealism,weacquireknowledge ofexternalobjectsbyvirtueofperceivingsomethingelse,namely appearancesorsense-data.Anindirectrealistwouldsaythat,when youseeandthusknowthatthereisatomatoonthetable,whatyou reallyseeisnotthetomatoitselfbutatomato-likesense-datumor somesuchentity. Directandindirectrealistsholddifferentviewsaboutthestructure ofperceptualknowledge.Indirectrealistswouldsaythatweacquire perceptualknowledgeofexternalobjectsbyvirtueofperceivingsense datathatrepresentexternalobjects.Sensedataenjoyaspecial status:weknowdirectlywhattheyarelike.Soindirectrealists thinkthat,whenperceptualknowledgeisfoundational,itisknowledge ofsensedataandothermentalstates.Knowledgeofexternalobjects isindirect:derivedfromourknowledgeofsensedata.Thebasicidea isthatwehaveindirectknowledgeoftheexternalworldbecausewe canhavefoundationalknowledgeofourownmind.Directrealists,in contrast,saythatperceptualexperiencescangiveyoudirect, foundationalknowledgeofexternal objects.[54] Wetakeourperceptualfacultiestobereliable.Buthowcanweknow thattheyarereliable?Forexternalists,thismightnotbemuchofa challenge.Iftheuseofreliablefacultiesissufficientfor knowledge,andifbyusingreliablefacultiesweacquirethebelief thatourfacultiesarereliable,thenwecometoknowthatour facultiesarereliable.Butevenexternalistsmightwonderhowthey can,viaargument,showthatourperceptualfacultiesare reliable.Theproblemisthis.Itwouldseemtheonlywayofacquiring knowledgeaboutthereliabilityofourperceptualfacultiesisthrough memory,throughrememberingwhethertheyserveduswellinthepast. ButshouldItrustmymemory,andshouldIthinkthattheepisodesof perceptualsuccessthatIseemtorecallwereinfactepisodesof perceptualsuccess?IfIamentitledtoanswerthesequestionswith “yes”,thenIneedtohave,tobeginwith,reasontoview mymemoryandmyperceptualexperiencesasreliable.Itwouldseem, therefore,thatthereisnonon-circularwayofarguingforthe reliabilityofone’sperceptual faculties.[55] 5.2Introspection Introspectionisthecapacitytoinspectthepresentcontentsof one’sownmind.Throughintrospection,oneknowswhatmental statesoneiscurrentlyin:whetheroneisthirsty,tired,excited,or depressed.Comparedwithperception,introspectionappearstohavea specialstatus.Itiseasytoseehowaperceptualseemingcango wrong:whatlookslikeacupofcoffeeonthetablemightbejustbea cleverhologramthat’svisuallyindistinguishablefromanactual cupofcoffee.ButcanitintrospectivelyseemtomethatIhavea headachewheninfactIdonot?Itisnoteasytoseehowitcouldbe. Thusintrospectioniswidelythoughttoenjoyaspecialkindof immunitytoerror.Butwhatdoesthisamountto? First,itcouldbearguedthat,whenitcomestointrospection,there isnodifferencebetweenappearanceandreality;therefore, introspectiveseemingsinfalliblyconstitutetheirownsuccess. Alternatively,onecouldviewintrospectionasasourceofcertainty. Heretheideaisthatanintrospectiveexperienceofp eliminatesanypossiblereasonfordoubtastowhetherpis true.Finally,onecouldattempttoexplainthespecialnessof introspectionbyexaminingthewaywerespondtofirst-personreports: typically,weattributeaspecialauthoritytosuchreports.According tothisapproach,introspectionisincorrigible:itsdeliverances cannotbecorrectedbyanyothersource. Howeverweconstruethespecialkindofimmunitytoerrorthat introspectionenjoys,suchimmunityisnotenjoyedbyperception.Some foundationalistshavethereforethoughtthatthefoundationsofour empiricalknowledgecanbefurnishedbyintrospectionofourown perceptualexperiences,ratherthanperceptionofmind-independent thingsaroundus. Isitreallytrue,however,that,comparedwithperception, introspectionisinsomewayspecial?Criticsoffoundationalismhave arguedthatintrospectionisnotinfallible.Mightonenotconfusean unpleasantitchforapain?MightInotthinkthattheshapebeforeme appearscirculartomewheninfactitappearsslightlyellipticalto me?Ifitisindeedpossibleforintrospectiontomislead,thenitis notclearinwhatsenseintrospectioncanconstituteitsownsuccess, providecertainty,orevenincorrigibility.Yetitalsoisn’t easytoseeeitherhow,ifoneclearlyanddistinctlyfeelsa throbbingheadache,onecouldbemistakenaboutthat.Introspection, then,turnsouttobeamysteriousfaculty.Ontheonehand,itdoes notseemtobeaninfalliblefaculty;ontheotherhand,itisnot easytoseehowerrorispossibleinmanyspecificcasesof introspection.[56] Thedefinitionofintrospectionasthecapacitytoknowthepresent contentsofone’sownmindleavesopenthequestionofhow similarthedifferentexercisesofthiscapacitymaybefromone another.Accordingtosomeepistemologists,whenweexercisethis capacitywithrespecttooursensations,wearedoingsomethingvery differentfromwhatwedowhenweexercisethiscapacitywithrespect toourownconsciousbeliefs,intentions,orotherrationally evaluablestatesofmind:ourexercisesofthiscapacitywithrespect toourownconscious,rationallyevaluablestatesofmindis,they claim,partlyconstitutiveofourbeinginthoseverystates. Insupportofthisclaim,theypointoutthatwesometimesaddress questionsoftheform“doyoubelievethatp?”by consideringwhetheritistruethatp,andreportingourbelief concerningpnotbyinspectingourmind,butratherbymakingupour mind(seeMoran2001andBoyle2009fordefensesofthisview;see Gertler2011forobjectionstotheview). 5.3Memory Memoryisthecapacitytoretainknowledgeacquiredinthepast.What oneremembers,though,neednotbeapastevent.Itmaybeapresent fact,suchasone’stelephonenumber,orafutureevent,suchas thedateofthenextelections.Memoryis,ofcourse,fallible.Not everyexperienceasofrememberingthatpisaninstanceof correctlyrememberingthatp.Weshoulddistinguish,therefore, betweenrememberingthatp(whichentailsthetruthof p)andseemingtorememberthatp(whichdoes notentailthetruthofp). Whatmakesmemorialseemingsasourceofjustification?Isita necessarytruththat,ifonehasamemorialseemingthatp,one hastherebyprimafaciejustificationforp?Orismemorya sourceofjustificationonlyif,ascoherentistsmightsay,onehas reasontothinkthatone’smemoryisreliable?Orismemorya sourceofjustificationonlyif,asexternalistswouldsay,itisin factreliable?Also,howcanwerespondtoskepticismaboutknowledge ofthepast?Memorialseemingsofthepastdonotguaranteethatthe pastiswhatwetakeittobe.Wethinkthatweareolderthanfive minutes,butitislogicallypossiblethattheworldspranginto existencejustfiveminutesago,completewithourdispositionsto havememorialseemingsofamoredistantpastanditemssuchas apparentfossilsthatsuggestapastgoingbackmillionsofyears.Our seemingtorememberthattheworldisolderthanamerefiveminutes doesnotentail,therefore,thatitreallyis.Why,then,shouldwe thinkthatmemoryisasourceofknowledgeaboutthe past?[57] 5.4Reason Somebeliefsare(thoughttobe)justifiedindependentlyof experience.Justificationofthatkindissaidtobea priori.Astandardwayofdefiningapriori justificationisasfollows: APrioriJustification Sisjustifiedaprioriinbelievingthatpif andonlyifS’sjustificationforbelievingthatp doesnotdependonanyexperience. Whentheyareknowledgeablyheld,beliefsjustifiedinthiswayare instancesofapriori knowledge.[58] Whatexactlycountsasexperience?Ifby“experience”we meanjustperceptualexperiences,justificationderivingfrom introspectiveormemorialexperienceswouldcountasa priori.Forexample,Icouldthenknowapriorithat I’mthirsty,orwhatIateforbreakfastthismorning.Whilethe term“apriori”issometimesusedinthisway, thestrictuseofthetermrestrictsapriorijustification tojustificationderivedsolelyfromtheuseofreason. Accordingtothisusage,theword“experiences”inthe definitionaboveincludesperceptual,introspective,andmemorial experiencesalike.Onthisnarrowerunderstanding,paragonsofwhatI canknowaprioriareconceptualtruths(suchas“All bachelorsareunmarried”),andtruthsofmathematics,geometry andlogic. Justificationandknowledgethatisnotaprioriiscalled “aposteriori”or“empirical”.For example,inthenarrowsenseof“apriori”, whetherI’mthirstyornotissomethingIknowempirically(on thebasisofintrospectiveexperiences),whereasIknowa priorithat12dividedby3is4. Severalimportantissuesariseaboutaprioriknowledge. First,doesitexistatall?Skepticsaboutaprioritydenyits existence.Theydon’tmeantosaythatwehavenoknowledgeof mathematics,geometry,logic,andconceptualtruths.Rather,whatthey claimisthatallsuchknowledgeis empirical.[59] Second,ifapriorijustificationispossible,exactlywhat doesitinvolve?Whatmakesabeliefsuchas“All bachelorsareunmarried”justified?Isitanunmediatedgraspof thetruthofthisproposition?Ordoesitconsistofgraspingthatthe propositionisnecessarilytrue?Orisitthepurely intellectualstateof“seeing”(withthe“eyeof reason”)or“intuiting”thatthispropositionis true(ornecessarilytrue)?(seeBengson2015andChudnoff2013for sophisticateddefensesofthisview).Orisit,asexternalistswould suggest,thereliabilityofthecognitiveprocessbywhichwecometo recognizethetruthofsuchaproposition? Third,ifaprioriknowledgeexists,whatisitsextent? Empiricistshavearguedthataprioriknowledgeis limitedtotherealmoftheanalytic,consistingof propositionstruesolelybyvirtueofourconcepts,andsodonot conveyanyinformationabouttheworld.Propositionsthatconvey genuineinformationaboutworldarecalledsynthetic.a prioriknowledgeofsyntheticpropositions,empiricistswould say,isnotpossible.Rationalistsdenythis.Theymight appealtoapropositionsuchas“Ifaballisgreenallover, thenitdoesn’thaveblackspots”asanexampleofa propositionthatisbothsyntheticandyetknowableapriori (seeIchikawaandJarvis2009andMalmgren2011foradiscussionof thecontentofsuchapriorijustifiedjudgments;for literatureonaprioriknowledge,seeBonJour1998,BonJour inBonJour&Devitt2005[2013];BoghossianandPeacocke2000; Casullo2003;Jenkins2008,2014;andDevitt2014). 5.5Testimony Testimonydiffersfromthesourcesweconsideredabovebecauseit isn’tdistinguishedbyhavingitsowncognitivefaculty.Rather, toacquireknowledgeofpthroughtestimonyistocometoknow thatponthebasisofsomeone’ssayingthatp. “Sayingthatp”mustbeunderstoodbroadly,as includingordinaryutterancesindailylife,postingsbybloggerson theirblogs,articlesbyjournalists,deliveryofinformationon television,radio,tapes,books,andothermedia.So,whenyouaskthe personnexttoyouwhattimeitis,andshetellsyou,andyouthereby cometoknowwhattimeitis,that’sanexampleofcomingto knowsomethingonthebasisoftestimony.Andwhenyoulearnby readingtheWashingtonPostthattheterroristattackin Sharmel-Sheikhof22July2005killedatleast88people,that,too, isanexampleofacquiringknowledgeonthebasisoftestimony. Theepistemologicalpuzzletestimonyraisesisthis:Whyistestimony asourceofknowledge?Anexternalistmightsaythattestimonyisa sourceofknowledgeif,andbecause,itcomesfromareliablesource. Buthere,evenmoresothaninthecaseofourfaculties,internalists willnotfindthatanswersatisfactory.Supposeyouhearsomeone saying“p”.Supposefurtherthatpersonisinfact utterlyreliablewithregardtothequestionofwhetherpis thecaseornot.Finally,supposeyouhavenocluewhateverastothat person’sreliability.Wouldn’titbeplausibletoconclude that,sincethatperson’sreliabilityisunknowntoyou,that person’ssaying“p”doesnotputyouina positiontoknowthatp?Butifthereliabilityofa testimonialsourceisnotsufficientformakingitasourceof knowledge,whatelseisneeded?ThomasReidsuggestedthat,byour verynature,weaccepttestimonialsourcesasreliableandtendto attributecredibilitytothemunlessweencounterspecialcontrary reasons.Butthat’smerelyastatementoftheattitudewein facttaketowardtestimony.Whatisitthatmakesthatattitude reasonable?Itcouldbearguedthat,inone’sownpersonal experienceswithtestimonialsources,onehasaccumulatedalongtrack recordthatcanbetakenasasignofreliability.However,whenwe thinkofthesheerbreadthoftheknowledgewederivefromtestimony, onewonderswhetherone’spersonalexperiencesconstitutean evidencebaserichenoughtojustifytheattributionofreliabilityto thetotalityofthetestimonialsourcesonetendstotrust(seeE. Fricker1994andM.Fricker2007formoreonthisissue).An alternativetothetrackrecordapproachwouldbetodeclareita necessarytruththattrustintestimonialsourcesisatleastprima faciejustified.Whilethisviewhasbeenprominentlydefended,it requiresanexplanationofwhatmakessuchtrustnecessarilyprima faciejustified.Suchexplanationshaveproventobe controversial.[60] 6.TheLimitsofCognitiveSuccess 6.1GeneralSkepticismandSelectiveSkepticism Muchofmodernepistemologyaimstoaddressoneoranotherkindof skepticism.Skepticismisachallengetoourpre-philosophical conceptionofourselvesascognitivelysuccessfulbeings.Such challengescomeinmanyvarieties.Onewayinwhichthesevarieties differconcernsthedifferentkindsofcognitivesuccessthatthey target:skepticismcanchallengeourclaimstoknow,orour claimstobelievejustifiably,orourclaimstohave justificationforbelieving,orourclaimstohaveany goodreasonsforbeliefwhatsoever.Butanotherwayinwhich thesevarietiesdifferisinwhethertheskepticisminquestionis fullygeneral—targetingthepossibilityofenjoyinganyinstance oftherelevantcognitivesuccess—oris selective—targetingthepossibilityofenjoyingtherelevant cognitivesuccessconcerningaparticularsubjectmatter(e.g.,the past,themindsofothers,theworldbeyondourownconsciousness)or concerningbeliefsformedbyaparticularmethod(e.g.,perception, memory,reasoning,etc.).Generalskepticismandselectiveskepticism poseverydifferentsortsofchallenges,anduseverydifferentkinds ofarguments.Generalskepticismismotivatedbyreasoningfromsome apparentlyconflictingfeaturesofthekindofcognitivesuccessin question.Forinstance,ageneralskepticmightclaimthat justificationrequiresaregressofjustifiers,butthenarguethat thisregressofjustifierscannotbecontainedinanyfinite mind—andthus,theskepticmightconclude,nofinitebeingcan bejustifiedinbelievinganything.Alternativelyageneralskeptic mightclaimthatknowledgerequirescertainty,andthatnobodycanbe certainofsomethingunlessthereisnothingofwhichshecouldbe evenmorecertain—thus,theskepticmightconclude,wecanknow virtuallynothing(seeUnger1975). Selectiveskepticism,incontrast,istypicallymotivatedbyappealto oneoranotherskepticalhypothesis.Askepticalhypothesisisa hypothesisaccordingtowhichthefactsthatyouclaimtoknow (whetherthesefactsconcernthepast,orthemindofothers,orthe mind-independentworld,orwhathaveyou)may,forallyoucantell, beradicallydifferentfromhowtheyappeartoyoutobe.Thus,a skepticalhypothesisisahypothesisthatdistinguishesbetweenthe waythingsappeartoyou,ontheonehand,andthewaytheyreally are,ontheother;andthisdistinctionisdeployedinsuchawayas toposeachallengetoyourcognitivesuccessconcerningthelatter. Herearesomefamousexamplesofskepticalhypotheses: Alltheotherhumansaroundmeareautomatawhosimplyactexactly asiftheyhavethoughtsandfeelings. Thewholeuniversewascreatednomorethan5minutesago,replete withfakememoriesandothermisleadingevidenceconcerningadistant past. I’mlyinginmybeddreamingeverythingthatI’maware ofrightnow. I’mamerebrain-in-a-vat(aBIV,forshort)being electrochemicallystimulatedtohaveallthesestatesofmindthat I’mnowhaving. Skepticscanmakeuseofsuchhypothesesinconstructingvarious argumentsthatchallengeourpre-philosophicalpictureofourselvesas cognitivelysuccessful.Consider,forinstance,theBIVhypothesis, andsomewaysinwhichthishypothesiscanbeemployedinaskeptical argument. Hereisonewayofdoingso.AccordingtotheBIVhypothesis,the experiencesyouwouldhaveasaBIVandtheexperiencesyouhaveasa normalpersonareperfectlyalike,indistinguishable,sotospeak, “fromtheinside”.Thus,althoughitappearstoyouasif youareanormallyembodiedhumanbeing,everythingwouldappear exactlythesamewaytoaBIV.Thus,thewaythingsappeartoyou cannotprovideyouwithknowledgethatyouarenotaBIV.Butifthe waythingsappeartoyoucannotprovideyouwithsuchknowledge,then nothingcangiveyousuchknowledge,andsoyoucannotknowthat you’renotaBIV.Ofcourse,youalreadyknowthismuch:ifyou areaBIV,thenyoudon’thaveanyhands.Ifyoudon’t knowthatyou’renotaBIV,thenyoudon’tknowthat you’renotinasituationinwhichyoudon’thaveany hands.Butifyoudon’tknowthatyou’renotina situationinwhichyoudon’thaveanyhands,thenyou don’tknowthatyou’renothandless.Andtonotknowthat you’renothandlessissimplytonotknowthatyouhavehands. Wecansummarizethisskepticalargumentasfollows: TheBIV-KnowledgeClosureArgument(BKCA) (C1)Idon’tknowthatI’mnota BIV. (C2)IfIdon’tknowthatI’mnot aBIV,thenIdon’tknowthatIhavehands. Therefore: (C3)Idon’tknowthatIhave hands. Aswehavejustseen,(C1)and(C2)areveryplausible premises.Itwouldseem,therefore,thatBKCAissound.Ifitis,we mustconcludewedon’tknowwehavehands.Butsurelythat conclusioncan’tberight:ifitturnsoutthatIdon’t knowthatIhavehands,thatmustbebecauseofsomethingvery peculiaraboutmycognitiverelationtotheissueofwhetherIhave hands—notbecauseofthecompletelyanodyne considerationsmentionedinBKCA.Soweareconfrontedwitha difficultchallenge:TheconclusionoftheBKCAseemsplainlyfalse, butonwhatgroundscanwereject it?[61] HerearesomeotherwaysofusingtheBIVhypothesistogeneratea skepticalargument. TheBIV-JustificationUnderdeterminationArgument (BJUA) (U1)Thewaythingsappeartomecouldbe equallywellexplainedbytheBIVhypothesisasbymyordinarybeliefs thatthingsappeartomethewaytheydobecauseIperceive mind-independentobjects. (U2)Ifthewaythingsappeartomecouldbe equallywellexplainedbyeitheroftwohypotheses,thenIamnot justifiedinbelievingoneofthosehypothesesratherthanthe other. Therefore: (U3)IamnotjustifiedinbelievingthatI perceivemind-independentobjects. TheBIV-KnowledgeDefeasibilityArgument(BKDA) (D1)IfIknowthatIhavehands,thenIknowthat anyevidenceindicatingthatIdon’thavehandsismisleading evidence. (D2)IfIknowthatsomeevidenceismisleading,then IknowthatIshoulddisregardthatevidence. Therefore: (D3)IfIknowthatIhavehands,thenIknowthatI shoulddisregardanyevidencetothecontrary. (D4)IdonotknowthatIshoulddisregardany evidencetothecontrary. Therefore: (D5)IdonotknowthatIhavehands. TheBIV-EpistemicPossibilityArgument(BEPA) (P1)It’satleastpossiblethat I’maBIV. (P2)Ifit’spossiblethatI’maBIV,then it’spossiblethatIdon’thavehands. (P3)Ifit’spossiblethatIdon’thave hands,thenIdon’tknowthatIhavehands. Therefore: (P4)Idon’tknowthatIhavehands. Obviously,thislistofskepticalargumentscouldbeextendedby varyingeither(a)theskepticalhypothesisemployed,or(b)thekind ofcognitivesuccessbeingchallenged,or(c)theepistemological principlesthatlinkthehypothesisin(a)andthechallengein(b). Someoftheresultingskepticalargumentsaremoreplausiblethan others,andsomearehistoricallymoreprominentthanothers,but thereisn’tspaceforacomprehensivesurvey.Here,wewill reviewsomeofthemoreinfluentialrepliestoBKCA,BJUA,BKDA,and BEPA. 6.2ResponsestotheClosureArgument Next,wewillexaminevariousresponsestothe BKCA argument.Accordingtothefirst,wecanseethat (C2) isfalseifwedistinguishbetweenrelevantandirrelevant alternatives.Analternativetoapropositionpisany propositionthatisincompatiblewithp.Yourhavinghandsand yourbeingaBIVarealternatives:iftheformeristrue,thelatter isfalse,andviceversa.Accordingtothethoughtthat motivatesthesecondpremiseoftheBIVargument,youknowthatyou havehandsonlyifyoucandiscriminatebetweenyouractuallyhaving handsandthealternativeofbeinga(handless)BIV.But,by hypothesis,youcan’tdiscriminatebetweenthese.That’s whyyoudon’tknowthatyouhavehands.Inresponsetosuch reasoning,arelevantalternativestheoristwouldsaythatyour inabilitytodiscriminatebetweenthesetwoisnotanobstacletoyour knowingthatyouhavehands,andthat’sbecauseyourbeingaBIV isnotarelevantalternativetoyourhavinghands. Whatwouldbearelevantalternative?This,forexample:yourarms endinginstumpsratherthanhands,oryourhavinghooksinsteadof hands,oryourhavingprosthetichands.Butthesealternatives don’tpreventyoufromknowingthatyouhavehands—not becausetheyareirrelevant,butratherbecauseyoucandiscriminate betweenthesealternativesandyourhavinghands.Therelevant alternativetheoristholds,therefore,thatyoudoknowthatyouhave hands:youknowitbecauseyoucandiscriminateitfromrelevant alternatives,likeyourhavingstumpsratherthanhands. Thus,accordingtoRelevantAlternativestheorists,youknowthatyou havehandseventhoughyoudon’tknowthatyouarenotaBIV. Therearetwochiefproblemsforthisapproach.Thefirstisthat denouncingtheBIValternativeasirrelevantisadhocunless itissupplementedwithaprincipledaccountofwhatmakesone alternativerelevantandanotherirrelevant.Thesecondisthat premise2ishighlyplausible.Todenyitistoallowthatthe followingconjunctioncanbetrue: AbominableConjunction IknowthatIhavehandsbutIdonotknowthatIamnota(handless) BIV. Manyepistemologistswouldagreethatthisconjunctionisindeed abominablebecauseitblatantlyviolatesthebasicandextremely plausibleintuitionthatyoucan’tknowyouhavehandswithout knowingthatyouarenota BIV.[62] Next,letusconsideraresponsetoBKCAaccordingtowhichit’s notthesecondbutthefirstpremisethatmustberejected.G.E. Moorehaspointedoutthatanargumentsucceedsonlytotheextent thatitspremisesaremoreplausiblethantheconclusion.Soifwe encounteranargumentwhoseconclusionwefindmuchmoreimplausible thanthedenialofthepremises,thenwecanturntheargumentonits head.Accordingtothisapproach,wecanrespondtotheBIVargument asfollows: CounterBIV (~C3)IknowthatIhavehands. (C2)IfIdon’tknowthatI’mnotaBIV,thenI don’tknowthatIhavehands. Therefore: (~C1)IknowthatIamnotaBIV. Unlessweareskepticsoropponentsofclosure,wewouldhaveto concedethatthisargumentissound.Itisvalid,anditspremisesare true.YetfewphilosopherswouldagreethatCounterBIVamountstoa satisfyingresponsetotheBIVargument.Itfailstoexplain howonecanknowthatoneisnotaBIV.Theobservationthat thepremisesoftheBIVargumentarelessplausiblethanthedenialof itsconclusiondoesn’thelpusunderstandhowsuchknowledgeis possible.That’swhytheMooreanresponse,unsupplementedwith anaccountofhowonecanknowthatoneisnotaBIV,iswidely thoughttobeanunsuccessfulrebuttalof BKCA.[63] WehavelookedattworesponsestoBKCA.Therelevantalternatives responseimplausiblydeniesthesecondpremise.TheMooreanresponse deniesthefirstpremisewithoutexplaininghowwecouldpossiblyhave theknowledgethatthefirstpremiseclaimswedon’thave. Anotherprominentresponse,contextualism,avoidsbothofthese objections.Accordingtothecontextualist,theprecisecontribution thattheverb“toknow”makestothetruth-conditionsof thesentencesinwhichitoccursvariesfromonecontexttoanother: incontextsinwhichtheBIVhypothesisisunderdiscussion,anagent countsas“knowing”afactonlyifshecansatisfysome extremelyhigh(typicallyunachievable)epistemicfeat,andthisis why(1)istrue.ButincontextsinwhichtheBIVhypothesisisnot underdiscussion,anagentcancountas“knowing”afact evenifherepistemicpositionvis-à-visthatfactismuchmore modest,andthisiswhy(3),takeninisolation,appearsfalse. Thecontextualistliteraturehasgrownvastlyoverthepasttwo decades:differentcontextualistshavedifferentaccountsofhow featuresofcontextaffectthemeaningofsomeoccurrenceoftheverb “toknow”,andeachproposalhasencounteredspecific challengesconcerningthesemanticmechanismsthatitposits,andthe extenttowhichitexplainsthewholerangeoffactsaboutwhich epistemicclaimsareplausibleunderwhich conditions.[64] 6.3ResponsestotheUnderdeterminationArgument BoththecontextualistandtheMooreanresponsesto BKCA, asdiscussedintheprevioussection,leaveoutoneimportantdetail. Bothsaythatonecanknowthatoneisn’taBIV(though contextualistsgrantthispointonlyforthesenseof “know”operationalinlow-standardscontexts),butneither viewexplainshowonecanknowsuchathing.If,by hypothesis,aBIVhasallthesamestatesofmindthatI have—includingallthesameperceptualexperiences—then howcanIbejustifiedinbelievingthatI’mnotaBIV?AndifI can’tbejustifiedinbelievingthatI’mnotaBIV,then howcanIknowthatI’mnot? Ofcourse,thequestionabouthowIcanbejustifiedinbelievingthat I’mnotaBIVisnotespeciallyhardforexternaliststoanswer. Fromthepointofviewofanexternalist,thefactthatyouandthe BIVhavetheverysamestatesofmindneednotbeatallrelevantto theissueofwhetheryou’rejustifiedinbelievingthat you’renotaBIV,sincesuchjustificationisn’tfully determinedbythosementalstatesanyway. Thephilosopherswhohavehadtodoconsiderableworktoanswerthe questionhowIcanbejustifiedinbelievingthatI’mnotaBIV havetypicallydonethisworknotdirectlyinreplytoBKCA,but ratherinreplytoBJUA. Whatmightjustifyyourbeliefthatyou’renotaBIV?According tosomephilosophers,youarejustifiedinbelievingthatyou’re notaBIVbecause,forinstance,youknowperfectlywellthatcurrent technologydoesn’tenableanyonetocreateaBIV.Theproponent oftheBIVhypothesismightregardthisanswerasnobetterthanthe MooreanresponsetoBKCA:ifyouareallowedtoappealto(whatyou regardasyour)knowledgeofcurrenttechnologytojustifyyourbelief thatyou’renotaBIV,thenwhycan’ttheMooreanequally wellrelyonhisknowledgethathehashandstojustifyhisbelief thathe’snotaBIV?Philosopherswhoacceptthisobjection,but whodon’twanttogroundyourjustificationforbelievingthat you’renotaBIVinpurelyexternalisticfactors,mayinstead claimthatyourbeliefisjustifiedbythefactthatyourownbeliefs abouttheexternalworldprovideabetterexplanationofyoursense experiencesthandoestheBIVhypothesis(seeRussell1912andVogel 1990forinfluentialdefensesofthisargumentagainstskepticism,and seeNeta2004forarebuttal). 6.4ResponsestotheDefeasibilityArgument Themostinfluentialreplyto BKDA istosaythat,whenIacquireevidencethatIdon’thave hands,suchevidencemakesmeceasetoknowthatIhavehands.Onthis view,whenIacquiresuchevidence,theargumentaboveissound.But priortomyacquiringsuchevidence,(4)isfalse,andsotheargument aboveisnotsound.Thus,thetruthof(4),andconsequentlythe soundnessofthisargument,dependsonwhetherornotIhaveevidence thatIdon’thavehands.IfIdohavesuchevidence,thenthe argumentissound,butofcourseithasnogeneralskeptical implications:allitshowsthatIcan’tknowsomefactwhenever Ihaveevidencethatthefactdoesn’tobtain(versionsofthis viewaredefendedbyHarman1973andGinet1980). Plausibleasthisreplyhasseemedtomostphilosophers,ithasbeen effectivelychallengedbyLasonen-Aarnio(2014b).Herargumentis this:presumably,it’spossibletohavemorethan enoughevidencetoknowsomefact.Butifit’spossibleto havemorethanenoughevidencetoknowsomefact,itfollowsthatone mightstillknowthatfactevenifoneacquiressomeslightevidence againstit.Andyet,itwouldbewrongtoleaveone’sconfidence entirelyunaffectedbytheslightevidencethatoneacquiresagainst thatfact:thoughtheevidencemightbetooslighttodestroy one’sknowledge,itcannotbetooslighttodiminishone’s confidenceevenslightly.Solongasonecouldcontinuetoknowafact whilerationallydiminishingone’sconfidenceinitinresponse tonewevidence,themostpopularreplytothedefeasibilityargument fails. Otherrepliestothedefeasibilityargumentincludethedenialof premise (2),[65] thedenialof(4)(McDowell1982,Kern2006[2017]),andtheclaim thatthecontext-sensitivityof“knows”meansthat(4)is trueonlyrelativetocontextsinwhichthepossibilityoffuture defeatersisrelevant(seeNeta2002).Butneitherofthesereplies hasyetreceivedwidespreadassent. 6.5ResponsestotheEpistemicPossibilityArgument Themostcommonreplyto BEPA iseithertodenypremise(1),ortodenythatwearejustifiedin believingthatpremise(1)istrue.Mostwriterswoulddenypremise (1),andwoulddosoonwhatevergroundstheyhaveforthinkingthatI canknowthatI’mnotaBIV:knowingthatsomethingisnotthe caseexcludesthatthing’sbeingepistemicallypossiblefor you.[66] Butacoupleofinfluentialwriters—mostnotablyRogers AlbrittonandThompsonClarke(seeAlbritton2011andClarke 1972)—donotclaimthatpremise(1)isfalse.Rather,theydeny thatwearejustifiedinbelievingthatpremise(1)istrue.According tothesewriters,whatnormallyjustifiesusinbelievingthat somethingorotherisepistemicallypossibleisthatwecanconceive ofdiscoveringthatitistrue.Forinstance,whatjustifies meinbelieving,say,thatit’spossiblethatDonaldTrumphas resignedisthatIcanclearlyconceiveofdiscoveringthat DonaldTrumphasresigned.ButifIattempttoconceiveofdiscovering thatI’maBIV,it’snotclearthatIcansucceedinthis attempt.ImayconceiveofcominguponsomeevidencethatI’ma BIV—but,insofarasthisevidencetellsinfavorofthe hypothesisthatI’maBIV,doesn’titalsoundermineits owncredibility?Insuchacase,isthereanythingatallthatwould countas“myevidence”?(seeNetaforthcomingforan elaborationofthispoint).Withoutbeingabletoanswerthisquestion intheaffirmative,it’snotclearthatIcanconceiveof anythingthatwouldamounttodiscoveringthatI’maBIV.Of course,fromthefactthatIcannotconceiveofanythingthatwould amounttodiscoveringthatI’maBIV,itdoesn’tfollow thatI’mnotaBIV—andsoitdoesn’tevenfollow thatit’snotpossiblethatI’maBIV.But,whetherornot itispossiblethatI’maBIV,Ican’tbe justifiedinthinkingthatitis.Andthat’stosaythatI can’tbejustifiedinacceptingpremise(1)ofBEPA. 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